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This dissertation examines the ways in which indigenous peoples and missionaries, specifically Quakers
(Society of Friends), contributed to the development of the American empire in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The U.S. civilization plan, in which Friends were central participants, offered
agricultural education to American Indian men and, for women, instruction in the “domestic arts” as part
of a broader mission complex. Far from being simply a means to “assimilate the Indians,” the mission
complex was central to U.S. imperial and economic development, and its methods, endurance, and
character grew out of a particular historical moment and as the result of a negotiation of Indians’ and
Euroamericans’ goals and motivations. In order to investigate that negotiation, “Cultivating Empire”
follows the evolution of diplomacy and agricultural mission work in the Ohio Country as a case study, and
it draws upon individuals’ journals, family papers, account books and receipts, as well as missionary
correspondences, meeting minutes from the Society of Friends, and various papers of federal, state, and
territorial governments. Reading Euroamerican-produced sources against the grain in conjunction with
sources such as Hendrick Aupaumut’s (Mohican) invaluable journals, moreover, offers means to bring
indigenous politics to bear on this history, and it offers a top-down and bottom-up glimpse of the making
of American empire. Such work reveals that the Society of Friends and its members, and their cooperation
with the U.S. federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for the United States’ model of
“philanthropic” empire beginning in the late eighteenth century. It also demonstrates that the society’s
work was foundational for the development of the federal government’s relationship with nongovernmental organizations and imperial policies abroad. Quaker diplomacy and agricultural missions
also, however, offered Native peoples a powerful discourse and innovative means to continue to negotiate
for power into the twenty-first century. U.S. state officials, Quaker missionaries, Euroamerican immigrants,
and indigenous peoples together, then, produced the paradigms of U.S. empire in North America and the
world in ways that had lasting consequences.
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ABSTRACT
CULTIVATING EMPIRE: INDIANS, QUAKERS, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, 1754-1846
Lori J. Daggar
Daniel K. Richter

This dissertation examines the ways in which indigenous peoples and
missionaries, specifically Quakers (Society of Friends), contributed to the development of
the American empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The U.S. civilization
plan, in which Friends were central participants, offered agricultural education to
American Indian men and, for women, instruction in the “domestic arts” as part of a
broader mission complex. Far from being simply a means to “assimilate the Indians,” the
mission complex was central to U.S. imperial and economic development, and its
methods, endurance, and character grew out of a particular historical moment and as the
result of a negotiation of Indians’ and Euroamericans’ goals and motivations. In order to
investigate that negotiation, “Cultivating Empire” follows the evolution of diplomacy and
agricultural mission work in the Ohio Country as a case study, and it draws upon
individuals’ journals, family papers, account books and receipts, as well as missionary
correspondences, meeting minutes from the Society of Friends, and various papers of
federal, state, and territorial governments. Reading Euroamerican-produced sources
against the grain in conjunction with sources such as Hendrick Aupaumut’s (Mohican)
invaluable journals, moreover, offers means to bring indigenous politics to bear on this
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history, and it offers a top-down and bottom-up glimpse of the making of American
empire. Such work reveals that the Society of Friends and its members, and their
cooperation with the U.S. federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for
the United States’ model of “philanthropic” empire beginning in the late eighteenth
century. It also demonstrates that the society’s work was foundational for the
development of the federal government’s relationship with non-governmental
organizations and imperial policies abroad. Quaker diplomacy and agricultural missions
also, however, offered Native peoples a powerful discourse and innovative means to
continue to negotiate for power into the twenty-first century. U.S. state officials, Quaker
missionaries, Euroamerican immigrants, and indigenous peoples together, then, produced
the paradigms of U.S. empire in North America and the world in ways that had lasting
consequences.
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In 1831, a young French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, traversed the Atlantic
to visit the United States. He traveled widely, taking in all that he could, and in 1835, he
published the first volume of a revealing portrait of the republic in its adolescence. In his
famous Democracy in America, Tocqueville devoted hundreds of pages to descriptions of
American political structures, economics, and reform efforts, as well as to the plights of
African Americans and American Indians. With regards to the latter, the Frenchman
explained that “[t]he Spaniards, despite acts of unparalleled monstrousness that left them
indelibly covered with shame, were unable to exterminate the Indian race or even prevent
the Indians from sharing their rights. The Americans of the United States achieved both
results with marvelous ease, quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed,
without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world.
To destroy human beings with greater respect for the laws of humanity would be
impossible.”1
Tocqueville’s assessment of U.S. Indian affairs implicitly acknowledged a
fundamental truth: Americans, like imperial Spaniards, exacted violence over North
American indigenous peoples. According to the Frenchman, however, Americans did so
“philanthropically.” Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Americans set out to
“civilize,” through agricultural education, American Indians who, due to their supposed
“savage” and “barbaric” state, “misused” North America’s bountiful lands. Tocqueville
insisted that the civilizing process made way for the rapid proliferation of American
1

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (New York:
Penguin Putnam, Inc., 2004), 391.
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democracy, and that it was a humane alternative to the depravity that characterized
Spanish imperial policies. For him, the United States’ method for dealing with its “Indian
problem,” though harsh, nonetheless offered a means to avoid the “indelible shame”
attributed to the Spaniards’ brutality.
Many Americans, particularly missionaries, did not consider efforts to “civilize”
Native peoples to be quite so vicious. They instead viewed such policies to be the most
enlightened way to tackle a problem of immense proportions. Peaceful diplomacy and
then axes, ploughs, and fences, they argued, were the best defenses against indigenous
peoples’ “extinction.” U.S. officials and settlers too gave voice to these ideas, though
they added their own motivations and reasoning to their arguments. Civilizing policies
could save an entire race, but they could also facilitate nation-building and territorial
acquisition, as well as create new consumers and debtors. Though Americans’ goals and
motivations differed, most saw philanthropy—if not philanthropic violence—as central to
their national project. Ultimately, however, as Tocqueville’s statement suggests, acts and
rhetoric of philanthropy offered means by which to obscure the cultural, economic, and
political carnage of American settler colonialism and imperialism, and they were
fundamental to the making and endurance of American empire.

***
“Cultivating Empire” seeks to understand the roots, contingencies, and
consequences of U.S. empire-building in North America. Before the United States
became a global imperial power, it was a continental empire. Americans used Native
lands to develop their own economy, exported social and cultural ideals, and framed their
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political ascendency in North America in dialogue with Indians’ political and economic
dependence and decline—decline that was often fictional. And they did so with
missionary assistance and in ways that obscured the mechanisms and processes of their
imperialism. Agricultural mission work, part of the federal government’s civilization
plan, was one such mechanism. Ideas of “savagery” and Native peoples’ supposed misuse
of abundant lands—as well as Americans’ land hunger—prompted George Washington’s
Secretary of War Henry Knox to conceive of a plan to civilize the Indians in 1789. His
plan, and the federal government’s eventual partnership with missionary societies,
became the cornerstone of U.S. Indian policies in the nineteenth and into the twentieth
century. The plan’s longevity was not, however, preordained. The primary goal of the
plan was to educate American Indians in the ways of agriculture for males and “domestic
arts” such as spinning and weaving for females in order to make way for American
territorial acquisition. The plan’s methods, endurance, and character, however, grew out
of a particular historical moment and as a result of a negotiation of goals and motivations.
Despite the civilization plan’s goal to assimilate Native peoples and thus eradicate
their culture, indigenous peoples of North America did not succumb to the fates assigned
them by Tocqueville and Euroamericans more generally; they did not fall to extinction,
and they did not disappear. Rather, they influenced the character of U.S. Indian policies
and of American imperialism. Indeed, the emergence of the civilization plan itself was, in
part, due to Native peoples’ persistence. After years of violence during both the periods
of European and American colonization, the struggling American republic, equipped with
a still-small state apparatus, needed an Indian policy that cut the financial and human
costs of war. Knox developed his understanding of Indian affairs in the context of
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conflict, and he, like others, understood the practicalities involved in attempting to
colonize a vast array of still-powerful peoples. Endemic violence in the eighteenth
century and armies of united Indians in the 1790s thwarted American dreams of
conquering North America quickly and efficiently. Those Native peoples who avoided
war—but nonetheless maintained their own politics and ways of living—offered the
United States equal amounts of frustration. Knox thus conceived of his plan to civilize
Native peoples in 1789 in the midst of Native-produced obstruction. Recognition of that
fact forces us to consider the limits of U.S. state power and the ways in which that power
grew together with the breadth of indigenous authority in eastern North America during
the era of the early republic.
Agricultural education was, on paper, at the heart of the civilization plan, with
other goals including the spread of Christianity and, sometimes, literacy. Central to the
plan were missionaries—members of the Moravian church, Presbyterians, Methodists,
and, most often in the early years of the nineteenth century, Quakers. Indeed, thanks to
their own expertise and interest in Indian affairs, Knox found an able partner in the
Society of Friends (Quakers), and Friends’ relationship with the federal government
proved long-lasting. The clerks of Friends’ Indian concerns committees were the War
Department’s frequent correspondents beginning in the late eighteenth century, and
Friends offered diplomatic support and performed the work of establishing and
maintaining agricultural missions in both New York State among the Haudenosaunee
peoples and in the Ohio Country, among the Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares, Wyandots,
and their neighbors. Friends divided their labors into two distinct jurisdictions:
Philadelphia Friends missionized in Haudenosaunee Country, while Baltimore Friends
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worked among the various Ohio Indians. The Society of Friends’ political structure
facilitated its partnership with the U.S. War Department, and it likewise lent organization
to the society’s philanthropic efforts in Indian Country. The society was organized in a
series of hierarchical “meetings,” with yearly meetings serving as the umbrella
organization for smaller, more local monthly meetings. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting
corresponded with the Baltimore Yearly Meeting regularly after the latter’s establishment
in 1795, and both corresponded with the London Yearly Meeting on the topic of
civilizing Native peoples.
The Society of Friends and its members, and their cooperation with the U.S.
Federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for the United States’ model
of “philanthropic” “destruction” beginning in the late eighteenth century. Friends
performed diplomatic work alongside U.S. officials, and they received public lands and
funds for their missions. Friends corresponded with federal and state officials, shared
information about local Indian politics, and offered their labor in mission spaces. In
return, they received financial support as well as explicit endorsements, often from the
secretary of war or the president, that facilitated both traveling to mission sites and
striking partnerships with regional Indian agents. After years of working with Friends, the
U.S. government institutionalized its partnership with missionary societies in 1819 with
the passage of the Civilization Act, which guaranteed $10,000 annually for missionary
endeavors in Indian Country. Another prominent missionary society, the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, followed the
Quaker model of agricultural education, and they continued, like the Friends, to work at
home and abroad into the twentieth century.
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Analyzing the formation of the partnership between the U.S. government and the
Society of Friends is foundational for understanding the United States’ humanitarian
work in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Framing the partnership in this way
encourages scholars to abandon the tendency to treat Friends’ mission efforts in
isolation.2 Indeed, the case of the Society of Friends offers a means to explore the early
foundations of federal relationships with what would later be termed non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), as well as the roles of NGOs in imperial development. While the
term may appear, at first blush, an anachronism, members of the Society of Friends were
non-government individuals who were, nonetheless, quasi-state actors, and they
performed work similar to that of later and present-day NGOs—many of which, like the
Friends, received government funds. The Society of Friends brought to its agricultural
mission work ideas regarding civility, religion, race, gender, class, and education. Friends
also, however, compromised their own religious tenets—namely, distancing oneself from
the affairs of worldly governments—to take advantage of the benefits that federal support
offered—money, intelligence, and personnel support. The personnel, financial, and
political ties that grew between Friends and the U.S. government in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century established a paradigm for Indian policies, and they proved

2

The movement toward cultural and social histories in the 1970s and 1980s enabled historians to
view missions—correctly—as sites of cultural negotiation. That rich scholarship offers a jumping
off point for a renewed look at Friends—and missionaries more broadly—and Native Americans’
connections with broader political and economic developments. For studies of Friends’ missions,
see Jill Kinney, "'Letters, Pen, and Tilling the Field': Quaker Schools Among the Seneca Indians
on the Allegany River, 1798-1852" (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2009); Diane
Rothenberg, "Friends Like These: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of the Interaction Between
Allegany Senecas and Quakers, 1798-1823" (Ph.D. diss., City College of New York, 1976).
Matthew Dennis’s Seneca Possessed begins the work of connecting Quaker missions to broader
political phenomena. Matthew Dennis, Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the
Early American Republic (Philadelphia, 2010).
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crucial both to the political and economic growth of the American imperial state and to
the cultivation of a U.S. reputation of moral authority.3
That reputation was often grounded in ideas of humanitarianism, mercy, and
charity, and, as work by Ian Tyrrell demonstrates, it remained a central concern of the
United States in the world into the twentieth century and, indeed, to present day.4 Moral
authority was a means by which to claim political authority on the international stage,
and that linkage between morality and political power reached back, as Tocqueville
makes clear, to the days when the “Black Legend” soured the Spanish Empire’s
reputation. Nonetheless, the emergence of Friends’ partnership with the federal
government reveals that a seemingly simple question remains: why did the particular way
in which Americans endeavored to spread “civilization”—agricultural education carried
out by a combination of missionary, Native, and U.S. state agents—gain such purchase in
the United States in the first place?
As the following pages make clear, notions of “civilizing” Native peoples were
grounded in differing opinions and motivations, practicalities, and contingencies, and the

3

Friends’ work in Indian Country differed little from other ventures, described as NGO efforts, in
other locales. In a 2002 study funded by the United States Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Africa, for example, the authors write that “[t]he involvement of NGOs in education
can be traced from the end of the 19th Century when missionaries introduced formal education in
the country. The main aim of schooling was to spread Christianity but apart form [sic] teaching
the bible the schools which were opened also offered lessons such as reading, writing, counting,
carpentry, brick laying and needlecraft.” The authors note that government funding for such
efforts grew as the twentieth century progressed. See Esme Chipo Kadzamira and Demis Kunje,
“The Changing Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations in Education in Malawi,” (Zomba,
Malawi: Centre for Educational Research and Training, University of Malawi, 2002), IV-V. Julie
Hearn offers a starting point for understanding twentieth and twenty-first-century missionary
organizations as “invisible” NGOs. See Julie Hearn, “The ‘Invisible’ NGO: US Evangelical
Missions in Kenya,” Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 32, Fasc. 1 Christian and Islamic NonGovernmental Organizations in Contemporary Africa (Feb., 2002), 32-60.
4
Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2010).
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actual policies of civilization, Indian affairs, and empire-building more generally were
marked by negotiation. Scholars Francis Paul Prucha, Bernard Sheehan, and Reginald
Horsman point to ideas of Christian humanitarianism and race as the primary factors in
determining U.S. Indian policies, but such interpretations omit other defining
developments that marked the early republican period.5 Both ideas of Christian
humanitarianism and race played key roles in creating Indian policies, but both were also
tools employed by the U.S. state and its citizens to meet a certain end, namely, to build a
powerful empire that stretched to—and beyond—the Pacific. Some Americans firmly
believed that civilization and even Indian removal were humanitarian policies, others
cared less about ideas of humanity and more about the growth of U.S. power in North
America and the world. All, however, grappled with ideas regarding moral authority—
indeed, even the self-interested employed a discourse of humanity—and all were
complicit in processes of settler colonialism and empire-building. The question of how
such a discourse developed to become a viable defense of some of the harshest of U.S.
Indian policies—including removal—is an important one.
So too are questions regarding the consequences of that discourse’s development.
At the heart of the civilization plan was Americans’ need to build their republic, both
politically and economically. Indeed, U.S. Indian policies were inseparable from larger
efforts of state-building, and they were, as a result, influenced by those efforts. Costly

5

Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American
Indians, 2 vols. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Reginald Horsman, Race and
Manifest Destiny: Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981); Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and
the American Indian (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Institute of Early American History and
Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia by The University of North Carolina Press, 1973).
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war with Britain in the American Revolution combined with the struggle to build a
system of taxation that most Americans could accept. Episodes such as Shays’s Rebellion
made clear that the taxation issue was not an easy one to reconcile for many Americans,
and subsequently economic issues were on the forefront of citizens’ minds.
Unsurprisingly, Indian policies such as the civilization plan and removal were bound up
in the context of state formation and economic development.
Indeed, one of the central claims of “Cultivating Empire” is that agricultural
mission work ultimately contributed to the development of the U.S. market economy and
the entrenchment of ideas that both accompanied and facilitated the growth of market
capitalism. Missionaries’ labors were part of a mission complex, a web of networks that
linked urban manufacturers and their wares—the axes, hoes, and ploughs required for
farming—with Indian consumers, interior lands, and growing markets. Missions required
goods that, in turn, bolstered American manufacturing and consumerism, often at the
expense of Native peoples’ once more global economic ties with a variety of polities.
Ideas of poverty, morality, and charity, meanwhile, also played a large role in defining
Indian policies, and they were bolstered by the complex’s development. As historian
Michael Katz argues, the connection between virtue and success accompanied the
“transition to capitalism” in the early republic.6 Drawing connections between these
ideas, cultivated, in part, in the republic’s urban spaces enables us to link Indian policies
and Native peoples’ histories more fully with the social, economic, and political history
of the early republic.

6

Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 14.
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Early Americans themselves understood the situations of Native Americans,
African Americans, and laboring peoples as connected and in dialogue with one another.
Missionaries compared the civilization plan as akin to the colonization plan that
endeavored to send free African Americans to Liberia, while Baltimore Friends perceived
Ohio Indians, and explicitly wrote about them, in ways that drew upon their experiences
living among the enslaved and wage laborers of the city. Agricultural mission work
among Native peoples, then, was bound up in the ideas and developments of the republic
at large.
Approaching the problem of the development of U.S. Indian policy in such a
wide-reaching way enables us to wed the histories of U.S.-Indian relations with the
broader narratives of early American history. Too often, analyses of U.S. Indian policy—
and, indeed, Native Americans’ histories in general—remain divorced from the larger
story. But framing Indian policy against the backdrop of state formation and market
development offers a means by which we can better understand the contingencies of
policy development as well as the way in which Native peoples, their politics, and U.S.
Indian affairs influenced the development of early American economics, politics, and
social hierarchies, analysis that is rarely undertaken by scholars of the early republic.7

7

Indeed, though scholars increasingly understand slavery as fundamental to the development of
the early American economy, most histories neglect the ways in which peoples and policies in
Indian Country affected the development of the U.S. market economy in the early republic. For
classic understandings of economic development, see Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution:
Jacksonian America, 1815-1848 (Oxford, 1991); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought:
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford, 2009); James A. Henretta, The Origins of
American Capitalism, Collected Essays (Boston, 1991); Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural
Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca, 1992). For recent work on slavery and
capitalism, see Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton
Kingdom (Cambridge, 2013); Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the
Making of American Capitalism (New York, 2014); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global

11
Market development, in many ways, gave Indian policies their character, as did the goals
and motivations of Native peoples, missionaries, settlers, and U.S. officials. But efforts in
Indian Country also profoundly influenced the development of the United States.
Missionaries’ agricultural work, diplomacy, and influence offered a blueprint for the
development of U.S. foreign relations in places like Hawaii, Alaska, and Liberia.8 The
emphasis on agricultural production and the consumption of American manufactures in
Indian Country, meanwhile, expanded the U.S. market economy and further encouraged
the intertwined development of both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the
American economy—an intertwining that men like Tench Coxe and Thomas Jefferson
debated in the years of the early republic.9 Such economic growth contributed to the
growth of the federal state and the American empire.
History (New York: Knopf, 2014). For calls to include Native peoples in broader economic
histories, see Stephen Aron, "The Significance of the Frontier in the Transition to Capitalism," in
Christopher Clark, ed., "The Transition to Capitalism in America: A Panel Discussion," The
History Teacher, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May, 1994), 263-288; Alexandra Harmon, Colleen O'Neill, and
Paul C. Rosier, "Interwoven Economic Histories: American Indians in a Capitalist America," The
Journal of American History, (December 2011), 698-722.
8
Ideas of agricultural education and civilization were centerpieces of missions abroad in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well. Like Friends, missionaries abroad also brought to their
work their own ideas regarding the role of governments. Merze Tate notes antagonisms between
missionaries and government officials and that members of the Sandwich Island Missions (the
ABCFM in Hawaii) exercised a good deal of influence over policy in Hawaii. They
communicated with government officials regarding officers and officials and policies in Hawaii,
and acted as a kind of “watchdog” group in the islands. Merze Tate, “U.S. Diplomacy: Influence
of Sandwich Island Missionaries and the ABCFM,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 1
(Mar., 1967), 53-74; Nicholas E. Flanders, "Missionaries and Professional Infidels: Religion and
Government in Western Alaska," Arctic Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1991), 44-62; Emily
Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic
(The United States in the World) (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2015).
9
Coxe was an ardent supporter of an economy that married manufacturing and farming interests.
Jefferson, on the other hand, envisioned a thoroughly agrarian republic. [Coxe, Tench],
Observations on the Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce of the United States (New York,
Childs & Swaine, 1789); Jacob E. Cooke, "Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the
Encouragement of American Manufactures," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol.
32, no. 3 (July 1975), 369-392; Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill,
University of North Carolina Press, 1978). Jefferson offered his clearest articulation of his
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Understanding Friends’ partnership with the federal government as fundamental
to the growth of American empire also adds to a growing historiographical corrective. Ian
Tyrrell’s work, like many works by scholars of empire and American foreign relations,
suggests that the United States built its moral empire at the end of the nineteenth century.
A burgeoning literature, including works on North American settler colonialism,
demonstrates, however, that such a timeline obscures the United States’ imperial
beginnings.10 Bethel Saler’s study on settler colonialism in Wisconsin Territory, for
example, suggests that families, missionaries, and even ground-level U.S. officials were
complicit in the haphazard development of the republic’s territories.11 By examining the
important role of the state in such processes, “Cultivating Empire” ultimately suggests
instead that it was often on the edges of empire where the federal state strove to exercise
the most power. Thus not only does Friends’ relationship with the federal government
reveal that Americans’ territorial and “moral empire” emerged in the late eighteenth
century, but it also demonstrates that the federal state employed various agents—both
state and non-state—in an effort to carry out its policies. This endeavor had mixed
results, thanks to actors’ own motivations and goals, but nonetheless, Quakers’

agrarian idealism in Notes on a State of Virginia. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on a State of
Virginia in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings: Autobiography/Notes on the
State of Virginia/Public and Private Papers/Addresses/Letters (Library of America) (New York:
Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1984), 123-325. See also Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language
of American Nationhood (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000).
10
Recent works seek to remedy this oversight. See Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism;
Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a
New World Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Walter Johnson, River of
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2013); Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley,
1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
11
Bethel Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old
Northwest (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

13
partnership with the U.S. government offers a compelling means to analyze how and why
missionaries and cultural imperialism more broadly became vital components of the
American empire, and it forces us to understand Americans’ empire as one built upon
foundations of both settler colonialism and federal state power and initiative.12 Indeed,
the American empire that occupies a central place in these pages was not an all-powerful
behemoth but rather one built upon reciprocal relations of power.13 It was also one built
upon popular narrative fictions of humanitarianism and indigenous “dependence.”14 This
perspective on power and discourse facilitates a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottomup” exploration of the ways in which U.S. officials, missionaries, Euroamerican settlers,
and Native Americans each played a role in the making of American empire.
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***
Bernard Sheehan wrote in 1973 that “[b]ooks about Indian-white relations are
usually confined to the description of the white man’s policy and Indian’s reaction.”15
And, indeed, beginning in the 1970s, historian Francis Paul Prucha penned an extensive
corpus of literature devoted to the development of Indian policies in the United States,
and his work stood then, as it does now, as the quintessential interpretation of U.S.-Indian
policy relations. His studies emphasized Americans’ paternalism and Christian
humanitarianism, and volumes such as The Great Father offer much in the way of
detailed accounts of various policies’ strengths and weaknesses.16 Largely absent from
Prucha’s analyses were Native peoples’ own politics. Much, however, has changed in the
literatures of American Indian history and of early America since Prucha completed his
volumes. While notions of paternalism, emphasized by Prucha, are important for
understanding some early Americans’ motivations, they are insufficient for understanding
Indian policy’s connection with the larger history of the early United States, and a simple
acceptance of those ideas obscures both their creation and the many inherent
contradictions that accompanied Americans’ discourse of humanitarianism. While Prucha
15
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focused his interpretations on Americans’ ideas of humanitarianism in an effort to
approach the past on its own terms, in doing so, he overlooked some of the more
insidious consequences and designs at work, namely state formation, market expansion,
and imperial rivalries. Analyzing the rhetoric of paternalism “on its own terms” serves to
mask important underlying agendas, and it encourages scholars to render U.S.-Indian
relations a somewhat separate, unique thread of American history.
With the “New Indian History” that grew during the 1980s, scholars such as Ned
Blackhawk, Brian DeLay, James Merrell, and Daniel K. Richter reveal in clear terms,
however, that Native peoples’ histories are fundamental to any history of early North
America.17 What is more, scholars such as Stephen Warren and Joshua Piker have offered
histories of individual indigenous peoples and towns that have not only forced scholars to
rethink the geopolitics of North America but have encouraged many to find ways to tell
stories on both the macro- and micro- levels.18 These works should encourage historians
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to approach policy history in a similar manner, to combine the “top-down” approach
adopted by Prucha with the “bottom-up” approaches showcased in works by Piker and
others. The resulting approach, a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-up” history,
guides what follows, and rather than offer a wholesale rejection of Prucha, it combines
his analysis with the lessons gleaned from the New Indian History. It aims to interrogate
the ways in which Native peoples’ politics also affected U.S. policy, market and imperial
development, and it contributes to our understanding of the history of Native peoples’
“survivance” in North America.19
Indeed, a set of interrelated queries drive this history. How was the American
empire made? How did Native Americans’ various motivations influence its growth?
Why did U.S. Indian policies take on the forms they did? How did Americans—and,
indeed, Tocqueville and many of the world’s citizens—come to understand the
“civilization plan” as “humane”? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the
devastating removal of thousands of American Indians from eastern North America, why
do such questions and histories matter? The answers are not, of course, simple.
Nonetheless, an exploration of the emergence of the U.S. civilization plan and its
endurance, offers a means by which to investigate these questions.
The Ohio Country, in particular—and thus Ohio Indians and Baltimore Friends’
work among them—offers a compelling case study. Though scholars define the
geographic bounds of the region differently, “Cultivating Empire” focuses on the lands
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and peoples that make up present-day Ohio and Indiana. Baltimore Friends established
their agricultural missions within the bounds of these modern-day states, at Wapakoneta
and Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) in Ohio and at Dennis’s Station (near present-day
Huntington) in Indiana. It was in the Ohio Country that the federal government
established its blueprint for colonization with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That
document established the procedure for U.S. territorial acquisition and for the translation
of “territories” into “states” and “settlers” into citizens who possessed the equal rights of
their counterparts in other states. The region allows us to see how American imperialism
facilitated the economic rise of one of the early United States’ most rapidly developing
regions.
What becomes quickly apparent in an examination of civilizing efforts in the Ohio
Country, however, is that any history of mission work in this relatively small region
requires an examination of more far-flung locales. Colonial Pennsylvania, early republic
Baltimore, and even western New York, Detroit, Missouri, and the Mexican Republic
factor into the story of American empire in the Ohio Country. Indeed, traveling Quakers,
U.S. officials, settlers, and Indians created linkages between discrete locales, and they
force scholars to understand regional histories in a wider context. Moreover, recent
scholarship pays excellent attention to the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, but too often
those treatments are confined to the continent, overlooking broader context and
connections and encouraging a division between Atlantic and continental histories. This
is particularly true, with important exceptions, for the historiography of Ohio and Indiana
during the era of the early republic. Part of the aim of “Cultivating Empire” is to
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encourage further connections between continental and Atlantic historiographical
paradigms.20
“Cultivating Empire,” then, frames Friends’ agricultural mission work in the
contested Ohio Country as a case study, and it demonstrates that missions and
"civilizing” policies were not simply tools for “assimilating the Indians," but rather were
hinges for economic and political development. It shows that the United States’ civilizing
efforts offered Native peoples a discourse and means to negotiate for power even as those
same efforts bolstered Americans’ claims to moral authority on the international stage.
The first chapter sketches the eighteenth-century history of Quaker-Native relations. Its
central focus rests on Friends' and Delaware Indians' diplomatic partnership during the
years of the Seven Years War (1754-1763)—a war fought in large part over Ohio
Country lands—and the ways in which this partnership proved formative for U.S.-Indian
relations. It reveals that though Friends were once deemed "meddling nuisances" by the
colonial Pennsylvania government, they ultimately became invaluable partners of the
U.S. government after the American Revolution.
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Chapter two continues to examine how missionaries' and Native Americans'
diplomatic efforts laid the foundation for U.S. imperial politics and policies. Here, in an
examination of 1790s diplomacy, I draw upon the scholarship of U.S. foreign relations to
argue that Native nations conducted themselves as—and were in reality—sovereign
nations with their own diplomatic and political ambitions during the earliest years of the
republic. Indians' politics forced U.S. state officials to bring missionary men to the
dinners, official treaties, and pipe-smoking affairs that characterized the spaces within
which the United States conducted some of its earliest diplomacy with foreign nations in
North America. As a result of Native political authority and the international politics of
intercultural diplomacy, then, missionaries labored as extensions and representatives of
the U.S. government in Indian Country.
I connect Baltimore Friends' educational reform work among the free and
enslaved laboring poor in Baltimore with their agricultural instruction among Ohio
Indians in chapter three. Such analysis reveals that Friends' visions of and efforts in the
"west" were informed by their experiences in the east. It argues that Quakers took
advantage of the young republic's small state apparatus to garner official support for their
work among Native peoples, but that emerging U.S. social ideals nonetheless shaped
Friends' efforts in both Baltimore and Indian Country. This chapter also reveals the ways
in which Quakers offered the Ohio Country's Indian nations direct intellectual links to the
emerging discourses of race and class of the early American republic. Rather than offer
"civilization" according to Euroamerican standards, then, these missionary linkages
served to educate Native communities in the ways of American imperialism such that
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Native peoples continued to take advantage of Euroamerican politics and policies into the
nineteenth century.
Chapter four tells the story of how the "mission complex" expanded the influence
and power of the United States in the Ohio Country and beyond. The mission complex
linked missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal employees, and indigenous
peoples through networks of markets and capital: the material goods used in the
agricultural missions offered a means both to stimulate business for eastern (and
developing western) manufacturers and develop a new consumer base in the Ohio
Country. Attention to the functioning of this system, based upon hierarchical relations of
power, reveals how the early U.S. Empire thrived off of economic growth. It also
demonstrates that imperial state policy, as well as a myriad of Native and non-Native
actors, facilitated the development and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor
in the early republic, and that such developments linked Native peoples ever closer to the
U.S. market economy through the War of 1812 and beyond.
The fifth chapter demonstrates that Native peoples in the Ohio Country
manipulated Americans' own economic and social ideals for their own purposes in efforts
to assert the authority of their nations beyond the War of 1812. They drew upon the
paradigm of missionaries' labor and contracted Euroamerican wage laborers to perform
the same physical work formerly undertaken by missionary men on their lands by the
1820s and 1830s. They blended many of their own economic ideals with the
understandings of both poverty and "poor Indians" brought to them through missionary
rhetoric, and they used their increasingly uncertain political and economic status to make
claims upon the U.S. state for material aid. By doing so, however, they aided in the
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development of the U.S. economy and its social relations in Indian Country, the United
States, and beyond, and they contributed to the growth of the early American state.
The final chapter, "'Of Mercy and of sound policy too': Indian Removal and the
Cultivation of American Empire" contends that, as a result of Indians’ persistence, ideas
of poverty, dependence, civilization, and humanitarianism intertwined to facilitate the
ongoing development of a discourse of exclusion that increasingly characterized
American imperialism during the nineteenth century. These exclusionary politics
combined, however, with U.S. government officials' desire to present the United States as
a humanitarian state on the world stage, and some U.S. officials and their missionary
partners wove ideas of poverty, the "deserving poor," and mercy into their statements
regarding Indian removal. With Great Britain's abolition of slavery and the United States'
ongoing dependence upon slave labor, Indian affairs, and missionaries' connection with
policies, thus became a means by which some cast the United States as a benevolent
power. Race, then, was not always the central factor in shaping Euroamerican-indigenous
relations; rather, ideas of race, class, and nation together created a discourse of inclusion
and exclusion that, in turn, shaped the politics of Indian removal, benevolence, reform
and empire in the early republic and on the world stage.

***
In 1817, Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney, a Quaker,
prophesied that the indigenous peoples of North American would, “at no very distant
day,” “constitute a portion of ‘our great American family of freemen’” thanks to the
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ongoing efforts of missionaries. His sentiments are reminiscent of episodes labeled by
21

literary scholar David Kazanjian as being part of the United States’ “colonizing trick.”22
By relegating American Indians to a future citizenship premised on their eventual
civilization, Americans cultivated a homogenous and inherently equal citizenry by
masking the inequalities that accompanied their developing political economy. Through
policies of “philanthropic” violence—civilizing efforts as well as schemes such as
African colonization and Indian removal—Americans worked to realize—and display for
others—the nation’s adherence to its founding tenets of freedom and equality. By
pointing to their missionary partners and framing their efforts as philanthropic, however,
Americans obscured their empire-building efforts. Missionaries’ agricultural mission
work in Indian Country masked the process of transforming Indians lands into a
marketable commodity, and it concealed the fact that agricultural education implicitly
relegated Native peoples to the lowest ranks of the republic’s developing social
hierarchy. Missionaries’ partnership with the federal government likewise facilitated the
erosion of Americans’ recognition of Native peoples’ sovereign authority by providing
“evidence” of Natives’ “dependence” on American aid, and it attempted to mask the
violence of removal by offering a means to frame it in humanitarian terms.
By continuing to assert political, economic, and cultural autonomy, however,
Native peoples exposed the contradictions inherent to Americans’ project and forced the
United States to adapt its policies to Indians’ persistence. Miamis, Shawnees, and their
neighbors in the Ohio Country ultimately seized the benefits of civilizing schemes—
21
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missionary labor, infrastructure, and a political discourse that enabled them to make
claims upon the U.S. state—and ensured that U.S. policies would continue to be
negotiated throughout the nineteenth and into the twenty-first century. Missionaries’
work, and Indian policies more broadly, offered Americans a means to cultivate new
lands, as well as a nation and an empire, but North American indigenous peoples
ultimately played an immense role in developing that empire’s character by forcing
Americans to adapt their policies and ideas to Native peoples’ own politics of
endurance.23
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Chapter 1
"The Most Extraordinary Procedure": Friends and Delawares in Penn's Woods

In 1757, Pennsylvania's governor William Denny confronted Philadelphia's
Quakers. The Earl of Halifax, Denny wrote, offered "very strong Expressions of
Dissatisfaction" regarding "a Treaty held with the Indians at Philadelphia by the People
called Quakers, which his Lordship was pleas’d to think the most extraordinary
procedure he had ever seen in Persons who are on the same footing only with all others of
the King’s private Subjects, to presume to treat with Foreign Princes."24 Such frustrations
were understandable. It was the height of the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania, and
members of the Quakers' Friendly Association for the Preservation of Peace with the
Indians by Pacific Measures had, one-year earlier, forced the issue of the controversial
1737 Walking Purchase to the forefront of official conversation at the Treaty of Easton.
Discussion of the suspect land deal was a political nuisance that Denny had hoped to
avoid. After a series of private meetings with the Friends at Easton, however, the
Delaware leader Teedyuscung approached the governor and his secretary to officially
request that “Friends might have liberty to examine into their complaints” regarding the
late purchase.25 Denny ultimately conceded and, in doing so, strengthened Friends'
relations with Native peoples and, in turn, their ability to influence Indian affairs in
eastern North America.
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When the Earl of Halifax framed Friends' treaty work as "the most extraordinary
procedure" adopted by "the King's private Subjects," he condemned private citizens'
participation in official diplomatic affairs. Friends, however, paid no heed. They
participated in the 1758 Treaty of Easton, they continued to offer gifts at meetings,
councils, and treaties with the region's Indian peoples (gifts that the colony's officials
gladly accepted), and they maintained their connections with leaders like Teedyuscung.
Friends' efforts during the Seven Years War, though they stirred controversy during the
1750s and 1760s, also contributed to a narrative of Quaker-Indian friendship that was
foundational for their ongoing diplomatic and reform work among the continent's Native
peoples throughout the subsequent centuries. That narrative proved central to the
cultivation of Friends' partnership with the United States War Department in North
America.
The Friendly Association's efforts in Pennsylvania built upon the revered history
of William Penn's first meeting with Native peoples in 1682. They were also the
consequence, however, of Friends' and Delawares' political agendas. During the 1750s,
Pennsylvania Quakers faced political competition in the colonial assembly as well as
internal strife within the Society of Friends. At the same time, Delawares confronted the
consequences of migrations and land competition. They witnessed European peoples
invade their home of Lenapehoking, and they watched as some of their countrymen left
their lands for new homes in the Ohio Country. Friends and Delawares, then, each
confronted political crises. Those Delawares still in "Penn's Woods" saw peace with
Pennsylvania as crucial to their futures on their lands, and Friends hoped to scavenge for
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as much political capital as possible while also upholding their faith's commitment to
peace.
Though some scholars interpret the eighteenth century as a period when the
Society of Friends turned inward, individual Quakers' work in Indian affairs suggests that
some Friends found ways to resist that turn.26 That Israel Pemberton, Anthony Benezet,
and others willingly pursued a political connection with Pennsylvania and the Indians by
forming the Friendly Association, suggests that various Friends envisioned different
futures for their society and for themselves. Already during the 1750s, some Friends saw
that philanthropic benevolence offered a means to engage with the world, to cultivate a
positive image of their society, and to garner political capital within their community.
Friends' relationship with the Delawares during the years of the Seven Years War—as
well as their continued philanthropy after that conflict—reveals, then, that the Quakers
were a varied lot, and that they held myriad political opinions and motivations. Those
opinions and motivations, however, also proved to be pivotal for Friends' ability to gain a
political foothold during and after the American Revolution and throughout the following
centuries.

***
When the Delaware Teedyuscung sought alliance with Quaker Israel Pemberton
and other members of the Friendly Association in 1756, he did so in large part because
his people shared a history of friendship with Philadelphia's Quakers—a friendship
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rooted in both action and memory. Friends and Delawares laid the groundwork for their
enduring friendship in the late seventeenth century when William Penn, newly arrived in
North America, met with leaders of the Delaware Nation beneath an elm tree on the
banks of the Delaware River. Or, rather, they laid the groundwork by remembering (and
romanticizing) that fabled gathering later.27 Indeed, during the height of war, the Friendly
Association's clerk recorded a meeting between the Friends and various Native leaders
wherein William Penn, then dead, figured prominently. The men gathered reportedly
enjoyed a meal and discussed their conjoined pasts. They together spoke of the “happy
state of the first settlers” of Pennsylvania and bemoaned “the unhappy Rupture” which
had, of late, disrupted their lives and threatened Euroamericans and Native peoples'
already tenuous coexistence.28 They lamented that some Delawares and their allies,
mostly hailing from lands in the western Ohio County, attacked Pennsylvania
settlements, and they likewise lamented that Euroamerican settlers and governments
slighted the region's Native peoples during several land negotiations. The men gathered at
the table, however, determined to restore peace. As they continued to speak of William
Penn’s first treaty of peace with the Indians, Conrad Weiser, provincial interpreter,
reportedly noticed a calm overtake the agitated Native discussants. Weiser informed the
men that he had not “heard [the Indians] express themselves with so much openness” and
urged the Quakers there assembled to call “together as many of our ancient Men of the
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Survivors of the first settlers as we could collect and to give the Indians another
Meeting.”29 Penn and other first generation Pennsylvanians would play a pivotal role,
along with the "ancient Men" of the Delawares, in restoring peace to “Penn’s Woods.”
Those "ancient Men" who crossed the Atlantic in the late seventeenth century
were among the earliest of the Quakers. The Society of Friends organized in the midst of
England's violent mid-seventeenth-century turmoil. Many Friends identified with
Parliamentarians during the English Civil War as a result of both their aversion to the
Anglican Church and their place among the ranks of England's middling and non-elite
populations.30 By the time of the Restoration of Charles II to the throne in 1660, however,
many officials and English Protestants considered the Friends with contempt. Quakers
failed to recognize social distinctions and, more broadly, England's socio-economic
hierarchy, they believed in the spiritual equality of the sexes and a de-emphasis of the
Bible, and they opposed oath-taking and military service and action. Such beliefs meant
that the Friends were, increasingly, aberrations in English society. Though the Society of
Friends eventually became a quietist, inward-looking faith, during the mid-seventeenth
century Quakers openly protested the war, the Anglican Church, and England's prevailing
social order. Many English subjects consequently deemed them radical.
Under Charles II, Friends encountered particularly vehement opposition. The
Quaker Act passed Parliament in 1662 and required all English subjects to swear an oath
of loyalty to the king—an act that violated Quaker doctrine. The Conventicle Act of
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1664, meanwhile, forbade meetings for unauthorized worship—anything that was not
Anglican worship—if there were more than five persons present. These harsh realities
offered Friends' ample reason to journey across the Atlantic, though, even in North
America, Friends encountered others' scorn. The Puritans, in particular, discriminated
against the Quakers in Massachusetts. Perhaps most infamously, Puritan colonists hanged
Puritan-turned-Quaker Mary Dyer in 1660 after she repeatedly refused to leave the
colony. Quakers' belief in social and gender equality directly contradicted the firm
hierarchy of the Puritan's city upon a hill.31 Quaker William Penn's 1681 acquisition of
land, then, offered many Friends a means to live unmolested in North America.
Quakers' peace testimony, conceived of by George Fox during the years of
English civil war, required peaceful relations with the continent's indigenous peoples.
Even at Pennsylvania's founding, then, the Quakers' political motivations—the peaceful
acquisition of land for their own colony—required the recognition of Indians' rights to
their lands. As a result, William Penn, unlike many of his fellow English proprietors,
initiated a policy of paying the region's Native peoples for their lands. It was in this
context that William Penn famously treated with Delawares beneath a tree on the banks
of the Delaware River.32
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While Friends' pacifism and Penn's desire for land required that they establish
close working relations with the Delawares, the Quakers' faith and recognition of others'
spiritual potential pushed them to respect Native peoples as well as recognize the many
shared cultural similarities with their Delaware neighbors. Indeed, both George Fox, the
founder of Quakerism, and William Penn penned positive accounts of their time among
the Delawares, and their writings figured prominently in the development of Friends'
attitudes regarding Native peoples in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fox noted
in his journal, for example, that the Indians "received mee very loveingly," and he
emphasized their willingness to embrace his religious teachings.33 Penn likewise
explained that "[i]f an European comes to see them, or calls for Lodging at their House or
Wigwam they have him the best place and first cut. If they come to visit us, they salute us
with an Itah which is as much as to say, Good be to you."34 Both Fox and Penn penned
such accounts consciously, but their willingness to frame Delawares as polite people who
possessed the equivalent of their own greeting, "good be to you," reflects the influence of
their belief in the Inner Light and their recognition of their shared qualities. Indeed, the
Inward Light, an internal spiritual presence that rendered everyone—without exception—
capable of receiving God's grace, encouraged Friends like Fox and Penn to view Native
peoples in their own image. Fox noted in his journal, for example, that he was asked,
upon a visit to an Indian village, to prove that Indians possessed the spirit of Christ. In
order to make his case, he simply asked one individual whether he knew when he
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committed wrong. When the man replied in the affirmative, Fox used the response as
evidence of the Inward Light.35
Fox's beliefs and observations influenced eighteenth-century Friends. Anthony
Benezet quoted Jonathan Carter in his Some Observations on the Situation, Disposition,
and Character of the Indian Natives of this Continent, in order to make the point that
Indians were "not without some sense of Religion, such as proves that they worship the
great Creator."36 Friends did, of course, note differences, but compared to many of their
other English religious counterparts, they were particularly receptive to Native peoples'
cultures and mannerisms. The wide availability of Fox and Penn's writings likewise
encouraged eighteenth-century Quakers to contemplate and adopt their forbears' views.
Those views rendered Friends willing to embrace Native peoples’ potential for reform—a
trait that would prove foundational for their later reform work.
Quakerism itself encouraged individuals like Penn, Fox, and Benezet to consider
working with and among Delawares, but Friends and Delawares also shared a number of
practices that rendered each intelligible to the other. Like Friends, Delaware women were
central participants in the rituals of their people. Early twentieth-century anthropologist
M.R. Harrington noted that not only were girls "taught the manifold duties and arts of the
household, how to tan hides, and to plant and cultivate the garden," but they also
"received instruction in the tradition and rituals of religion."37 On the twelfth night of the
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Gamwing, an annual celebration that took place just after harvest, one early twentiethcentury Delaware informed another observer that that night "is the time that our women
and any other person who feels competent among our young people take part and help. If
his mind is made up, anyone truly is permitted to 'Sing-the-Fires-out.'"38 Delaware
women, moreover—like many Algonquian women—enjoyed political power. Not only
could they speak during the Gamwing, but Delawares traced their lineages through the
maternal line, and they afforded women prominent roles in matters of peacemaking.39
Although Delaware women enjoyed, arguably, greater political power and mobility, the
Society of Friends too considered women to be the spiritual equals of men, and they
permitted them to share their thoughts in meeting when moved to do so.
Similarly, George Fox, believing that God moved individuals to speak, embraced
one Delaware man's contention that he received a vision from the Great Spirit. The
Delaware in question reportedly explained that if his people "did hurt or wrong the white
people, they would be destroyed. And this hath been seen and fulfilled, that when they
did wrong the English they never prospered and have been destroyed."40 After listening
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to the man, Fox came to the conclusion that "that Indian was a prophet and prophesized
truly."41 William Penn likewise offered appreciation for Delawares' religion when he
explained that they believe "in God and Immortality without the help of Metaphysics."42
All of this suggests that Friends viewed Delaware spirituality in the context of their own.
Not only did this provide Fox and Penn with the satisfaction of knowing that their
religious tenets were grounded in "truth"—if evidence demonstrated that Native peoples
possessed the capacity for religion, then surely the Inner Light was, in fact, real—but it
also suggests that Friends and Delawares recognized their similarities and that this
recognition, in turn, facilitated their partnership during the eighteenth century.

***
The Seven Years War in North America put Friends and Delawares' relationship
to the test. The British and French empires long antagonized one another, and by midcentury, the fertile Ohio Country lands were particularly divisive in North America. Both
France and Britain claimed the lands as theirs, and neither power paused to consider
Native peoples' own claims, save for when such claims bolstered their own. The valley
was valuable. The Ohio River flowed out of western Pennsylvania and offered a pathway
to the heart of the continent and the Mississippi River, though Euroamericans found parts
of the river to be initially impassable. To hold claim to the region was to gain a foothold
to the rich continental interior and to the thriving port of New Orleans. By mid-century,
British officials contested French efforts to build new forts in the region, and Native
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peoples grew increasingly frustrated. Lieutenant Colonel George Washington attempted
to push the French out of the region, but he failed. As episodes such as the 1754 Battle of
Jumonville Glen and the well-known history of Washington’s Fort Necessity suggests,
Ohio River politics stood at the center of the conflict between French and British at midcentury.43
The string of early eighteenth-century wars for empire in North America
presented Pennsylvania's Quaker leadership with the problems inherent in being pacifist
leaders in an empire at war. The Friends avoided crippling political controversy by
appropriating funds rather than men in arms, though as historian Hermann Wellenreuther
makes clear, Friends’ peace testimony in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did
not necessarily preclude them from ensuring against any dangers to government.
Nonetheless, Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York, who took charge of
Pennsylvania after the Crown suspected William Penn of treason in 1692, informed the
Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania colonial assembly that their funds would “not be dipt in
blood.” Friends agreed to the proposition and allocated funds that were, according to
Fletcher, used for budget items such as salaries. Though Wellenreuther interprets
Fletcher’s statement as a political one meant to assuage the fears of Friends, the episode
offers a glimpse of the ways in which the Society of Friends avoided destructive political
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conflict. By working to ensure that their own Indian affairs remained peaceful, moreover,
Pennsylvania’s Quakers worked to keep wars distant.44
This changed when the governor of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, declared war on
the Delawares in 1756. Many of the colony's inhabitants cheered the declaration: they
blamed the Delawares for recent attacks on their lands and families. Indeed, the Seven
Years War in North America pitted French against English, but Native peoples were
largely responsible for its start. Delawares fought alongside French and British but they
also did so as individual groups, each with its own political agenda. The "French and
Indian War" was, more accurately, a contest for power among many polities. Even more
confusing for colonial Pennsylvanians were political and geographic divisions among
Delawares. “Eastern” Delawares still lived in Pennsylvania and remained neutral or sued
for peace. "Western" Delawares—those who migrated to the Ohio Country to escape
European colonization and find peace—fought to protect their adopted lands against the
incursions of Anglo-American families that pushed toward and beyond the Appalachian
Mountains. In many Pennsylvania colonists’ minds, however, Delawares were
Delawares, Indians were Indians, and all of them were violent.45
The escalation of violence in western colonial Pennsylvania exacerbated the
problem of Friends' pacifism. Members of the Proprietary party pressured their Quaker
colleagues in the colonial assembly to vote for defense of the colony. Proprietary party
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members saw the violence as a political opportunity to discredit and disempower their
Quaker party rivals—many of whom, but not all, were members of the Society of
Friends. William Smith, a Proprietary party member and vocal supporter of the current
colonial proprietor Thomas Penn, circulated pamphlets questioning Quakers' ability to
lead in a time of war, and he urged that a loyalty oath be required of all assemblymen.46
As a result of party antagonisms and the threat of losing political power, Friends in the
assembly split into two factions. Defense Quakers remained in the assembly and voted to
allocate funds for the defense of the colony, while stricter pacifist Friends abdicated their
seats.
The peace testimony conflict was not new but amplified. William Penn himself
had had to find ways to balance his pacifist principles with his duties as the governor of
Pennsylvania to protect the king's subjects.47 After the turmoil of the mid-to-late
seventeenth century in England, many of the Friends advocated for removal from the
world, and they adopted a more quietist modus operandi. To hold political power in
colonial Pennsylvania as a Quaker, then, was already to engage with the world; to agree
to support war, as the Defense Quakers did, was to threaten the very meaning of what it
meant to be a member of the Society of Friends by the mid-eighteenth century.
Unsurprisingly, the public division between Friends in the assembly coincided with the
Philadelphia Monthly Meeting's call for simplicity and avoidance of "pernicious Books

46
47

Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 227-232.
Wellenreuther, “The Political Dilemma of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, 145.

48

37

and the Corrupt Conversation of the World." Pennsylvania's crisis was also a crisis
within the Philadelphia Meeting.
It was in this context that Israel Pemberton, Jr., a Quaker merchant and
councilman who abdicated his seat in the assembly, and several others called on
Governor Morris "to reconsider the proposed declaration of war, and to institute a rigid
inquiry, as to 'whether some apprehensions these Indians have conceived, of a deviation
from the integrity of conduct towards them, so conspicuous in the first establishment,'
may not have assisted, to alienate their affections."49 Pemberton, Anthony Benezet, and
interpreter Conrad Weiser then met with Delaware leaders and urged them "to lay down
the hatchet."50 The Friends demonstrated "willingness to meet them, at some place
mutually agreed upon, in friendly conference."51 They believed that "some further
attempts may be made by pacific Measures to reduce them to a Sense of their Duty, and
that a farther opportunity may be offered to such as may be willing to separate from those
who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them."52 As Friends' language
suggests, they, in essence, waged war against Pennsylvania's violent measures; they
pitted peace against war in a battle to determine which would guarantee political stability.
The Friends' language also reveals both their political motivations and their
internalization of earlier Friends' accounts of the region's Indians. On the one hand, they
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endeavored "to reduce [the Indians] to a Sense of their Duty"—rhetoric that appealed to
their former colonial constituents, and on the other, they blamed Delawares' violence on
"those who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them"—language that
recalled both Fox and Penn's claims that Native peoples were once polite and religious.
The careful balance of language suggests that Friends hoped their political exile from the
assembly was temporary. Peace, they hoped, would not only afford the colony security,
but its triumph would restore the Quakers' political mandate. That Friends' words were
recorded in the minutes of the Provincial Council is further suggestive of their hope to
win back the hearts and minds of their fellow colonists.
It was at this same meeting that Conrad Weiser, the colony's interpreter,
suggested that Pennsylvania round up its "ancient Men" and "give the Indians another
Meeting." Weiser, the proprietors' employee, likely envisioned such a meeting to take
place between the colonial government and the Delawares. He likely knew that Friends
would be present, but also probably hoped that they would accept their place as subjects
of the government. For Friends, however, the prospect of another meeting was far more
meaningful. Theorist Yael Zerubavel argues that groups perform "memory rituals" in
order to revive, reaffirm, and modify collective memories in an effort to reemphasize the
"master narrative" of their identity.53 While Friends acted for political, self-interested
purposes, the prospect of reviving their own political power—and that of the Quakers
writ large—likely made the re-performance of the earlier, romanticized meeting between
Penn and the Indians attractive. By remembering and recreating a past in which they
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possessed ample political power, they hoped to remind others' of their history of
leadership.
The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting dampened the effect, however, by declaring
"any interference with 'public affairs' to be beyond its jurisdiction."54 Instead of
abandoning the peace effort, however, Pemberton and his companions established the
Friendly Association. It was the first of Friends' voluntary associations, and it offered a
means to engage with the political world in a way that complemented the Society of
Friends' commitment to peace. It also, however, offered Friends a means to pursue their
own agendas as individuals separate from the larger body of the yearly meeting. It meant
that Friends could engage with political life, accumulate "moral capital," and, in turn,
maintain their position of leadership within their community.55 For men like Israel
Pemberton, a prosperous merchant from a prominent Quaker family, it was ideal. The
Friendly Association wove together ideals of benevolence, pacifism, and political action
in a way that spoke to mid-eighteenth-century Friends' political needs and aspirations.
The association's example proved enduring.
The Friendly Association boasted a large membership drawn from the mostrespected (and prosperous) families of Philadelphia Friends.56 The association declared
that it was "determined to improve every future opportunity of manifesting some Regard"
with the Indians after "seriously considering the fatal Consequences of losing that Interest
and Friendship our Predecessors had obtain'd by their upright dealing and Hospitable
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Treatment of the Indians in the first Settlement." The mission statement was thus
twofold: the association endeavored to exact peace in the colony, but it also sought to
revert back to what was, to the Friends’ minds, a glorious past. The intervening decades
between Penn and the Seven Years War saw a slow decline in both Quakers' proportional
population in the colony and their political power. Those changes, they implicitly argued,
produced the "fatal Consequences" of war.
The association raised funds for the purchase of presents distributed during
conferences with Native leaders and their peoples. Members also attended numerous
councils and treaties in 1756 with the most significant being the Treaty of Easton. Friends
attended the meeting in an unofficial capacity that frustrated the colonial government's
efforts to unilaterally deal with the Delawares. Given that many of the Friendly
Association's members included those who abdicated their legislative seats, their
presence was controversial. They endeavored to steer politics by circumventing the
colony's official political process. Some Delawares, undoubtedly aware of the Quakerproprietary political divide (indeed, they were using it to their advantage), were left
"inquisitive about the Governor's coming" to Easton at all.58 According to one Quaker
chronicler, however, Delawares were "told he was on the road and would be here soon."
Still doubtful, the Delawares ultimately concluded that if "Israel Pemberton said so, they
would believe it."59
Delawares' uncertainty and alliance with the Friendly Association was chronicled
later by Samuel Parrish, a descendent of the prosperous Parrish family—a family whose
57
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own John Parrish played a pivotal role, as will be seen in chapter two, in Indian affairs
during the 1790s. Parrish's account is, of course, biased. Writing in 1877, however,
Parrish's narrative describes the pivotal role played by the Friendly Association in
crafting Friends' internal narrative of their own work in Indian affairs. That narrative both
endured and transformed as it was passed down through subsequent generations of
Friends, and it was foundational to their involvement in Indian affairs throughout the
subsequent centuries.60 Despite the bias of time and association, Samuel Parrish's account
of Friends' efforts at the Treaty of Easton is supported by contemporary documentation,
though much of that documentation varies.61 What is certain, however, is that Friends
played a pivotal role both at the treaty and behind the scenes.
The Delaware Teedyuscung, in particular, embraced the Friends' willingness to
pursue peace. He professed that he was glad that they were "willing to renew the old,
good understanding, and that you call to mind the first treaties of friendship made by
Onas, our great friend....We take hold of these treaties with both our hands, and desire
you will do the same, that a true friendship may be re-established."62 Like Friends, the
Delaware leader employed the past for political purposes. He reminded Pennsylvanians
that their forbears declared friendship—not merely through words but through treaty.
Instead of invoking the power of wampum or oral agreement, as would have been custom
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among his people, Teedyuscung consciously appealed to the Europeans' strategy of using
paper when crafting peace and alliances, and he likely did so in order to place his
argument for peace in their own political context. He established Pennsylvanians as the
hypocritical violators of their own political tools. The Delaware concluded his speech by
informing Friends that "what you said to us we took to heart, and we speak to you from
our heart, and we will deal honestly with you in every respect."63
Teedyuscung was simultaneously perfect and horribly suited for the role of
negotiator. Born around 1700 in Delaware lands near present-day Trenton, New Jersey,
he was accustomed to dealing with Euroamericans. He wore European-style clothing, and
his people were well-acquainted with European trade goods and modes of conduct. He
was a "go-between"—a man who was at the same time in both and neither the worlds of
the Delawares and the Europeans. His ability to render himself intelligible to both
Delawares and Euroamericans in Pennsylvania proved valuable, and he proved a pivotal
ally of the Philadelphia Friends' Indian affairs work.64
Teedysucung met with the Friendly Association during a series of private
meetings at Easton, and he asked the Friends to "examine into [Delawares'] complaints"
regarding the controversial 1737 Walking Purchase.65 The purchase concerned a large
tract of land north of Philadelphia near the Forks of the Delaware in the Lehigh River
Valley, and it ultimately became emblematic of colonials' desire for cheap land.
Pennsylvania officials claimed that William Penn purchased lands that were bounded by

63

Ibid; this text is also contained in Parrish, 14.
Anthony F. C. Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763 (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1949). Teedyuscung also and less usefully, however, had extensive familiarity
with European alcohol as well.
65
Parrish, Some chapters, 39.
64

43
the distance of a day and a half walk. Penn’s sons, Thomas and John then produced a
deed in order to claim that Pennsylvania had already paid for the lands but that the walk
was never performed.66 Some Delaware leaders reluctantly allowed Pennsylvania to
measure the lands in 1737. John and Thomas Penn and land speculator James Logan,
however, hired a team of skilled runners to complete the "walk" on a prepared trail. By
doing so, the colonial government measured out a tract much larger than Delawares had
originally intended to sell—roughly 1,200 square miles. The purchase remained a foul
memory for Delawares during the Seven Years War, and Teedyuscung endeavored to
bring it up during the treaty in order to gain political leverage. After the conclusion of the
1756 treaty, Pemberton followed through on Teedyuscung's request. He formally asked
proprietary secretary Richard Peters for permission to examine the Minutes of the
Governor and Council in order to evaluate the Delawares' claim of fraud. Peters denied
his request.67
Proprietary government officials considered the Friendly Association's work
during the 1756 treaty to be a nuisance, but the aftermath of the Walking Purchase
incident reveals that their annoyance became open disdain. Indeed, in 1757, Pennsylvania
Governor William Denny informed the Earl of Halifax of Friends' interventions.
According to Denny, the Earl considered the Friends' actions to be "the most
extraordinary procedure he had ever seen," but Friends were undeterred. Indeed, Israel
Pemberton informed Mennonites just one year later that "[t]he Encouragement we daily

66

Francis Jennings asserts the “deed” in question was a copy and that “no such original had ever
been finally executed.” Francis Jennings, “The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn’s Sons:
Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of MidAtlantic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January, 1970), 19-39, quotation 30.
67
Colonial Records, VII, 394, 397-398.

44
receive...is alone worth all our Labour & Expense, but we likewise have the Satisfaction
of finding our Proceedings are well approv'd of by the King & Great Men in
England...which will not be agreeable to those who have oppos'd us."68 In this letter,
Pemberton crafted a narrative that both ignored official disdain for their work and framed
their efforts as politically viable. His invocation of the "King & Great Men in England"
suggests that he hoped to frame the Friends' work as beneficial to the colony and empire.
Such a narrative either would prove useful to build coalitions if the Friends regained
political power after the war, or it would facilitate the maintenance of their unofficial
diplomatic work. Either way, it was a narrative with political purpose.
Members of the Friendly Association also captured their political message in coin.
In 1757, they distributed the first peace medal coined in the British colonies. It was a
tradition that the United States, most famously President Thomas Jefferson, continued
throughout the nineteenth century. The Friendly Association's medal depicted a Quaker
seated across from an Indian, likely Delaware, male (see figure 1.1 below). A council fire
burned between the two, and the Quaker held out a peace pipe—both symbols of peaceful
negotiation. While the medal was not meant to depict William Penn's first treaty with the
Delawares literally, certain elements were borrowed from the tale of the "first
establishment." The elm beneath which Penn reportedly treated with the Indians in 1682
was diplomatic sacred space, and the men on the coin invoked that romantic past. The
tree was symbolic, but the placement of the Quaker beneath its branches was also
significant. The Quaker ventured into the woods to treat with the Indian; he was a guest
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on Native ground. When William Penn arrived on the shores of the Delaware, the
members of the Friendly Association recalled that he too was a guest: "when [the
Indians'] Numbers were great and their strength vastly superior, they received our
Ancestors with gladness, relieved their wants with open Hears, granted them peaceable
possession of the Land, and for along Course of Time, gave constant and frequent Proofs
of a cordial Friendship."69 The peace medal thus harkened back to a rosier past, but it also
suggested a way forward. It asserted that alliance between Euroamericans and Native
peoples was crucial, and the placement of the Indian in the sun and the Quaker in the
woods, suggested that Native peoples could prove to be an aid to European success on the
continent. This was, then, but one vision of North America's political future.
Figure 1.1

This medal depicts a Quaker
holding a peace pipe at a council
fire. These medals were
distributed to Native peoples by
members of the Friendly
Association as a token of their
goodwill, as a reminder of the
peaceful past, and as a statement
of their political agenda.
Peace Medal (from the Friendly
Association for Regaining and
Preserving Peace with the
Indians), 1757. Silver. Library
Company of Philadelphia.

The peace medal was also indicative of the Friendly Association's support for
Teedyuscung. In 1757, Teedyuscung continued to craft his political power, even as the
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proprietary government endeavored to take advantage of his political weaknesses. When
the Earl of Halifax, through Governor Denny's pen, argued that the Friends endeavored to
treat with "Foreign Princes," he conceptualized—for primarily political reasons—Native
polities as sovereign political entities whose leaders were similar to those in Europe. The
earl’s assertion that Native leaders were “foreign princes” was likely not a widely-held
viewpoint in Britain, but it reveals both that notions of Native sovereignty had political
currency in the British Empire and that Friends’ aid was so unwanted that the earl was
willing to present Native peoples as sovereign polities in order to discourage Quakers’
efforts. Teedyuscung's authority in Pennsylvania was also derived, in part, from colonial
government officials' desire to seek out individual Native "chiefs"—whether truly leaders
or not—as partners during treaty negotiations. In doing so, they sought to undermine
localized tribal authority. Treating with a leader representing a hierarchical indigenous
polity was far simpler than negotiating with what were, in actuality, many clan and
village leaders.
As a consequence of partnership with Friends and the colony's attempt to simplify
negotiations with the Delawares, Teedyuscung spoke on behalf of eastern and western
Delawares at a council held in 1757 between members of the Pennsylvania government
and leaders of the western Indian nations (including western Delawares). Positioning
himself as leader of a coalition of all gathered nations, Teedyuscung implored the
gathered Indians, "I take you, my Grand Children, by the Hand; I take your young Men
by the Hand; I take the Hatchet out of all your Hands, and lay it upon the Ground, and
observe you to do so."70 Teedyuscung invoked the authority of the Delaware Nation by
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referring to those gathered as his "Grand Children" in the tradition of fictive kinship. He
used his peoples' authority as "grandfathers" to seek the respect of those gathered, but he
also sought power among the English. In a monologue addressed to the gathered Ohio
leaders and councilmen, Teedyuscung explained, "[y]ou see here this Belt; It tells you
that Peace is concluded. With one hand I take hold of the governor; the Five Nations take
hold of the Governor likewise. With my other hand, I will take hold of you, and bring you
together."71 Teedyuscung, then, was the link between Pennsylvania and the Six Nations
(Haudenosaunee) on the one hand, and the Ohio Indians on the other. Not only did he
seek to bolster his power by fashioning himself as a grand mediator, he also sought to
dramatically alter North America's political landscape. He sought to bring the old
"Covenant Chain" to the Ohio Country. It was an idea that would bolster his own power,
and give the British an advantage over their French foes.
Teedyuscung's proposal was grounded in fantasy. Few, particularly those among
the Ohio Indians, recognized the Delaware as a viable leader with the authority to create
and lead a coalition of "ten nations." Just as importantly, the idea was rejected by the
leaders of the Six Nations who were also present in 1757. The Haudenosaunee had long
claimed superior status among the Crown's Indian allies. During the Seven Years War,
Sir William Johnson, a man closely connected with Six Nations' leadership, tried
desperately to convince them to join the British in the fight against the French. The
British promised to recognize the Six Nations’ fictional authority over southern and
western lands and peoples so long as they then turned over those lands to the British as
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part of their alliance. From the Six Nations' perspective, it was a means to ensure that
Iroquoia remained protected against British encroachments; from the Crown's
perspective, the agreement granted them political authority over lands and peoples that it
had never conquered. The Six Nations had already declared Delawares to be "women"
and subordinated them to the council at Onondaga, and so, in 1757, Pennsylvania
supported its Haudenosaunee allies and dismissed Teedyuscung's proposal.73
The Six Nations, however, went further. They referred to them as “nephews”
rather than “grandfathers” and reduced the Delawares under Teedyuscung's leadership to
the status of tributary nation, while also allowing them to occupy lands in the Wyoming
Valley. What was more, they co-opted Teedyuscung's role as mediator. They informed all
gathered,
that we have not only brought about this Union with our Nephews on the
Waters of the River Susquehannah, but also have sent Messages to our
Nephews, the Delawares and Minisinks, and to those likewise of our own
Nations, who are on the Ohio under the influence of the French; We have
told all these that they must lay down the French Hatchet, and be
reconciled to their Brethren, the English, and never more employ it against
them, and we hope they will take our advice; We, the Mohocks, Senecas
and Onondagas, deliver this String of Wampum to remove the Hatchet out
of your Heads that has been struck into them by the Ohio Indians, in order
to lay a Foundation for Peace.74
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If the Friendly Association's goal was peace alone, then the council and the
subsequent 1758 Treaty of Easton was immensely satisfying. If, as was more likely, they
hoped to secure some semblance of political authority in the colony and heal divisions
within their society, then the aftermath of the council was disastrous. Teedyuscung, the
association's principal ally, was politically impotent. What was more, Friends received no
credit for the peace despite their earlier attempts to convince others of their political
support in London. Indeed, several months after the 1758 treaty, Philadelphia Quakers
"received undoubted Intelligence from our Friends in London" that a circulating report
"designed to lay on us the whole Blame of the late Indian Ravages."75 London Friends
were in turn "desirous of receiving from the Governor and Council the whole of these
Charges in such manner that we may acquit ourselves" and protest their "Interest and
reputation as a Religious Society."76 Not only had Philadelphia Friends failed to secure
political capital, but they had also failed to heal the growing internal tensions within the
Society of Friends. Indeed, they had made matters worse. The London Yearly Meeting
redoubled its efforts to encourage its members to minimize their involvement in
governmental affairs.77
Despite cautions from the London and Philadelphia meetings, in 1759 Pemberton
opened a store near Fort Pitt in order to provide wares to nearby Indians at a reasonable
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price. His efforts were, in many ways, a continuation of his earlier work among the
Indians during the war. They stemmed from a perceived sense of benevolence, but, unlike
the earlier peace efforts, they also incorporated his economic ambitions. Members of the
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton in an effort to enforce recent calls to
embrace simplicity and minimal engagement with the world. They explained that "we did
desire thee not to prossecute thy Intentions of Fixing a Licenc'd Trade with the Indians in
the manner thou propos'd."79 Instead of embracing his fellow Quakers' perspectives,
however, Pemberton continued to frame his work as misunderstood benevolence. Indeed,
in a letter to the Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post, Pemberton reflected that
"[p]arts of the Service which fall to our Lotts may subject us to divers Difficulties &
Inconveniences some of the greatest is that of being often blamed & censured by those
we love & Esteem, yet if he who knows the Secrets of all Hearts approves of our
Intentions, he can & will in due time manifest our Integrity & reward us openly."80
While Pemberton struggled to square his own efforts with the demands of his
yearly meeting, Teedyuscung succumbed to bribery and alcohol. In an effort to bury the
Walking Purchase issue for good, Pennsylvania's Provincial Council offered
Teedyuscung £400 in 1762 to claim that "[h]e himself knew nothing of the Proprietors
cheating them, and was sorry it had reached their Hearts."81 The council then "asked
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whether the Indians had ever conferr'd together about the Lands they said were never sold
by them to the Proprietors, He answered that they had, & that they would be contented
with £400."82 Teedyuscung was murdered by arsonists—likely representatives of the
Susquehanna Company of Connecticut—the following year during an attack on the
Delawares' settlement in the Wyoming Valley.83

***
The attack on the Delawares' settlement was part of renewed violence in
Pennsylvania. Once again, Pennsylvanians pushed onto Indian lands to the fury of
western Indians. A group of Euroamerican men expressed their frustrations with the
government's ineptitude, dubbed themselves the Paxton Boys, and determined to take
measures into their own hands. Indeed, they argued that the "Quakers may talk what they
will of the Happiness & Justice of their Administration, but...their want of the Principles
of Justice & the common Feelings of human Nature for the distressed" meant "that we
cannot but blame them as the Cause of many of our Sufferings."84 When the Philadelphia
Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton for opening a store, then, it did it because it knew
that prevailing political attitudes did not look upon it favorably, and it wished to remain,
at least for a time, distant from Indian affairs. For a religious group whose own historical
beginnings were clouded in violence and ostracization, others' scorn was a potent
concern.
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The Paxton Boys called into question Quakers' past political leadership by
pushing the Society of Friends’ pacifism to the forefront of discourse once more. Rather
than lament Quakers’ inability to raise funds or pursue war, however, the men questioned
Friends' very humanity by questioning their ability to care about "the distressed." For
Friends in the colony and in London, the problem was serious. One Friend informed
another that the Paxton men "were still roving about in companys, and that in all their
Revels, they Breath vengeance against Is Pemberton...as well as against many others."85
After the Paxton Boys' brutal murder of Conestoga Indians near and at Lancaster, they set
their sights on killing both Moravian Indians in Philadelphia and Israel Pemberton. More
generally, a flurry of pamphlets almost universally blamed the Quakers for the recent
violence.86 Friends' political past and the Friendly Association's efforts combined to
render the Quakers widely hated among their fellow Pennsylvania colonists.
Friends' troubles did not cease once peace returned to Pennsylvania in the mid1760s. Instead, the American Revolution exacerbated Friends' political woes. News of
rebellion gripped Philadelphia in 1774, and it forced both the Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting and individual Friends to confront the practicalities, once again, of wartime
politics. The yearly meeting condemned opposition to Great Britain, and admonished its
members against participating in protests. The stance proved problematic for both those
Quakers who harbored sympathies for colonial independence as well as for those who
advocated pacifist neutrality. As a result, "Free Quakers" organized in Philadelphia and
moved to contribute money to the cause and take up arms. Those who chose the
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increasingly strict policies of the meeting endeavored to remain above the fray. As
scholars such as Sydney James suggest, however, many non-Quaker Pennsylvanians
often confused these latter Friends' neutrality with loyalism.87 Officials jailed numerous
of Philadelphia's Friends for suspected loyalties to the British, and they exiled others.
They sent Israel Pemberton, for example, to western Virginia for failing to take a loyalty
oath—an oath that violated his religious principles.88
Over time, however, the yearly meeting softened its anti-Revolution position, and
increasing concern over the slave trade pushed some Friends to take on variations of the
philanthropic work that Israel Pemberton continued after the Seven Years War. Sydney
James points out that Friends in Philadelphia—as well as in other meetings in eastern
North America—offered relief for the victims of war in 1775, including those Friends
who lived in rebellious and besieged Boston as well as their Quaker and non-Quaker
neighbors in Philadelphia in 1776.89 The war years—and the accompanying internal
squabbling—pushed Friends to repair their reputation as a society among their peers.
Crucially, Friends' wartime philanthropy gained sanction from the yearly meetings in
Philadelphia and London, and it meant that the meetings officially recognized such
efforts as a means to heal internal divisions and garner political capital.
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Native peoples' politics proved to be just as complicated during the Revolution as
they had been during the Seven Years War, and, like the Quakers, many communities
faced internal divisions. Some were pro-American, some favored the British, and others
desired neutrality.90 Colin Calloway demonstrates that, for Shawnees in particular, the
American Revolution offered an opportunity to form an alliance with the British and
recommence their quest to secure the lower Ohio Valley lands against Euroamerican
encroachments. For many Shawnees and Six Nations peoples alike, the political
ramifications of the war centered on the destruction of their lands, communities, and
crops.91 The Revolution, then, brought about devastating economic and political
consequences, but it also offered an opportunity to protect, maintain, or reaffirm the
boundaries of Indians' lands. It was, in many ways, part of the ongoing battle for the Ohio
Country—waged since Delawares fought to keep westward roaming Pennsylvanians off
of their lands during the 1750s and 1760s—and it offered the hope that Native peoples
could serve their own political agendas during a contest between their two Euroamerican
neighbors.
Despite the complicated geopolitics of war and alliance, the 1783 Treaty of Paris
declared that, as British allies, Native peoples lost the war. If the treaty signers did not
lump a particular Indian nation along with the losing British allies, they ignored their
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presence on the map of North America altogether. Indeed, the British abandoned their
Indian allies during peace negotiations. Consequently, more of the Delawares chose to
migrate westward and, in doing so, they endeavored to keep much of their culture and
political organization intact. Others, however, remained and continued the fight—
whether through violence or simple occupation—for their lands.92
Indeed, while the American victors claimed authority over Ohio Valley lands
once claimed by the British, Delawares, Shawnees, and other Ohio Country Indians did
not recognize those rights to their lands. Disputes over the controversial Kentucky region,
proved especially difficult to resolve. Ohio Indians raided settlers through the 1780s and
early 1790s, and they put financial, political, and military strain on the young U.S. state at
a time when its inhabitants were testing its authority in episodes such as Shays's
Rebellion.93 The region's Indians also partnered with the British, still lingering in Ohio
Country forts after the Revolution, in efforts to thwart U.S. expansion. One official noted
in 1784 that “the British keep within those garrisons, several Americans who were taken
prisoners by the Indians under their direction” and that Congress should “take such
measures as becomes the honor of the United States so flagrantly wounded by the
Officers of the King of Great Britain.”94 Indians' alliances thus ensured that the United
States' dreams of unfettered expansion remained elusive.
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The U.S. state, meanwhile, attempted to wed dream with reality with a series of
ordinances in the 1780s. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, in particular, proved crucial to
both the processes of empire building and state building during the nineteenth century. At
its most basic level, the 1787 ordinance provided a procedure for territories' incorporation
into the U.S. as states, and it sketched a plan for their government. The United States
Congress appointed territorial governors and secretaries, and territorial officials were to
"adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as
may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to
Congress from time to time."95 It was a practical system, and it was also a clear assertion
of federal power over states and territories that enabled the republic to avoid formerly
articulating its status as an imperial power. Congressional power over the territories
meant that subsequent states and territories must adopt laws, procedures, and rights of
"the original States" that were "not repugnant to the principles and articles" of the
Ordinance created by the federal government.96 It was, in essence, a plan for selfreplication across the continent. What was more, the legislation required "an oath or
affirmation of fidelity and of office; the governor before the president of congress, and all
other officers before the Governor."97 The territories thus had their own governments,
laws, courts, even a representative in Congress, but all were subject to congressional
approval or to the approval of a congressional appointee. Lastly, the Ordinance explicitly
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banned slavery in the Northwest territories, revealing that the federal government claimed
the power to limit the extension of slavery and to define the property rights of individuals
living beyond the bounds of the original state. Power flowed from the center outward and
the Northwest Ordinance should be interpreted as a watershed moment in defining the
federal state's powers.98
The Northwest Ordinance codified the United States' imperial ambitions, but the
mechanics of empire nonetheless remained uncertain and obscured—many Americans
did not wish to consider themselves constituents of a new empire. The U.S. federal state
was small, and its Articles of Confederation did it no favors. The loose confederation of
states meant that the federal government lacked the resources to colonize a continent and
its peoples by force. Such a political organization was, in some ways, the result of
Americans' victory in a revolutionary contest that concerned, largely, competing visions
of empire. With victory, Americans' initial vision for empire prevailed. The functioning
of the British Empire in eastern North America had been predicated on the mutual
consent of its constituent parts. A delicate and contested balance of power existed
between the center and the periphery with the colonies subordinate to metropolitan
authority and colonial inhabitants vested with the rights of Englishmen and substantial
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power over the conduct of local affairs. Britain's North American colonists had found
this arrangement increasingly frustrating. When the Crown attempted to pay its war debts
with new taxes after the Seven Years War, for example, the colonists affirmed their
perceived right to be governed by consent and insisted, by the 1770s, that "taxation
without representation" was unjust. Many colonists wished to govern their own internal
affairs, and, through protest, they articulated their own imperial vision in which multiple
centers were connected by mutual affinity.
That arrangement, however, proved practically problematic for a migratory
population, and the Northwest Ordinance thus not only bolstered federal power and
vested it with the ability to expand its territorial reach, but it also suggested a new mode
of empire. Jack Greene argues that revolutionary Americans separated from Britain in
part because they envisioned the relationship between "peripheries and center" to be one
of mutually constitutive parts, but the Ordinance legislation suggests that, at least for
1787 policy-makers, this was no longer the case.100 Episodes such as Shays's Rebellion
seemed to suggest for some policy-makers that limited, decentralized power was
inadequate. The problem posed by the continent's Indian peoples did so likewise.
The Northwest Ordinance declared that "[t]he utmost good faith shall always be
observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress."101 The
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document thus presumed Euroamerican immigration to the region, and it also implicitly
presumed future land sales. It presumed, in other words, settler colonialism. This posed a
conundrum, however, with regard to U.S. Indian relations. If Native peoples' property
could "never be taken from them without their consent," then the United States needed to
translate and transform Native peoples' ideas regarding land into ones of private property,
so that they would be intelligible to Euroamerican land buyers. Such a transformation
would promise peaceful dealings with the Indians, and it would facilitate the new U.S.
policy of buying Indian lands through formal treaties. In the meantime, however, the
United States government erased Indians' alternative conceptions of the land, and instead,
as the ordinance's text reveals, assumed that ideas of property were already mutually
intelligible.
With the pressures of U.S. immigration to the region, however, tensions continued
to mount. Skirmishes abounded in the Ohio Country during the 1780s. Just two years
after the ordinance's presumptions regarding private property, the U.S. federal
government endeavored to begin the hard work of altering Native peoples' conceptions of
their lands. To do so, Secretary of War Henry Knox devised a plan to transform the
continent's Native peoples into yeoman farmers. He enlisted the aid of missionaries, and
his plan is the product of a small, indebted state bent on territorial acquisition premised
on the ideas of commoditized private property and recognition of indigenous peoples’
persistence. It articulated Americans’ desires for the “west,” but also offered an implicit
acknowledgment that the state required assistance. Indeed, Knox declared in 1789,
"[m]issionaries of excellent moral character should be appointed to reside in their nation,
who should be well supplied with all the implements of husbandry and the necessary
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stock for a farm. These men should be made the instruments to work on the indians."
In the Ohio Country, however, Knox’s plan remained an idea into the 1790s. Ohio

Indians’ politics intervened, prevented that idea from being translated into action, and
prompted Friends to continue their diplomatic work, this time alongside U.S. officials.

***
Given their history, Philadelphia's Quakers were accustomed to cultivating
political partnerships that proved mutually beneficial. Like their relationship with the
Delawares in colonial Pennsylvania, the Quakers struck up a partnership with the U.S.
federal state in an effort to achieve their own political and philanthropic ends. Indeed,
Friends' willingness to engage with public philanthropic projects continued after the
American Revolution, and they resumed, once again, their diplomatic work in Indian
Country.103 Friends and Delawares' relationship during the Seven Years War was one that
bred continuity between the eras of the British and American empires in North America.
The situation in the Ohio Country was tense, and with the outbreak of war in 1790s,
individual Friends once again perceived an opportunity to benefit Indian peoples, serve
the public, and remain true to their religious principles.
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Chapter 2
Resurrecting the "Chain of Friendship": The International Politics of Intercultural
Diplomacy

In the heat of June 1791, Quaker John Parrish dined with Colonel Timothy
Pickering, then a U.S. commissioner to the Six Nations, "12 or 15 Sachems and head
wariors of the Six Nations," and an interpreter in western New York. Conversation was
friendly, and the food, in Parrish's opinion, somewhat too lavish given both his Quaker
taste for simplicity and the fact that a war was on. After several servers cleared the table,
Parrish solicited the group's interpreter to aid him in offering the diners a speech on
behalf of the Philadelphia Society of Friends. Parrish informed the Haudenosaunee men
that he was of the "peaceable people called Quakers," and that he and his brethren had
come "with a design to see our Bretheren the Indians and take them by the hand and
brighten the Chane of friendship agreeably to the Custom of their friends our Ancestors."
He explained that "the People called Quakers came into this country with Wm Penn a
bout 108 Years ago and in consequence of which lived together a bout 70 Years in
uninterrupted Peace & fellowship." In his opinion, "if the Indians desire[d] to perpetuate
the same friendly disposition...a peace of still longer continuance may be the happy
consequence of the Presant Treaty." Towards the end of this speechmaking, however,
another commissioner interrupted him and insisted, "there was none but men of Peace
presant." Parrish later reflected that the statement "occationed me to stop shorter than
otherwise I should have done."104
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Despite this latter commissioner’s brusqueness, Parrish’s inclusion at the
diplomatic dinner was purposeful, though his role was ill-defined. Friends’ history of
cooperation with Native peoples rendered Quakers useful both to the U.S. government
and to Native polities and their leaders, but Friends’ inclusion in official proceedings was
a relatively new phenomenon. Some, like the second commissioner, were not yet
accustomed to the prominence top U.S. officials like Pickering afforded nongovernmental diplomats. Even Parrish—whose diplomatic speech irritated at least one
Oneida diner that evening—lacked familiarity with his new position. Indeed, shortly after
Parrish spoke the Oneida Good Peter informed him that "we ware now in a free freindly
conversation between Brothers it was not the business of the Treaty we ware not at the
Council Fire.”105 Parrish erred by speaking of official business at an informal gathering—
a rare mistake given that Friends were, by the 1790s, savvy diplomats. But his mistake
was born from his position in flux. During the 1790s the Society of Friends operated as a
private organization that, unlike during the 1750s, cooperated openly with the U.S.
federal government. The federal state was still small and, similar to the ways of the
French empire in North America, the legitimization of U.S. overtures of peace by a few
well-connected missionaries was essential to the early United State’s ability to assert and
exert authority in far-flung locales—particularly in the Ohio Country where a host of
Native nations vied for power.106 Friends’ usefulness and their emerging partnership with
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the U.S. government thus was born from necessity, and it encouraged a paradigm of
federal cooperation with non-governmental organizations.
As Good Peter’s criticism of Parrish’s speech reveals, however, the Quaker’s
status was confused not simply because of the society’s increasing connection with the
federal state, but because of Native polities’ uncertain political status in U.S. politics. On
paper, they were neither foreign or domestic, while in practice, Native peoples were, for
all intents and purposes, necessarily treated as sovereign nations. At the 1791 table,
Pickering was aware of Haudenosaunee diplomatic politics, and he acceded to their
desires, expectations, and standing alliances. The Six Nations had a long history of
working with—though sometimes against—the Society of Friends, and Friends were
useful allies to have. As a result of Native nations’ power on the ground, the U.S.
government allied itself with the Society of Friends, Parrish its representative, and,
ultimately, the Society’s agenda. Native nations, their authority intact as evidenced by
Pickering's inviting a Quaker diplomat to dinner, ensured that they both checked and
shaped the United States' imperial ambitions in the Ohio Country. They forced the United
States to recognize Native sovereignty in the dinners and pipe-smoking affairs that
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characterized U.S.-Indian diplomacy—even if U.S. officials had other ideas on paper—
and they ultimately compelled a partnership between the U.S. federal government and
non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends.107

***
In 1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to President George Washington,
"Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular
state." He penned the words within a broader dialogical context of the struggle between
federal authority and the power of the states, with an argument for the "foreign" status of
Native nations uttered, in part, to bolster the Federalist viewpoint. Knox’s statement was
also, however, a consequence of wartime exigency. The Treaty of Paris ending the
American Revolution attempted to obliterate Indians’ claims to Ohio Valley and
southeastern lands, but it ultimately failed in its aim. In the southeast, the Creeks
effectively played Spanish interests off of American, and for a time, they maintained their
lands in the region. Alexander McGillivray, a Creek with Scottish heritage, was crucial to
that effort, and he, like the Shawnee Blue Jacket and Miami Little Turtle in the Ohio
Country, maintained connections with competing Euroamerican officials to do so.108 For
a republic that struggled to raise revenue or field militias adequate to the task of quieting
citizen rebellions such as Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, the ongoing persistence of
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Native peoples—complete with skirmishing in the Ohio Valley during the 1780s—
pushed Knox to articulate a relationship between Indian nations and the federal
government, just as it had pushed him to conceive of the civilization plan in 1789.
That relationship, however, was a contested and confused one. Knox’s claim that
Native nations were “foreign” was a novel one, particularly in comparison to the
Constitution’s suggestion that Native polities were neither foreign or domestic. John
Parrish’s inclusion as part of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus, however, suggests that during
the 1790s the United States recognized Native nations' sovereign power (and its
subsequent need to court that power) in practice—the United States’ own diplomatic
apparatus was insufficient—while treaty relationships similarly showcased the
international nature of U.S. dealings with various Native American polities.
The early national understanding of a hierarchy of nations, however, influenced
the articulation of Native nations' place in the Constitution's all-important commerce
clause. The clause lists "the Indian tribes" as distinct from "foreign nations" but also from
"the several States." They were a uniquely ambiguous political entity, at least in the
rhetoric of U.S. statecraft, and here it is evident that the founders' understanding of
foreign relations collided with their North American imperialist desires. Native nations
were foreign nations, but something more uncertain on paper and in practice. Indeed, one
of the central elements of U.S. Indian policy, for example, the 1790 Trade and
Intercourse Act, was built upon the ambiguous status of Native polities as articulated in
the commerce clause. The act endeavored to control U.S. citizens' ability to buy and sell
goods in Indian Country, and it prohibited Americans or individual U.S. states from
buying Indian lands. It ultimately attempted to bolster the power of the U.S. state in its

66
dealings in Indian Country and also over its citizenry. Because the act asserted the power
of the federal government to buy lands and issue trading licenses, however, it
simultaneously recognized Native nations' sovereignty. The federal state dealt with
Indian nations, and that, in turn, rendered individual Native nations the federal
government’s diplomatic equivalent. With the Trade and Intercourse acts the federal state
attempted to articulate its own powers and, by necessity, those of Native polities.109
The United States issued the Trade and Intercourse Act in an attempt both to ward
off British traders and to regulate settler colonization of Indian lands. The acts also
exposed the republic’s commitment to building its fledgling economy. Indian affairs
became crucial to that task—a trend that proved enduring. The federal government seized
upon its ambiguous relationship with Native nations in order to ensure that trade revenues
became federal revenues.
Native polities’ political status remained contested for decades after Knox’s
statement. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall's infamous 1831 ruling in which he
declared the Cherokee Nation and all other Indian nations "domestic dependent nations,"
contributed to an on-going argument concerning North America's Indian polities. He
ultimately declared that they were considered and treated by the U.S. government as
"foreign nations" prior to Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia:
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our
country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States
109
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recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace
and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation
of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of
the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been
enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly
recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those
acts.
Marshall went on to declare Native nations "domestic dependent nations" as a
consequence of his reading of the U.S. Constitution, and as the result of his wondering
"whether the Cherokee constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution." That
document, at best, couched relations with Indian nations in vague terms and, at worst,
endeavored to utilize Indian policy in the creation of a powerful state. Knox's declaration
that Native nations were "foreign nations," coupled with U.S.-Native diplomatic
protocols, however, reveals the extent to which the U.S. Constitution's framers not only
sought to create the U.S. state, but sought to create the U.S. imperial state predicated
upon fictions that transformed Indian sovereignty into an uncertainty.110
Indeed, there was a tension between policy and law on the one hand and the actual
workings of U.S -Native relations on the other: encounters revealed that the U.S. state's
imperial policy—and the government’s inclusion of missionaries into its diplomatic
apparatus—was produced as a result of Native nations' sovereignty. For men like Knox
and Parrish—the people conducting the actual work of diplomacy in Indian Country—
Native polities had to be treated as foreign nations. Indeed, despite the historiographical
trend to interpret the rise of the U.S. nation-state in conversation with the decline of
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Native sovereign authority, U.S.-Native relations show that Natives' sovereignty
remained intact after the American Revolution and into the nineteenth century.
While officials debated, disagreed, and harbored inconsistent ideas regarding
Indians’ status vis a vis the United States, they constructed Indian policies in the context
of their dealings with other polities. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton,
supported a foreign policy that simultaneously promoted a global United States
reputation of strength and increased government revenues. He advocated for
congressional regulation of foreign commerce—like he did the Indian trade with the trade
and intercourse acts—in an attempt to ensure that the federal government reaped the
financial benefits of global trade. Revenues and centralized power were the primary goals
of both Indian policy and foreign policy more broadly.111
Beyond financial policy, federal officials treated Indian nations in ways
reminiscent of their relations with the North African states. With the Treaty of Paris in
1783 and the subsequent loss of British imperial protection in the Mediterranean, the
United States negotiated treaties with the various Barbary States in order to avoid the
seizure of American ships' cargoes and crewmen. Such treaties were similar to captive
exchange negotiations in Indian Country. What was more, the United States continued to
engage in practices of federally-funded gift-giving and ransom payments to the North
African nations into the nineteenth century. Given its still-small state apparatus and
limited budget, it is not surprising that the U.S. balanced its engagements among both
Indian nations and the Barbary States with isolation from European conflicts as a matter
111

Douglas A. Irwin, "Revenue or Reciprocity?: Founding Feuds over Early U.S. Trade Policy"
in Douglas A. Irwin and Richard Sylla, eds., Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in
the 1790s (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 89-120.

69
of imperial necessity. Native polities—like their North African counterparts—forced the
United States to construct a very particular foreign relations agenda, one of balanced—
and selective—military and diplomatic engagement. In the discourses and policies of
statecraft, Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, and the Indian nations were sovereign, but, in
keeping with a commitment to ambiguity and the advantages that accompanied that
status, U.S. officials also deemed these polities as among the more "barbaric" nations of
the world.112
Knox’s need to frame Indian affairs in the context of federal power was a
consequence of his understanding of both Native and global diplomatic politics, and it
was also the result of U.S. officials’ familiarity with the potency of Native authority in
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Parrish observed diplomatic pageantry that suggested both federal and Indian

sovereignty—as well as his own conception of both. Prior to the treaty proceedings in
1791, for example, Parrish witnessed three to four hundred Senecas marching into
Colonel Pickering's encampment. The "wariers...came in Indian file with their Rifles on
their sholders and drew themselves up in a line by the [colonel's] Tent and gave him 2
Sallutes by the discharge of their guns, which the Colonel received as a mark of respect."
Not only was this a show of Seneca military power, but Pickering's reception of their
army, along with the Seneca salutes, suggests that the Senecas, in the eyes of both
Pickering and Parrish who interpreted the events, were incorporated into the
Euroamericans' own framework of state-backed military power.114
On yet another occasion of Seneca military parade, "about 50 Indians" formed "a
line near the Coln." and "sent and fired 3 sallutes & informed that their was as many
more on their way." The marching indicated that the Seneca Nation possessed an army,
even if it was not, at the moment, hostile; the assurances that more warriors were
available conveyed a claim to power but also a subtle threat. The Senecas' military
showing demonstrated that they possessed the power of arms, men, and respect, and it
served as a means to translate Native sovereignty into a performative diplomatic space
that was easily understood by U.S. officials. Such a show facilitated Senecas' ability to
minimize their cultural differences while also asserting their place—and thus both
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eroding and maintaining political difference—among the many nations that the United
States government recognized as sovereign. The meeting of two sovereign polities—each
foreign to the other—created such spaces, and they were representative of each power’s
attempt to find a common performative language that would render one intelligible to the
other.115
These elaborate spaces of diplomacy further complicated—and enshrined—U.S.
officials' already ambiguous perceptions of Native leaders and Native nations' political
standing. For John Parrish, Native leaders were the equivalents of the most prominent
European statesmen. Parrish described the Shawnee Blue Jacket's "person and
appearence" as "much like the great men such as an Admiral or General." When, in 1791,
moreover, the Seneca Red Jacket spoke to Pickering and others of the U.S. diplomatic
entourage, Parrish reflected that the chief's "appearance and maner his eliquence and
person I concluded would out no inconsiderable figure on the flore of a British Parliment
or an American Congress I do not remember have seen any states man make a more
magisterial appearence." The Quaker understood Red Jacket as belonging to the realms of
diplomacy and international politics, while Pickering, who received the Seneca statesmen
in the company of Parrish and an interpreter, legitimated the Seneca's claim to authority
by engaging in Six Nations diplomatic traditions of speech-making. Parrish's presence, a
consequence of Pickering's appeal to Six Nations' alliances and protocols, likewise
underscored the power of the Six Nations in western New York; Colonel Pickering
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encouraged the Quaker's participation in the meeting and thereby recognized the
legitimacy of the Senecas and their diplomatic networks.116
Some private U.S. citizens likewise recognized the potency of Native sovereignty.
One worried citizen, for example, perhaps a student, penned an essay in 1794 in an effort
to answer the query "Is the prosecution of the present Indian War an advantage to the
United States?" The answer reveals this citizen's understanding not only of the politics of
states and war but of Native nations' relationship with the United States. The author, in
prose that suggests a reading of Vattel's Law of Nations, contended that when "bodies of
people have united themselves together in civil society" they may, "in order to answer the
purpose of self-preservation more effectually," engage in war "against other bodies of
people, who have encroached upon their liberty and rights....The prosecution of the
present Indian war is in defence of personal safety. For, if we did not send an armed force
to impede their incursions and savage cruelties, our frontiers would daily be diminished
in number." Though the widely-read Law of Nations left the question of Indians’ political
status ambiguous and suggested that Europeans had a right to Native lands because of a
failure on the part of the latter to "cultivate the earth," this essayist nonetheless reveals
that war was necessary for Americans' "self-preservation," and that Native nations and
the United States were both "bodies of people." They were equals engaged in war
because Native nations' threatened the United States' preservation; Indians threatened to
"diminish" the "frontiers." Even if the essayist cultivated his or her opinion because of a
desire to eradicate Native peoples or claim Indian lands, it remains that the politics of war
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necessitated an understanding of Native nations as "bodies of people”—an understanding
that combined with their presumed inferior status based upon ideas of supposed
"savagery" or "heathenism”—to render Native peoples’ status confusing in the eyes of
common Americans as well. This provides a glimpse of early U.S. citizens' understanding
of the international politics of war with Native nations.117
William Eaton, future U.S. consul to Tunis, similarly understood Native nations
and their leaders as sovereign equivalents of the United States. Writing in 1793, he
informed Stephen Jacobs that "the Indians are determined not to talk of a peace so long as
one Federal American lives on the N West side of the Ohio." Here, Eaton revealed,
somewhat unwittingly, that the U.S. desired peace with the Indians; this is especially
significant given that treaty rhetoric usually involved presumptions of Native nations'
desires for friendship. U.S.-Native diplomacy and the writings of U.S. citizens, however,
reveal that such presumptions were the products of imperial fiction. Moreover, Eaton
went on to tell his correspondent that he "heard the Cornplanter (a Commissioner &
Chief from the Six Nations)" refuse to speak of peace "in the presence of, and in a talk
with our Commander in Chief." Native "commissioners" and leaders, then, had a direct
line of communication with the President of the United States. Many presidents did, in
fact, receive visits from Native leaders in meetings and gatherings not unlike later U.S.
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state dinners, and Eaton's report reveals that he too envisioned Cornplanter as a statesman
who dealt with the U.S. head of state.118
Eaton also understood Native nations, however, as possessing close ties with
Britain; Friends were not, then, the only links in the Six Nations' chain of alliances. Like
many Native North American nations, the Haudenosaunee, Shawnees, Wyandots, and
others cultivated close ties with the British Empire and its representatives. The Seneca
diplomat Red Jacket, for example, reminded Pickering in 1791 that diplomacy with his
people—or any Indian nation—was not as simple as professing friendship. After
Pickering asked the Seneca why his people sought the alliance of the British—a question
that, alone, reveals Pickering's awareness of Native sovereignty—Red Jacket informed
the colonel that "the British are our Anchant friends, they live near us when we treat with
them they make use of Wampum which we understand they give us good advice...they
make use of waighting when they speake to us." Since, according to Red Jacket, "not one
man among us can read," when the United States violated Natives' customs of wampumgiving and speechmaking during U.S. treaty-making, "then we are oblige to go to our
Kneghbours the British to get them explaind us." Not only were the Six Nations' ties with
the British the product of proximity, then, but it was because British officials made use of
their knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols such as the exchange of wampum belts.
When, on another occasion, the Seneca insisted, "we have our anchant customs I have
one in my hand, (meaning the belt)," he emphasized that the meeting between the United
States and his nation was one between two nations with diverse—and equally
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significant—traditions. The Seneca’s insistence upon “anchant” customs likewise
suggested his own conception of Senecas’ sovereignty, one grounded in a long past. As
Pickering well knew by the 1790s, courting Native authority—and thus Native
protocols—could produce a myriad of advantages in both the political and military
realms. The United States' continuance of speechmaking, gift-giving, and other traditions
in Indian affairs, then, was derived from an understanding that such appeals to Native
traditions, along with the recognition that Native nations commanded power that required
such appeals, fostered strong diplomatic relations. Appeals to Native authority were,
simply, the product of smart foreign relations; enlisting Friends as unofficial diplomats
who possessed vast knowledge of Native protocols was the same.119
Red Jacket's speech to Pickering also reveals much, moreover, about his own
perceived power and that of his nation. The Seneca continued to explain "we desire you
to appoint an agent for Indian Affairs to whom we may go to [tell] every thing that
happens to us and from whom we may hear what concerns us as this used to be in old
times." In responding to Pickering's query regarding the Six Nations' relationship with the
British, Red Jacket made an appeal: he recognized the extent to which Pickering and the
United States required the friendship of the Six Nations, and he used that knowledge in
an attempt to acquire an Indian agent who would engage in reconnaissance for his nation.
Such an individual would also serve as an ambassador between his nation and the United
States. Though Red Jacket was no doubt aware that the United States commanded
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formidable power and that his people needed to work with that power (just as he knew
that the United States needed to work with him), he nonetheless understood, rightfully,
that the Six Nations were not a colonized people; they were a sovereign power.120
Native nations showcased their power when making appeals, but also in
making clear—or purposefully obscuring—their own political agendas. Like the Society
of Friends, the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut was a useful ally of the United States, but
he was also acted on behalf of his people. In 1791 Aupaumut visited the Ohio Indian
nations "having agreed with the great men of the United States to take a Tour with their
Message of peace." Six Nations leaders opposed his trip, yet still he went. To his mind,
"if the western nations could be rightly informed of the desires of the United States—they
would comply for peace." Such information, he argued, would be delivered best by "an
Indian to whom they look upon as a true friend." Like Parrish and other diplomatic
members of the Society of Friends, Aupaumut relied upon a peaceful past to make claims
to power in a violent present. Indeed, his nation, the Mohicans, possessed a reputation for
peace-making, and in describing the kinship relationships between the Mohicans,
Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and others, he explained that "it was the business of our
fathers to go around the Towns of these nations to renew the agreements between them—
And tell them many things which they discover in among the White people in the
east."121
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Aupaumut's travels through the contested Ohio Country as a diplomatic
messenger reveal his close ties with the United States, but also his own political
motivations. Indeed, the Mohican informed Delawares:
since the British & Amaricans lay down their hatchets—then my Nation
was forgotten. We never had had invitation to set in Council with the
white people.—not as the 5 Nations & you are greatly regarded by the
white people but last winter was the first time I had invitation from the
great man of the United States...according to that invitation I went and
after we arrived at Philadelphia—I find that the business was for the
wellfare of all nations—and then I was asked whether I would carry a
Message of peace to you, here.
Aupaumut's statement appealed to Delawares' egos—they were, after all, "greatly
regarded by the white people" unlike his own nation—but it also belied his desire to give
the United States reason to remember the Mohicans. Lamenting that his "Nation was
forgotten" after the American Revolution, Aupaumut undertook the work of peace that
was central to his nation's historical identity, and he allied himself with the U.S.
government. His motives were thus born of a desire for peace but also for political
authority. Aupaumut hoped that alliance with the United States would offer the Mohican
nation advantage.122
Aupaumut's work and motivations reveal the international nature of 1790s
diplomacy. Like Friends, Aupaumut's diplomacy aligned with the desires of U.S.
officials, and they recruited him for their purposes, but he undertook his mission for the
Mohicans. Indian Country, like the United States, was not a united place; rather, it was
fractured by alliances and viewpoints. The "western nations" so often mentioned en
masse in U.S. government correspondence were conflicted. Some wished to broker peace
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with the United States but remained firm that no further land sessions should be made; a
pan-Indian union of nations, meanwhile, fought for their lands under the leadership of the
Miami Little Turtle and the Shawnee Blue Jacket; "back nations" as Aupaumut called
them, meanwhile hated the Shawnees and "wished to see the Shawannese [on] one side
by themselves...and have washed their kittles [sic] to boil the Shawannese so as to have
Good broth." There were other views too. The Six Nations, like all the Indian nations,
engaged the United States, Britain, Shawnees, Delawares, and others of the allied Ohio
Nations in talks, sometimes to broker peace, other times to push for war, but always with
the political future of the Six Nations in mind. These were the international politics that
combined with U.S. imperial ambitions to produce the political landscape of 1790s North
America.
Those same politics, however, were the very politics that produced the U.S.
government’s relationship with the Society of Friends. With Native leaders affirming
their sovereign status in speech, appearance, and pageantry throughout the 1780s and
1790s, missionary partners such as John Parrish grew in importance. Such figures offered
a means to treat with Native peoples peacefully while satisfying and recognizing Native
claims to authority—as Pickering did when he invited Parrish to dinner—yet Friends’
status was ambiguous enough that the United States could maintain its fickle official
stance regarding U.S.-Indian relations. The U.S. government’s relationship with the
Society of Friends, then, was one born of compulsion and imperial expediency.123
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During the 1790s years of war in particular, men of friendly reputation like John
Parrish and his fellow Quakers—William Hartshorne, Joseph Moore, William Savery,
and others—were indispensible to U.S. hopes for peace with Native nations.124 Like the
go-betweens who brokered relations between Euroamericans and Native peoples in
decades past, Quakers’ indeterminate relationship with the United States and their history
of diplomacy in colonial Pennsylvania combined to render them malleable actors whose
ambiguity enabled them to find usefulness among both Native and American leaders.
Also like many of those go-betweens, Friends found ways to carry out their own
agendas—the pursuit of peace and political capital. Theirs were efforts to create a godly
society on Earth through peaceful relations and labor, and when proselytizing in Indian
Country they focused on work, virtue, and civility while de-emphasizing Bible
instruction. This appealed to many Native communities both on a spiritual level and
because Friends' message was practically applicable to their daily lives. Friends
continued to invoke historical memory in diplomacy as they had during the Seven Years
War, and, as a consequence, their reputation among and partnership with Indian peoples
endured into the nineteenth century.125
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When violence escalated in the 1790s Ohio Country, Friends wrote a memorial to
President Washington, the Senate, and the House of Representatives indicating that they
were "deeply affected with the distressed situation of the frontier inhabitants," and that
they "desire[d] a solid and careful enquiry may be made into the cause." They claimed it
had been their "uniform care to admonish and caution our members against settling on
lands which have not been fairly purchas'd of the original owner," insinuated that the
government should do the same with its citizens, and promised that "as far as our
influence extends, we mean to maintain this our ancient testimony inviolate, which from
experience has been found effectual to the preservation of peace with the natives, who
with great hospitality, cherished and assisted our forefathers in their early settlement of
this country." Friends thus reminded the federal government of their previous history
with Native peoples on the continent, encouraged officials to work toward peace, and, in
turn, asserted their unique ability to promote peace. They also, however, carefully trod
the line between support for Indian peoples and the United States, which bolstered both
their appeal and ability to function as a neutral non-governmental organization.126
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Though the Society of Friends in Philadelphia engaged in the national politics of
Indian affairs and war with their petitions, from the perspective of the debt-ridden federal
government, Friends' most valuable work took place on an individual basis in Indian
Country. Peace was, after all, far less expensive than war, and it encouraged regular
trade. As a consequence of the Quakers’ already-extensive dealings in Indian Country
and the constant migrations of Native communities and individuals during the latter half
of the eighteenth century, knowledge of Friends and their friendships with Native peoples
circulated throughout eastern North America by the 1790s. In 1793 Detroit, for example,
John Parrish encountered several local traders who informed him that "our cuming will
be usefull as a number of the tribes have a Knowledge of friends of whom they have a
faverable oppinion from their haveing nothing to do with the sheding of Blood and their
honest deeling with them in the first setling [of] the Country." A Shawnee in western
New York likewise knew of Friends' past work in Indian Country, as did "18 Onados
[Oneidas]" who visited the Quaker and several other Friends in 1793. Friends conversed
with these latter Oneidas "to mutual Sattisfaction" akin to "a time of brighting the Chain
of friend-ship which they exprest their gladness to find that the fire which was kindled by
our fore fathers was not quite gone out."127
Such encounters reveal that Friends had a special reputation among Native
peoples, and that repute proved useful in furthering friendly interpersonal and diplomatic
networks. Most other religious-minded men, conversely, often were lumped with
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negative connotations of "white people." Indeed, in 1751, the renowned Presbyterian
missionary David Brainerd wrote, "[the Indians] understood that the white people were
contriving a method to deprive them of their country in those parts" and "that I was sent
on purpose to accomplish that design." Of course, Parrish and other Friends glorified
their friendly reputations in their writings to some extent, but their consistent ability to
interact with Native leaders and their countrymen, coupled with many other missionaries'
comparatively few successes during the 1790s, demonstrates that they did, in fact,
possess a special reputation for diplomacy among Native nations.128
Though Friends were the most adept in their diplomatic encounters with Native
nations, other missionaries, particularly the Moravians, were also successful. John
Heckewelder and David Zeisberger, like Friends, attended treaty councils and often
discussed Indian affairs with colonial and then U.S. officials, and both their treaty
attendance and mission work offered them ample opportunity to gain intimate knowledge
of their pupils. Heckewelder and Zeisberger's journals offer detailed ethnographic
information, and they reveal their ability to cultivate close ties with Native peoples.
These men were, however, nearly unique among late eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury Ohio Country Moravians. Other Moravian missionaries, such as Abraham
Luckenbach and John Kluge, failed to cultivate workable relations among the Delawares
in 1806 Indiana Territory.129 Moravians' mission work—with its emphasis on theology—
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appealed to some Native communities. Those communities who did not wish to adopt the
tenets of Christianity could however, find use for Quakers' friendship.130
Also appealing, from both Indians’ and U.S. officials’ perspectives was the
Society of Friends’ hierarchical organization. Yearly meetings at Philadelphia, Baltimore,
and London oversaw Quarterly and Monthly meetings which, in turn, supervised
individual meetings that consisted of local Friends. Moreover, Friends' various
committees appointed clerks with whom federal officials and Native peoples alike could
communicate, in consultation with the committee. That clerk could also call upon
volunteer committee members for various tasks among Indian nations—including travel,
diplomacy, and, eventually, mission work and its requisite reconnaissance. Like the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG), the Society of Friends
thus offered a relatively efficient means to coordinate communication and labor in Indian
Country. Friends’ organization also underscored their ambiguous status vis a vis the
United States. The Society of Friends operated as a non-governmental organization that
nonetheless possessed the efficiency, funds, and labor necessary to effectively offer the
United States diplomatic—and later mission—support in Indian Country.
It was a model that later caught on in the United States. The American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, adopted a similarly
hierarchical structure. Importantly, however, Friends became the United States’ most oft-
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recruited missionary partners, particularly in the first quarter of the nineteenth century—
but also during President Ulysses S. Grant’s “peace policy” in the postbellum years—due
to their history of working alongside Native leaders and their people. Friends enjoyed and
capitalized upon their appeal to those Indians who saw value in the economic and
diplomatic benefits that came with alliance with the Society of Friends.
Indeed, Friends’ reputation for usefulness and diplomacy preceded them in the
1790s Ohio Country. It was not unusual for Quakers traveling through western New York
or the Ohio Country to encounter Haudenosaunee, Delaware, or Shawnee individuals
with whom they or a member of their society had already formed friendships. Near
Detroit in 1793, for example, John Parrish crossed paths with a Nanticoke, John White,
who lived among the Christian Indians under the tutelage of the Moravian missionary
John Heckewelder. White, who visited Philadelphia on several occasions prior to
encountering Parrish in Detroit, exchanged pleasantries with the Friends and asked after
several other members of the society, including John Pemberton, Robert Parrish, and
Isaac Zane—all men who had been involved with Indian affairs prior to the crisis of the
1790s. Thomas King, one of the "neighbouring Indians" Parrish encountered during his
travels to western New York, likewise "inquired perticularly after his freinds [sic] Isaac
Zane & Israel Pemberton." Such memories of Israel Pemberton and others were the
consequence of Friends' efforts among the western nations and, in particular, members of
the Delaware nation during the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. When Parrish
encountered a Shawnee in Detroit, he later noted in his journal that the Shawnee knew
"as most of the Shawneys do a good deel a bout friends, as well as the Delawares." The
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Delawares were among Friends' closest—if not the closest—of their Native allies, and
they were central to the creation of Quakers' reputation in Indian Country.131
Like the Shawnee who possessed knowledge of both Friends and Delawares,
Wyandots, who similarly had close relations with Delawares in Ohio and Indiana, too
possessed knowledge of the Society of Friends. By the 1790s, however, one Wyandot
linked the society with the U.S. federal government. Just prior to treaty proceedings in
1793, Parrish "received a visit from a Wyondot Chief" who had an interest in reaching an
eventual "accomedation between their people and those of the U. States." The man "said
he remembered the old friendship that subsisted in time past that they had still a large
Belt in possession as I understood him from Pennsylvania." For this leader, the
Pennsylvanian colonial past—Friends' past—lived on in the present and had the power to
shape the relations between his nation and the United States; he understood Friends as
diplomatic extensions of the U.S. federal government—people with whom he desired a
friendly, working relationship.132
Memories of Pennsylvania's past and Friends' work with the Delawares became
not only a useful means to build and spread Friends' reputation for peaceful negotiation
with Native peoples, but they also served as powerful diplomatic tools. Indeed, just as
Parrish did at the 1791 dinner table, Native and Quaker diplomats often invoked rhetoric
of a "chain of friendship" in their messages between one another. Six Nations' rhetoric
may have referenced memories of the "covenant chain" in eastern North America, and
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Parrish and other Quaker journalists may have conflated their own understanding of
Pennsylvania's founding with this rhetoric. Nonetheless, the chain metaphor became a
mutually intelligible language for both Friends and Native peoples, and it appears in
sources originating from military officials and both the Baltimore and Philadelphia yearly
meetings of the Society of Friends. The Oneida Good Peter, for example, asserted the
power of the Six Nations by using the chain metaphor to assert a Haudenosaunee
diplomatic agenda. At a 1791 meeting between the Six Nations and the United States he
remarked, "it is the voice of the 6 nations that the chain of friendship be made Bright, we
dont intend to sell any more of our lands." Here, Good Peter invoked the historical to
resurrect both past alliances but also former Haudenosaunee power—power that, while
by no means extinguished, was nonetheless threatened by the growth of United States
authority. Such rhetoric was, like material goods and military pageantry, crucial to the
ongoing development of cultural and political spaces within which Native polities and
Americans could converse in metaphor.133
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Indeed, diplomats such as Parrish and Good Peter and political leaders such as the
Wyandot Tarhe used the chain metaphor to articulate and achieve their own political
objectives, and it also invoked a binding political relationship. Tarhe, for example,
informed Philadelphia Friends in a 1799 letter that they "told us at that time when we met
together...That you then formed a Chain of Frienship: You said it was not a Chain of Iron,
but that it was a chain of precious metal, a chain of silver, which would never get
rusty….We have no records or place of security for our Speeches as you have—nor can
we write as you do….But if you examine your old Books and papers you will there find
written all that passed between your Forefathers and ours." By 1799, after the birth of the
Baltimore Yearly Meeting, Baltimore and Philadelphia Friends divided philanthropic
work among Native peoples into separate jurisdictions presumably for the sake of ease
and efficiency of resource-use: relations with Wyandots and Shawnees, Delawares, and
others in the Ohio Country were in the hands of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting of the
Society of Friends, while Philadelphia Friends handled relations in New York. When
Tarhe offered his speech to the Philadelphia Friends he was either unaware that his lands
fell under the philanthropic jurisdiction of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting or he failed to
care. The Wyandot's business concerned the Society of Friends writ large and he, for the
time being, associated Friends with Pennsylvania; in his mind, it was to that group that
his memory-infused language was intelligible.134
What was more, in a calculated diplomatic stroke, Tarhe emphasized his relations
with Philadelphia Friends' former allies, the Delawares. He informed Friends that his
134
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people were "much pleased to hear that you still hold in remembrance our nephew the
Delaware nation, The promisses and obligations made between your grandfathers and
ours included our two Nations (Wy andots [sic] and Delawares) in the Chain of
friendship and brotherly love, concidering us as one and the same people, which ...pray,
that the great Spirit will never permit to be divided." While the Delaware Teedyuscung
presented himself as a leader of the Delawares and of a political confederation that he
referred to as the "Ten Nations" during the Seven Years War—a coalition that may have
included some Wyandots among those supposedly confederated nations—the Wyandots
were not present at Penn's treaty in 1682. Indeed, for most other purposes and despite the
conglomerated nature of Ohio Country Indian villages by the late eighteenth century,
Delawares and Wyandots would still have insisted on their separate identities. Tarhe thus
proved himself a master politician: Quakers had allied themselves with Delawares in the
past and, by resurrecting the chain of friendship metaphor and asserting his people's
political alliance and fictive kinship with the Delawares, the Wyandot hoped to capitalize
on that partnership and ensure that his people would not confront United States officials
alone.
Native nations' memories of diplomatic friendship with Friends thus shaped the
character of American imperialism by ensuring that the nation's leading philanthropists
aided state officials in their empire-building project in North America. They compelled
the United States to develop a brand of empire that relied, in many ways, upon the
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reputation-cultivating and labor-intensive diplomacy, mission, and educational work of
non-governmental societies.135

***
The reputation and malleability of the Society of Friends and its members
contributed to its value as a government partner, but so too did Friends' years of
diplomatic experience in Indian Country. Indeed, that experience rendered Parrish’s
misstep at the 1791 dinner table a rare occurrence that was the product of his society’s
changing role in official U.S. diplomacy. Quakers understood the importance of Native
nations' protocols, and they willingly undertook the sometimes-tedious work of
cultivating partnerships with the various Native nations that they encountered. Friends'
copious meeting minutes, epistles, and publications ensured that knowledge of diplomatic
protocols and Native alliance networks survived within the meeting. Since men of
varying ages served on Friends' committees, the committee system likewise ensured that
knowledge passed from one generation to the next to become an essential foundation for
Friends' diplomatic work in Indian Country.136
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Relationships sometimes formed when delegations of Native leaders visited
Philadelphia or met Friends during the treaty councils of the 1750s and 1760s. It is likely
that these meetings further lumped all Friends together in Native peoples’ imaginations
since they occurred before Maryland Friends—some of whom migrated southward from
Philadelphia—founded the Baltimore Yearly Meeting. When Parrish visited the
Tuscaroras in 1793, for example, he was pleased to find that "divers of the inhabitants
came in and seemed pleased to see us, and what made our Visit more agreeable one of the
Chiefs I know who had been several times at my house."137 Friends' connections with
various Indians also, however, blossomed as a result of Friends' open curiosity. During
his 1793 voyage from western New York to Detroit "a bord the Schooner Dunmore,"
Parrish observed that there were "representitives of 5 different Indian Nations on Bord,
some Mohocks Mossesogers, Mohickins, Kighugers, & Stockbridge." The Quaker likely
gleaned such particular information through word of mouth, but also from the onboard
exchange of pleasantries. Captain John, one of the Mohawks aboard the Dunmore, made
the effort to visit Parrish in his Detroit lodgings after their journey together and "exprest
his sattisfaction in his acquaintance with us and wished we could make it in our way to
return by the Bay of Canty that we might see him at his [own] house that he might make
us welcome." Never one to miss an opportunity to develop closer ties with a new contact,
Parrish "red to him Friends missage to the Indians which he much approv'd of"
whereupon Captain John "said he would communicate the substance to the Indians at
their council where he expected to set out for next day." What began as a casual, chance
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acquaintance aboard a schooner, quickly developed into the interpersonal foundations for
diplomacy.138
Sometimes, however, Friends' attempts to cultivate their international networks
failed due to unforeseen circumstances. When Zebulon Heston, a Friend traveling with
Parrish to the eastern Ohio Country fell ill along the way, Parrish settled for sending a
letter to the Shawnees and Wyandots rather than paying them a personal visit. He wrote,
"we should have been glad to have come and seen you...but one of us Zebulon
Heston...being far advanced in age & in a poor State of helth & our horses forspent, we
are not [at] liberty to go any further then...Newcommers Town." He then conveyed his
affection for the nations and reminded them that Friends "had no other motive meaning
then your good and the Peace of our own minds we seek nothing that is yours, but you
unto God." Episodes such as this reveal not only Friends' persistence, but that they were
aware both of the importance of their connections and of the diplomatic protocols
common to many Native nations. Failing to pay a promised visit to an ally could have
devastating consequences in Indian Country, and thus a letter was required to ensure that
relations remained strong. Through years of alliance and observation, Friends knew how
to maintain relationships with Native nations.139
Friends cultivated knowledge through experience, and the time required for the
acquisition of such knowledge and experience increased Friends' value to the U.S. federal
government by the 1790s. The Society of Friends’ relationships with various Native
nations facilitated, for example, traveling Friends’ intelligence-gathering work. Before
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setting out for Detroit, Parrish reflected that "we should be likely to have an opertunity to
see a number of Indians and such others that might give us some necessary inteligence to
facilitate the Business we are ingaged in." Once in Detroit, the Quaker did, indeed, gather
intelligence "which was not the most favourable," and he then wrote to various
commissioners working with Colonel Thomas McKee near Grand Rapids "informing
them the Inteligence we had received since we came heare." By the 1790s, Friends were
crucial links between Native nations and the United States; by using their own
interpersonal networks to promote peace, they facilitated U.S. diplomatic reconnaissance
and constructed a valuable international information network that linked Philadelphia,
western New York, the Ohio Country, and the Great Lakes.140
By the 1790s, Quakers such as John Parrish made this work appear simple; in
reality, however, Friends’ efforts were only feasible after acquiring both years of
experience and knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols. Failure to abide by Natives'
rules of alliance making could make things awkward, if not dangerous during treaties
with various nations. In 1761 Pennsylvania, one Quaker woman described a particularly
uncomfortable interaction that was the product of Friends’ ignorance. A Delaware leader,
Papoonan, informed the Quakers that "God had been so kind to them" so as to ensure
"that his young men had success in hunting & killed a great many Deer,” and the
resulting skins he wished Friends "to accept as a token of his love." Unaccustomed to
Native politics of gift-giving and consequently caught off guard, one Friend explained
that "as Providence had favoured us with abundance, he thought we ought rather to be
helpfull to them, & excused friends from receiving their presents." Papoonan, appearing
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noticeably "uneasy" then, again encouraged Friends to accept the skins, "that this was
their practice, of their forefathers, therefore they had brought those skins, & again
requested friends would accept of them." Sensing their mistake, the Quakers quickly
replied that they "desired him not to take it amiss, that we did not at once receive them."
Two days later Papoonan, still "uneasy," visited Friends' lodgings to revive the issue,
whereupon the Quakers explained "that we were sorry that any thing that was said
respecting their presents should give him uneasiness." Friends were savvy enough to
learn from their mistake, and immediately set about repairing their relationship with the
Delaware leader.141
Native nations' politics thus shaped missionaries' abilities to work with their
peoples, and diplomatic blunders could render relationships between missionaries and
Native nations untenable. In 1802, Joseph Patterson, a Presbyterian missionary near
Chillicothe in the Ohio Country, experienced great frustration when a group of Shawnees
refused his primers, books, and preaching. A man unknown to the chiefs there, Patterson
"went to the chiefs who were assembled, and...informed them of the design of my
mission, and that tomorrow was our day of worship, and signified my intention of
[preaching] to any who would attend." Rather than offering Patterson statements of
friendship and invitation as Friends often received, the Shawnees "answered roughly that
they would hear nothing from me till the great council determined, nor should any of
their people." These Shawnees ultimately decided that Patterson should go home.142
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Patterson blamed his failure upon his interpreter's lack of commitment, the
Shawnees' being too "alarmed and confused" to engage him in formal speech at the
chiefs' council, the ill effects of alcohol among the Indians, and, somewhat closer to the
truth, his own inability to speak their language. Missing from this laundry list of excuses,
however, is the fact that Patterson arrived at the Shawnees' town lacking the foundations
for meaningful relations with its inhabitants. Though he frequently commented in his
journals that the Shawnees offered him food and lodging—gifts that suggest their
willingness to bring Patterson into their network of alliances—Patterson was ultimately
too hard-headed to realize that mission work required patience as well as a willingness to
engage Native nations and their leaders on their political terms. Waltzing into the chiefs'
council without first laying the groundwork for meaningful conversation did not produce
faithful converts, and such episodes reveal the great tenuousness of diplomacy in early
America. British and then U.S. relationships with Native peoples were fragile, and they
required constant—and experienced—cultivation; Friends, with their history of
experience in Indian Country, thus became useful in nurturing U.S. relations with Native
nations.143
As Patterson's experience among the Shawnees suggests, because of Native
nations' political authority, gifts were essential to diplomatic relations and in the smaller
exchanges between Native and non-Native individuals, as well as between missionaries
and their targeted flocks. U.S. officials and their partners drew upon earlier empires'
modes of gift-giving practices in their own efforts to engage with Native peoples. Gifts
ranged from small to lavish and included food, clothing, and an assortment of smaller
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items such as needles or tobacco. John Parrish in 1791, for example, offered his friend
and fellow diplomat the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut and two of his companions "a flag
hankerchef which was received with gratitude." The gift of a flag symbolized Parrish's
association with the United States, and it cemented his status as a partner and
representative of that polity. Such items were political symbols, and they were also the
material markers of reciprocity, the tangible symbols of interpersonal relationships. It
was significant that the failed Presbyterian missionary Joseph Patterson arrived at the
Shawnee chiefs' council with nothing but primers when they had already offered him
generous (though to him rather less than ideal) lodging and several meals. Gifts were the
means by which friendships developed, but, as in the case of Patterson or the Quakers at
Easton, they could also stifle budding relationships.144
Food was also central to Native politics of gift giving, and successful diplomats
engaged in the rituals of food diplomacy. Knowing these rules, in 1793 Detroit Parrish
offered "the Moravian Indians that came to us" several items to "releive their presant
necessities," including "a bout 27 Bushels of corn & a bout 400 of flower." He followed
this offering with a letter—"in couraging them to persevere in a life of Sivilization and
Christian fortitude"—to carry with them back to their Moravian community. Though
these Moravian Delawares were already "converted," Parrish wasted no time in
maintaining his networks with them since his society had already had extensive dealings

144

Parrish, 4th day 13 [July 13], 1791, vol. 2. Scholarship on gift-giving in early America reveals
that gift-giving was intricately connected with assertions of Native power. See, for example,
Joseph M. Hall, Jr., Zamumo's Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Richard White, The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); David Murray, Indian Giving: Economies of Power in Indian-white
Exchanges (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

96
with the Moravian Delawares during and after the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. In
the turbulent years of the later eighteenth century, all friendly alliances were crucial, and
Friends' overtures paid off. The Delawares later sent Parrish a letter extending "hearty
thanks" for the "Provisions to the Amount of one hundred dollars, which we acknowledge
as a testimoney of your former Love and friendship toward us."145
In 1790, moreover, the Delaware Captain White Eyes "sent a message to request"
that Parrish and other Friends "would make him a visit." Upon arrival, they found that not
only had the Delaware "had the logs cut that was fell a cross the road...out of the way" for
their coming, but that he "had a Calf killed" whereupon they enjoyed several items "rost
and boiled & were entertained with much kindness & hospitality." Immediately after
dinner, Friends and White Eyes "smoked our pipes together," and Parrish reflected that
"it was like a time of brightening the chain and renewing of friendship agreable to the
Easton of our forefathers."146
White Eyes, an old friend and political ally of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, made
a point to solicit Parrish's company and offer him gifts of sustenance, but this encounter
extended beyond the bounds of mere friendship. When in his journal he connected the
dinner and subsequent sharing of tobacco with the "the Easton of our forefathers," Parrish
revealed that the meeting was simultaneously personal and diplomatic. That was not an
unusual experience in the eighteenth century. The lines between friendship and official
diplomacy often blurred because effective diplomacy was impossible without friendship.
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Indeed, as Parrish's 1791 blunder at Pickering's dinner table reveals, even experienced
diplomats stumbled from time to time precisely because friendship and diplomacy were
so intermingled.
Such instances of gift-exchange long characterized both Native-non-Native
interpersonal relationships as well as, more broadly, diplomacy in colonial America, and
they remained at the center of U.S.-Native relations throughout the nineteenth century.
When he was not at the dinner table of Colonel Pickering or attending the treaty
deliberations at Newtown in western New York in 1791, John Parrish spoke with locals
and distributed gifts among the Senecas who camped nearby. He offered Senecas "600
seames of thread with 300 nedles to the women & girls" and "about 100 fish hooks &
some lines to the men & boys which highly delighted them for which they gave many
thanks." Several days later, Colonel Pickering and the interpreters likewise attempted to
distribute "the publick Present." The Senecas were the recipients of private and public
gifts, but because Parrish was allied with Pickering and the U.S. government, all of the
gifts supported the United States' goal of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with
the Six Nations.147 With help from the Society of Friends and its members, then, the
United States government continued the British imperial tradition of appealing to the
various nations on Natives' terms.
The power of Friends' diplomatic past, together with their relationships with the
many Indian nations they encountered during their experiences in Indian Country, meant
that, by 1791, events such as John Parrish's dinner with Colonel Pickering and others
were relatively commonplace. The Quaker dined with Pickering on several occasions,
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often with Native men in attendance as well. He shared a meal, for example, with the
colonel, an interpreter, and the Seneca Red Jacket "& several other Indians" in 1791.
Members of Native nations, however, were not always in attendance. In 1793 Detroit,
Parrish dined with Colonel England and "a company of wellbehaved genteelmen mostly
officers" and "with the Officers at their Mess" on another occasion. Men like Parrish,
then, were important diplomats among Native and non-Native men, but they also worked
to maintain their relationships with their American connections.148
Such dinners among Quakers and U.S. army men involved, however, more than
mere pleasantries: Parrish was often privy to official government information. At one
meal, he learned that the U.S. interrupted a council between Britain's ally, the Mohawk
Joseph Brant, and the western Indians, while another evening's talk was "on the Subject
of war & the Slave trade." Dinners and informal conversations rendered Parrish not only
useful to Pickering among Native leaders, but they also sowed the seeds of trust between
the Quakers and the U.S. government. Not long after dining with Colonel England in
Detroit, for example, Parrish found himself in "the Garden of Coln. England a beautifull
airy Place where we spent some time in Looking over Some papers relative to Indian
Affairs." Friends' relationships with top U.S. officials gave them intimate knowledge of
official policy, and they served to blur the lines between their roles as private citizens
concerned with peace and official United States diplomats.149
Indeed, those lines were so blurred that Parrish himself often struggled to define
whether he was a private citizen or an official U.S. diplomat. He informed the Seneca
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Red Jacket that he, along with his fellow Quaker companion, was "here in a privit [sic]
capacity." He continued to explain that "we had nothing to do with Government affairs,
but we ware heartly united with the Commissioners for promoting the work of Peace." He
then again felt it necessary to state that "although we ware in a private capacity yet it was
a matter of much concern that we had obtained the concurrence of our Bretheren at
home...& like wise our proceeding was approved of by the Presedent of the U.. States." In
a single message to Red Jacket, then, Parrish twice informed the Seneca that he was there
on private business, and twice informed him that his work was done in conjunction with
the official leadership of the United States. Parrish's status relative to the U.S.
government was confusing.150
Indeed, Parrish often contemplated the nature of his relationship with the federal
government. Parrish, a private U.S. citizen, attended treaties in a self-described "privit
capacity," yet he kept his journal of events with the awareness that they were "disigned
for publick Views." This understanding of public and private underscored the Society of
Friends’ work as a non-governmental organization: the society’s papers were not
officially policed by the government—the Society of Friends was “private”—but
Parrish’s papers were intended for public consumption by other Friends. Parrish and the
Society of Friends understood their role as a spiritual one of promoting peace and uplift
among Native peoples, but also as one wherein Parrish and the society acted as liaisons
between the federal government and the broader U.S. citizenry. Parrish, by calling
explicit attention to his presence in a “privit capacity,” revealed the ambiguous—if
increasingly defined—relationship between the Society of Friends and the U.S.
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government. Friends’ non-military status also underscored the emerging qualifications for
diplomats.
It was in the function as liaisons between government and citizens that Parrish
took the most liberties in his writing. The issue of alcohol, in particular, occasioned
Parrish to question whether he had the authority to confront Colonel Pickering and the
U.S. commissioners with his concerns for Native leaders' sobriety. The Quaker, deciding
it most appropriate to address the issue in a letter to Pickering, insisted that he "came
heare from a apprehention of duty and with the Concurrence of our friends of Philada. to
attend the Treaty without any intention to Interfeer or meddle with the publick business."
Continuing on in his letter, however, he reflected that, "as Subjects of the United States
equally concernd in it[s] wellfare with our fellow Sitizens," he had a duty to ensure that
the treaty was conducted "to the general benifit of the white Inhabitants and the good of
the Indians."151
The Quaker, also, however, included his opinions of the government's official
policy towards Native nations. Though he was usually pleased with Colonel Pickering's
efforts, he did not shy from offering scathing criticism of federal Indian policy. He wrote,
for example, that "many People it may be said Lement the steps that was taken by
Goverment after the war Ceased with Great Brittan that insted of singly attending to the
Establishing a Peace (with the Natives) measure ware persued to procure Large &
extensive tracts into their Country, and making them believe they ware a conquered
People and that all their Lands in reallity was the Property of the United States, which
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only tended to raise their resentment and become a [?] Enemey." As the word "believe"
reveals, Parrish undertook his work for reasons of perceived benevolence, but also
because of a fundamental political disagreement: he did not buy into the imperial fiction
that Native peoples "ware a conquered People." As the words of both William Eaton and
the anonymous essayist revealed above, in that assessment, Parrish was not alone.152

***
Understanding the partnership between the United States and the Society of
Friends during the 1790s forces us to consider together the breadth of Native sovereignty
during the era of the early republic and both the limits of U.S. state power and the ways
in which that power grew during the same period. Parrish's presence at the 1791 dinner
table reveals that the federal government cultivated an entire diplomatic apparatus in
order to effectively treat with Native nations, and the Society of Friends played a defining
role in the development of that diplomatic schema. As U.S. officials well knew, among
the Shawnees, Delawares, and others, there existed a division between the power of
"civil" leaders and "war" leaders. Indeed, prior to the meeting of a treaty council the
Shawnee Blue Jacket informed Pickering and Parrish as much when he stated that if "he
was presant he had no voice in the Council he was of the war department...he said he had
heard of the Quakers and had come on purpose to see us and he believed a peace would
take place but he had no voice in the Civil department." Such a statement reminded the
U.S. commissioners of the violent realities of previous Euroamerican disagreements with
Native powers in North America. For Pickering and Parrish both, memories and stories of
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1760s warfare—as well as the ongoing violence that characterized the Ohio Valley
during the 1780s—informed their understandings of diplomacy and war with Native
nations: U.S.-Native diplomacy required both war and civil chiefs.153
U.S. diplomatic relations with Native nations required knowledge regarding
Native protocols of gift-giving and alliance networks but also savvy human symbols of
peace—missionaries. These essentials were premised upon both Native polities’
sovereign and ambiguous diplomatic status with the United States. Partnering with a nongovernmental organization like the Society of Friends offered the United States the
ability to cultivate peace and authority through Friends’ interpersonal networks, but it
also offered opportunities to exert imperial influence in Indian Country via unofficial
means. Friends’ diplomatic work continued into the nineteenth century, but in the Ohio
Country—and in western New York as well—it was coupled with agricultural mission
work that further connected Indians’ economies with that of the United States. Such
mission work also served to chip away at the United States’s practical need to court
indigenous sovereignty. With agricultural missions and the growth of a mission complex,
the Society of Friends offered “evidence” of Native peoples’ “dependence” on U.S.
goods and services. As will be seen, such economic “dependence” translated into political
dependence for many Americans as the nineteenth century wore on.
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Indeed, after the defeat of the allied Indian nations at the Battle of Fallen Timbers
in 1794, the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of Greenville in an effort to assert,
once again, authority over the Ohio Country's Indian populations. While the treaty
established a boundary line between the United States and Indian Country in the region, it
also ushered in a renewed effort to "civilize" the Indians. Friends were, by 1795, reliable
partners of the U.S. War Department, and they took the lead in civilizing efforts with the
support of none other than John Parrish's dinner mate, Timothy Pickering. Warfare gave
way to redoubled efforts to obscure the entrenchment of ideas of difference—as well as
Indians’ sovereignty—altogether. 1795 marked a change in Ohio Country Indian
relations, but it did not usher in the decline of the region's Native peoples. Instead,
Indians' ongoing political power and persistence forced the United States to embark upon
the hard work of empire in the Ohio Country—“civilizing” work that was intimately
connected with efforts to define what precisely it meant to be a citizen and a young
republic.
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Chapter 3
"Useful Knowledge" for "Good Citizens": The Society of Friends' Educational
Philanthropy in Baltimore and the Ohio Country

Some of Philadelphia's Quakers migrated southward to northern Virginia and
Maryland during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and they brought their
memories of William Penn, the Friendly Association, and their fellow Quakers' recent
diplomatic efforts with them. Baltimore Friends continued Philadelphia's tradition of
working among the continent's Native peoples, and one of the first tasks of the Baltimore
Yearly Meeting was to establish an Indian Concerns committee. That the meeting wasted
no time doing so reveals the importance they placed upon participation in Indian affairs.
Baltimore corresponded regularly with Philadelphia Friends on matters of reform.154
Indeed, in 1796, the year of the establishment of Baltimore Friends’ Indian Concern
Committee, the Philadelphia Committee on Indian affairs sent a letter to Baltimore
Friends asking them to relay any important information regarding Indian affairs to the
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. Philadelphia Friends assured Baltimore that they would do
likewise writing, “[a]s in our attention to this concern any thing shall arrise that may be
deemed useful & proper to communicate we mean to impart the same desiring like care
may rest with you, that what may occur as useful herein may be intimated to your loving
friends." Friends' history of contributing to Indian affairs in Pennsylvania, western New
York, and the Ohio Country, and their cooperation with Philadelphia Friends informed
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the Baltimore committee's decision to cooperate with the U.S. federal government and its
new strategy for dealing with the “Indian problem.”
Henry Knox first proposed a general "civilization plan" that would transform
Indian peoples in 1789, but the 1790s War for the Ohio Country necessarily put those
plans on hold in the region. With peace, however, the United States confronted the
problem of how to transform a diverse region still populated by indigenous polities into
territories aligned with the federal state. The civilization plan offered a means to deal
with the government’s Indian problem in the aftermath of war, and it offered a means to
commodify Indians’ lands. It also ensured that ideas regarding citizenship and morality
traveled between the urban coast and the interior of the continent. Those ideas, carried by
the government’s missionary partners, ultimately reinforced notions of Native peoples’
“otherness.”
Baltimore Friends corresponded with now Secretary of State Timothy Pickering,
and they eventually agreed to work as civilizing agents, accepting federal funds for
establishing agricultural missions. With peace in 1795, Baltimore and Philadelphia
Friends essentially divided the northeastern portion of the continent into two
philanthropic jurisdictions in order to begin civilizing reform. The Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting began work among the Haudenosaunee and other peoples in the northeast while
the Baltimore Friends endeavored to reform the Ohio Country's Native populations.155
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From the federal perspective, Friends remained useful allies into the nineteenth
century. They maintained their knowledge of indigenous networks and cultures, and they
possessed a hierarchical organizational structure that facilitated the coordination of longterm projects in remote regions. Friends were not, however, mere pawns of the federal
government. They carried with them their own goals, motivations, and ideas when
traveling among Delawares, Miamis, and their neighbors. They used their partnership
with the War Department and the still small federal state in order to instruct Native
peoples how to labor toward morality and supposedly to save Indians from extinction.
Friends drew upon emerging ideas of poverty and alcohol use to claim that liquors, in
particular, left Ohio's Indian peoples "destitute and miserable, their morals
corrupted...their minds embittered against the white people."156 Such observations were
exaggerated—Ohio Indians boasted corn fields that prevented them from being
completely "destitute and miserable”—but those observations were compelling, and they
encouraged the maintenance of the civilization plan during the first half of the nineteenth
century. Friends’ ideas and experiences thus relegated Native peoples to the bottom of the
republic’s social hierarchy and ensured that class-based assumptions became an inherent
piece of the federal civilization plan, a consequence of the federal government’s need for
missionary assistance. The ideas of race, class, and gender developing in urban Baltimore
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traveled to the Ohio along with Quaker missionaries, and, in turn, Friends—along with
other Euroamerican immigrants who moved westward—offered Native peoples direct
access to those ideas. To understand Friends’ agricultural mission work and federal
Indian policy more broadly in the nineteenth century, we must examine the emerging
ideas that ultimately gave the U.S. civilization plan its gilded aura of benevolence.

***
In 1796, several of the Baltimore Friends went to the Ohio Country "for the
purpose of learning [Natives'] situation and disposition and thence to judge of the
practicability of introducing among them the simplest and most useful arts of civil
Life."157 They carried with them—as they would on subsequent trips and in their
correspondences—their religious tenets, assumptions regarding Native peoples’ potential,
and ideas regarding both race and class that were cultivated as a result of their
experiences living in the booming and diverse city of Baltimore. Those ideas had shifted
since the days when Fox and Penn noted Delawares’ polite mannerisms, a consequence
of ongoing changes in U.S. political economy. The Friends' old partner in Indian
Country, Timothy Pickering, relayed President Washington's approval and applauded
Friends' actions because, in his view, "[m]ost attempts at civilising the Indians...have
been preposterous—We have aimed at teaching Religion & the Sciences before we have
taught them the simple and essential labours of civil life."158 Federal support for Friends’
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efforts only grew as time wore on. In 1801, the Secretary of War Henry Dearborn
thanked Friends for their previous work among Native peoples and expressed his hope
"that by a Steady and persevereing application of the means provided by the Government
of the United States, powerfully aided by the constant exertions of your Society, the
Savage tribes will ultimately form a useful part of the great family of the United
States."159 The Secretary, impressed by Philadelphia Friends' burgeoning agricultural
work among the Haudenosaunee in western New York, was also "induced to ask whether
it is probable that suitable characters for the above mentioned purpose could be found in
your society who would ingage to go into the Choctaw Nation...on condition of receiving
a reasonable compensation from the public."160 Both the Secretary's promise of funds and
Pickering's support for Friends' efforts among Ohio Indians reveal that the federal
government was eager to continue its relationship with the Society of Friends generally.
Indeed, Dearborn failed to distinguish between Philadelphia and Baltimore Friends, and
both meetings considered his letter. Ultimately, Baltimore Friends did not missionize in
Choctaw Country, but they did set their sights on the Ohio Country.
U.S. claims to authority in the Ohio remained tenuous even during the earliest
years of the nineteenth century, and the federal government—as elucidated by both
Pickering and Dearborn’s request for Friends’ aid—still required missionary
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assistance.
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The United States managed a military victory with the Battle of Fallen

Timbers in 1794 and subsequently gained a large tract of land in southeastern Ohio with
the Treaty of Greenville the following year, but still the region remained contested. The
endurance of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors, particularly in the northwest of
what became the state of Ohio and also Indiana, meant that U.S. domination remained
elusive, and that the hard work of empire remained.
The federal government, still reeling from the expenses of war with Ohio Indians
and keen to establish peace, hoped that Friends would offer a means by which to pacify
Native peoples, and agricultural education seemed the key. For members of the Society
of Friends, however, the purpose of mission work was more profound. Their agricultural
initiatives were deeply connected with their religious principles. Friends saw in the
materiality of the world an opportunity to labor towards godly perfection, and they
looked in horror upon those who "suffered the plantation of God to be as a field
uncultivated, and a desert."162 Baltimore Friends’ celebration of work as well as of
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cultivation ultimately provided a powerful impetus behind their mission to Ohio Country
Indians.
So too, however, did their experiences in urban Baltimore. Baltimore was one of
the early republic's most diverse cities, and it boasted a robust and evolving economy.
Walking through Fells Point or down Market Street, Friends encountered stevedores,
seamstresses, slaves, and street sweeps—all of whom labored for the wages that provided
basic sustenance and shelter or, in the case of the enslaved, lined the pockets of those
who claimed ownership of their labor. Friends witnessed both demographic and
economic growth on an unprecedented scale: between 1790 and 1830, Baltimore's
population grew by 497%. Much of that growing populace provided labor that
transformed eighteenth-century Baltimore Town into the thriving metropolitan Baltimore
whose harbor was one of the most important ports in the United States.163 That harbor
attracted the United States' rural population, refugees from Saint Domingue, and other
travelers, all of whom made the city diverse and its harbor the second-most popular
destination for immigrants arriving from Europe, after New York City. What was more,
Baltimore boasted the largest African American population in the United States by 1820,
and with "two of every five people of color in the city...enslaved," this made for
complicated race, class, and labor relations.164
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Baltimore's diversity meant that it nurtured a robust economic hierarchy.
Historian Seth Rockman's analysis of class in the early nineteenth-century city reveals in
stark terms the material conditions of poverty that accompanied economic development.
The city, straddling the worlds of both North and South, was integrated—and becoming
more so on a daily basis—with an economy that was reliant upon both enslaved and
waged labor. Baltimore's labor hierarchy was uncertain—particularly at the bottom.
Wageworkers sought out and answered ads seeking labor for hire, and some managed to
string together enough opportunities that enabled them to survive on their own or to
survive with the assistance of public services.165 Employers' needs, however, added to the
challenge of finding and maintaining work. They often hired and fired workers depending
upon both seasonal and daily business needs.166 It was an employers' market, and it meant
that there was a growing sense of difference between laborers and their employers.
Friends, in many ways, occupied central positions in this developing economy that left
wageworkers "scraping by" in the otherwise thriving city. Members of the Society of
Friends employed free African Americans in their homes and many became prominent
merchants and businessmen. Like their Philadelphia counterparts, they manumitted their
slaves relatively late. The Maryland Yearly Meeting (which later became the Baltimore
Yearly Meeting) did not threaten to disown Friends for slave-ownership until 1777, three
years after Philadelphia took such action.167
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This stratified socio-economic world was the foundation upon which the
republic’s developing economy was built, and that hierarchy infiltrated most aspects of
daily life in both subtle and obvious ways. Historian Jack Marietta suggests that Friends
sought to distance themselves from worldly politics and the emerging market economy,
and he explains Friends’ eventual emergence as a revitalized group set to reform
American society by pointing to Friends’ “turning inward” during the late-eighteenth and
early nineteenth century.168 Importantly, however, Friends had actively sought to reform
Indian affairs since the seventeenth century. Friends’ eagerness to engage in reform in the
early nineteenth century had a number of origins. Most importantly, Friends’ reform
work was, in part, a product of their experiences with the labor market in Baltimore, and
that engagement had profound consequences for their efforts in the city as well as in the
Ohio Country. As will be seen, social hierarchy—a notion that seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Friends openly disavowed—infused the core of Baltimore Friends’
reform philosophy by the early nineteenth century. The “benevolence” with which
Friends approached their work among Ohio Indians was built on an assumption of
difference: Indians, like wage workers, were in need of assistance not merely because
they were supposedly “savage,” but because Friends deemed them impoverished, and
thus they were in some way corrupted and susceptible to immorality.
Quakers’ place within a robust social and economic hierarchy reveals the extent to
which ideas of difference formed a part of their daily lives. Though Friends made up a
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tiny fraction of Baltimore's inhabitants, many occupied powerful positions in the city's
social and political circles and were active entrepreneurs. Prosperous Friends on
Baltimore Yearly Meeting's Indian Concerns Committee, like other wealthy members of
Baltimore's religious denominations, occupied the leadership positions in their
meetings.169 Philip E. Thomas (the eventual president of the B&O Railroad), and Elisha
Tyson and Elias Ellicott (prominent businessmen in Baltimore's flour industry), for
example, were highly visible members of the Indian Concerns committee during the first
decades of both the committee's existence and its work among indigenous peoples.170
These men benefitted mightily from others' labor, and, though their faith demanded that
they embrace simplicity, they showcased their success in a number of ways.
Many elite Quakers exhibited their status by engaging in philanthropic efforts.
Indeed, one's visibility within the meeting corresponded with the extent to which one
engaged in its public outreach. Participation on committees translated into a form of
"moral capital" that not only elevated one's status within the meeting but in the city as
well.171 Philanthropy served as a means to engage with the public and leave one's mark
upon urban life. Because philanthropy required time, however, it was often the wealthiest
Friends who participated most extensively in meeting causes by serving as committee
clerks and conducting correspondence with the federal government. It was also these
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individuals who garnered the most political "capital” fit for Quakers who openly avoided
the more obvious political posts.172 The wealthy Baltimore Friend Elisha Tyson, for
example, served on the Baltimore committee for Indian Concern as early as 1803 and
contributed to the attempt to found the Baltimore School (and later, House) of Industry
for the urban poor in 1804. He also found time to travel to the Ohio Country in 1808 to
visit Friends' agricultural missions then underway as well as actively pursue abolitionist
politics until his death in 1824.173 Tyson's philanthropic exploits garnered him a position
of prestige within the meeting, and it also provided ample material for a memorial penned
by John Tyson after his death. That his efforts became enshrined in print meant that a
wide audience of Friends—and others—knew of his charitable work.174 His philanthropy
was a means by which Tyson cultivated both his public image and his political capital.175
While Friends like Tyson and Philip E. Thomas occupied the leadership roles in
their meetings and committees, more middling men, like farmer Baltimore Phillip
Dennis, performed the actual labor of civilization in the Ohio Country. Friends were not
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immune to Baltimore's class hierarchy, instead they internalized it. Ideas of class and
material difference influenced the character of Friends’ benevolence.

***
Thanks to Friends’ experiences in urban spaces, Baltimore Quakers’ agricultural
reform work grew out of an assumption that Native peoples and laboring poor shared
much in common. Indeed, those Friends who traveled to Shawnee or Miami Country
soon saw that the problems that bedeviled wage workers in Baltimore also plagued
Native Americans. The Baltimore committee and its traveling representatives often took
pains, for example, to contrast Native peoples' supposed poverty with the richness of the
lands. Friends wrote that Ohio's Indians "suffered all the miseries of extreme poverty, in a
country, which, from its great fertility, would, with but little cultivation, abundantly
supply them with all the necessaries of life."176 Gerard T. Hopkins, Elisha Tyson,
William Kirk, and other Baltimore Friends who travelled to the Ohio attributed this
dissonance to Indians’ “laziness.” Elisha Tyson wrote in 1808, "[h]ere is a proof of
Indian industry, William Kirk last built a house and cleared a corn field for this old
Indian. The field is entirely neglected though the land is excellent. A part is grown up
with spear or bluegrass so that it would mow."177 In a similar vein, another Baltimore
Friend explained to Miamis living near Fort Wayne: "Brethren There are some amongst
us who are not industrious and will not work; these cannot earn the comforts for
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themselves which industrious people do: but are often in great distress and poverty so that
we clearly see it is by industry that a comfortable living must be obtained."178 That this
Friend compared Ohio Indians to “some amongst us” further reveals the extent to which
Friends’ experiences in Baltimore informed their observations of Native peoples.
Ohio Indians were impoverished, Quakers claimed, not only because of their
supposed lack of industry, but because of their predilection towards drinking. Alcohol
consumption, these Quaker men believed, distracted the region's Native peoples from
properly employing their lands. Baltimore Friends contended that if the region's "traders
could not be restrained from furnishing them with this destructive article, in exchange for
their skins and furrs, they would not be easily persuaded, to turn their minds toward
agriculture and the useful arts."179 The distracting qualities of alcohol paralleled what
Friends saw as one of the primary reasons why urban laborers struggled to care for their
families. Friends informed the Shawnee Captain Lewis that "[s]pirituous Liquors not only
corrupts the minds of those who drink it, but it also occasions great poverty & distress in
the families of those men who get drunk because it destroys their reason and disqualifies
them for work, it has this effect upon the white people who drink it and it will have the
same effect upon you."180 Indeed, Friends’ concerns over alcohol were so pronounced
that they lobbied the Ohio legislature in 1808 to prohibit the sale and trade of alcohol to
Indians.181
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Notions of family and masculinity were at the heart of Friends’ critiques of Native
men’s supposed laziness and alcohol abuse. In Baltimore, at the precise moment when
ideas of work and home grew increasingly distinct, men were expected to be the primary
providers for their families—at least in the visible labor market—while women, ideally,
remained at home to raise, educate, and care for children as well as perform the essential
duties of running a household. Scholars such as Jeanne Boydston demonstrate that
women’s work contributed to the early republic’s economy by enabling men to leave the
home, but as historian Karin Wulf demonstrates, the prevailing assumption by the
nineteenth century was that women relied upon men for their well-being.182 Those
women who were unfortunate enough to have to work outside of the home were among
the distressed poor in the urban republic. As Baltimore Friends’ wrote, alcohol use
“occasions great poverty & distress” among the families of “white people,” and it had the
same affect upon Native women and children.183 Indeed, when Friends, U.S. officials,
and other Euroamericans encouraged Native men to pick up the ax and plough, they often
appealed to the conditions of the men’s families.
Friends' efforts to alter Indians’ conceptions of labor were in line with
government officials' efforts to transform Native peoples' gendered relationships. Native
societies often delegated agricultural work to females, and thus the "civilizing" work of
both the government and Quakers hoped to force Native men to accept what was, for
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many Ohio Indians, "women's work." Baltimore Quakers, however, did not see their
efforts as doing so much. Instead, they were combating the image of the "squaw drudge"
who toiled in the fields.184 Agriculture, reformers contended, was a manly pursuit.185
Quakers, famously "non-conformist" in the social and theological sense, nonetheless
emphasized, like many of their fellow nineteenth-century Americans, that the proper
place for Indian women was in the home. As Gerard Hopkins explained to Miamis and
Potawatomis in 1804,
brothers the white people in order to get their land cultivated find it
necessary that their young men should be employed in it and not their
women. Women are less than men They are not as strong as men. They are
not as able to endure fatigue and toil as men. It is the business of our women
to be employed in our houses. to keep them clean to sew knit--spin--and
weave...for themselves and families to make clothes for the men and the rest
of their families to keep the clothing of their families clean and to take care
of their children.186
The seamstresses and poor women of Baltimore were largely responsible for the making
of clothes, spinning, and weaving with which Quakers were familiar and to which they
referred in this passage. Most of their wives, while often occupied in the home, took part
in Baltimore Friends' public reform culture and even served on the Indian Concern
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Moreover, Friends' belief in the Inner Light ensured that Quaker

women enjoyed spiritual equality and constituted a significant portion of the Society of
Friends' ministry. Baltimore Friends claimed to be exceptional (and, in many aspects,
were) when it came to their views of women in society yet these Friends wrote and
uttered the line "women are less than men" in their message to Miamis and
Potawatomies. Such a statement may be attributable to a number of factors. Notions of
labor and gender changed in rural and urban areas during this period and in different
ways.188 What was more, Friends were likely attempting to convince men that agriculture
required strength that women did not have. Nonetheless, the sentiment was yet another
indication of the extent to which Friends incorporated ideas of difference into their
“benevolent” work. Many Friends encouraged white elite or "middling" women to take
on public leadership roles and, by the forties, some pushed to expand female claims to
citizenship by fighting for the right to vote; they encouraged Native women, however, to
remain in the home.189
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This reorganization of gender roles also corresponded to efforts to organize the
United States' non-native population according to patriarchic norms. Among the nonIndians in the United States, men were most often the individuals with whom the
government formed an explicit relationship. Census records, for example, usually placed
the eldest male as the “head of household," and beneath his name were listed the others
living in his home and under his care. With explicitly labeled patriarchs, the government's
bureaucratic apparatus could more efficiently deal with its growing population. The
federal government's partnership with Quakers in the Ohio Country—particularly once
Quaker women began accompanying their husbands to the region to teach spinning and
weaving in 1815—facilitated the exportation of this system of governing and, moreover,
conformed with the social dynamics of the developing market economy in the east and of
Americans’ settler colonialism. Like the white, "middling" women whose domestic labor
supported men’s wage labor outside of the home, Baltimore Friends encouraged Native
women to support their husbands' work by laboring within the home.190
The language of treaties between the United States and Native Americans,
moreover, involved rhetoric of protection, promises of peace, and broad notions of
friendship—all of which implicitly challenged Native masculine diplomatic roles. An
1805 treaty with the Wyandots, for example, states “[t]he said Indian nations do again
acknowledge themselves and all their tribes, to be in friendship with, and under the
protection of the United States.”191 The United States thus presupposed both that Native
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Americans required “the protection of the United States” and that they desired friendship
with the U.S. government. With the United States demanding peace from Native people
and presuming friendship, Native peoples’ own diplomatic powers of making war and
crafting military alliances were, according to treaty rhetoric, subjugated beneath United
States authority.192 Indeed, such a loss of diplomatic and military authority had once
rendered Delawares “women” in the eyes of the Six Nations.193
Native leaders like the Miami Little Turtle, the Wyandot White Loon, and others,
however, far from being passive recipients of Quakers’ messages, capitalized upon
Euroamericans’ assumptions regarding poverty and gender. When it suited them, they
employed language of pity and charity to gain access to wares or assistance.194 Indeed,
like laborers in Baltimore, Native Americans possessed bargaining power that enabled
them to negotiate for authority.195 The Wyandot Tarhe, for example, informed Friends
that his people were "poor & needy" when he contemplated the advantages of accepting
aid from Quakers in 1805.196 The Miami Little Turtle, moreover, employed a discourse of
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poverty in his dealings with both the Society of Friends and U.S. government officials. In
doing so, he made claims upon the U.S. state. Speaking in regards to traders in 1802, for
example, the Miami chief told Baltimore Friends, "Our repeated entreaties to those who
brings this evil [liquor] amongst us, we find, has not the desired effect. We tell them;
brothers, fetch us useful things—bring goods that will clothe us, our women, our
children."197 Here, the Miami claimed impoverishment in order to secure economic
advantage—he did not want just anything that traders or the U.S. government might feel
like offering, but rather he wanted "useful things" like textiles. Little Turtle went on to
say that the liquors that were often obtained in exchange for furs, "made us poor" and that
it caused "our young men to go without clothes, our women & children to go without any
thing to eat."198 Like Friends, Little Turtle emphasized the Miamis’ desire to care for
their women and children. He appealed to Friends’ own assumptions in an effort to
secure what he wanted.
When Friends received Little Turtle's pronouncements in 1802, they moved to
send Gerard T. Hopkins and Matthew Dennis to Miami lands in order to begin an
agricultural mission. Dennis began his mission work among the Miamis two years
later.199 While some historians rightly connect such rhetoric of pity and poverty with an
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older mode of Native diplomatic condolence speechmaking, we should not assume that
such rhetoric was static.200 Native leaders' expressions of poverty took on new meanings
in the early republic and blended with older modes of Native-European diplomacy and
gift-giving. They enabled Little Turtle and others to secure philanthropic assistance and,
as chapter five makes clear, initiated a relationship within which Native Americans
asserted the power to make claims upon the state and its recruited laborers. Little Turtle
adapted missionaries' notions of impoverished Indians for his own devices by connecting
his own rhetorical overtures of poverty with the gendered model of poverty with which so
many Euroamericans—particularly urbanites like the Baltimore Friends— were
increasingly familiar.201 This gendered model of poverty, featuring male breadwinners
and female and child dependents, cultivated in places like Baltimore, traveled to the Ohio
along with Quaker missionaries where Native peoples appropriated them, remade them,
and facilitated their entrenchment.
Thanks in part to both Friends and some Native men, then, gendered ideas
regarding labor and authority, again grounded in a sense of difference, became central to
the U.S. civilization plan. Quaker reformers, often deservedly, possessed a reputation for
progressive thinking; their efforts among Native American women, however, revealed the
extent to which they were, nonetheless, influenced by and contributed to the development
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of U.S. social hierarchies. These views colored Friends’ work in the Ohio Country, and
traveling Friends ensured that ideas regarding eastern cities’ developing social hierarchy
migrated westward. Friends’ reform work in Baltimore and Ohio, among wage workers
and Indians, thus was built on myriad assumptions of difference, and it sought to offer
correctives. Rather than eliminate difference through uplift, however, Friends’
prescription—“useful knowledge”—served to reinforce emerging ideas regarding labor,
morality, and poverty in both Baltimore and the Ohio Country.

***
Friends’ agricultural mission work, with its goal of offering Indians “useful
knowledge” for their betterment, was, at its core, an educational initiative. It was one that
relegated Native peoples, however, to the bottom of the republic’s emerging social
hierarchy. Baltimore Friends, like their counterparts throughout the Atlantic world,
engaged in efforts to aid the city's poor, and they regarded both labor and education as
central, intertwined elements of their work. Friends in Wilmington, Delaware were in
many ways the most ardent in their philanthropic work, and they managed to raise
impressive sums of money that ensured that poor children—African American and
Euroamerican alike—could attend Quaker-run schools.202 Philadelphia Quakers, with
whom the Baltimore committee on Indian Concern corresponded regularly, likewise
participated in numerous efforts to provide poor relief and charity schooling. In doing so,
they not only contributed to the development of Indian policies in North America, but
they rendered educational reform among American Indians and working men and women
202
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central to the development of ideas regarding morality, citizenship and the young
republic's national character.
Ideas regarding education, still contested in the United States, traveled to Indian
Country with Quaker agricultural instructors, and they provided some of the most
fundamental intellectual underpinnings of the U.S. civilization project more broadly.
Indeed, Friends’ agricultural missions were an effort to rescue “poor Indians” from the
vagrancies of a destitute life, and they offered Native peoples a tool—“useful
knowledge”—for combating poverty. For many early Americans, ignorance of the ways
in which one might lead an industrious and sober life bedeviled the whole of the nation's
"poor"—white, black, and "red" alike. For some Friends, a belief that ignorance lay at the
root of the nation's inequality and moral degeneracy constituted the philosophical core of
their benevolence. Combining with that belief, however, was a movement towards ideas
of humanitarianism, born out of the age of Enlightenment and emerging conceptions of
sensibility in the early republic.203 Novels such as the British work Clarissa instilled
within many middling and elite early Americans a sense of duty towards those who
struggled to make ends meet.204 Far from prescribing simple financial assistance,
however, education became a means by which budding philanthropists could do their part
to help their fellow citizens—as well as Indians and enslaved Africans—while garnering
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their own “moral capital.” What was more, many thought that acts of humanitarianism
would contribute to the betterment of the young republic as a whole.205
Reformers’ insistence upon offering certain peoples specific forms of “useful
knowledge” was ultimately bound up in ideas of race, class, and gender. Baltimore
Friends traveled to the Ohio Country with the promise of "[r]eligious Instruction,
Knowlege of Agriculture and useful Mechanic Arts," but they did so without offering
complimentary instruction in the skills of reading, writing, or numeracy—skills many
deemed "useful" for others and taught as part of a transition towards "practical" education
by the late eighteenth century.206 “Useful knowledge” was based upon one’s station, and
educational reform efforts among “poor Indians” and those facing poverty was both born
from and in fundamental tension with the early republic’s emphasis upon universal
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education. Plans for universal education—schemes thought up by the likes of Thomas
Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster—ultimately emphasized the utility of
education in creating a moral citizenry.207 These men believed that an educated citizenry
was necessary to ensure that the best representatives served the federal government. At
stake, then, was not just the nation's political future but also its moral future. Indeed, for
most thinkers, morals were inseparable from politics. Education, from the earliest days of
the republic then, was at the center of a U.S. national project. Along with ideas of the
nation’s moral future, however, came fears about the nation’s corruption: “failures,”
those who experienced the conditions of poverty, appeared to be a threat to the moral
health of the republic—a corruptible force that could render the body politic diseased.208
Indeed, reformers attached an array of assumptions to their educational efforts
such that stereotypical ideas of laziness or corruption plagued urban workers and their
children. In 1805, for example, the trustees of the newly established Free School in New
York wrote, "Children thus brought up in ignorance, and amidst the contagion of bad
example, are in imminent danger of ruin; and too many of them, it is to be feared, instead
of being useful members of the community, will become the burden and pests of
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The Free School’s young pupils were thus supposedly in danger of becoming

useless either because of the parents' "extreme indigence...their intemperance and vice, or
to a blind indifference to the best interests of their offspring."210 What was more, these
children—and the nation more broadly—were susceptible to the “contagion of bad
example.” Immorality, then, was a disease that required rooting out. The parents'
supposed incompetence, however, meant that others needed to educate their children in
order to provide for the common good and to stamp out the scourge of vice. Indeed, "it
becomes the duty of the public," the Free School trustees wrote, "and of individuals, who
have the power, to assist them in the discharge of this important obligation."211
For Free School reformers and many others—including Friends—education was a
matter of practical and immediate importance. In no other way was this made clearer than
in the very discourse surrounding "useful knowledge" and its acquisition. Free School
reformers feared that laborers’ children would fail to become “useful members of the
community,” while Baltimore Friends consistently declared their intentions to offer
Native peoples “useful knowledge.” Indeed, the language of "usefulness" was
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omnipresent in the discourse on proper education. Politicians debated whether a military
education was "useful" for a successful and morally upright life, and prominent men of
Baltimore formed an association in an effort to define and attain "useful knowledge."212
When Baltimore Friends used the term "useful" to describe the particular arts and
employments that Native people could learn, then, they connected their work among
Ohio Indians to the early republic’s broader discourse surrounding notions of
"usefulness," morality, and education.213
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That discourse was also grounded in developing notions of class. Historian Seth
Rockman rightly understands the emergence of class concepts as fundamentally
connected to the material conditions of poverty. Such conditions—observed by reformers
partially as the result of stereotypes and racial assumptions—also rendered educational
reform efforts hierarchical. By limiting "useful" pursuits to agriculture and the
"mechanical arts,” Friends defined the limits, from their perspective, of Native peoples'
utility. Baltimore Friends thus included Native peoples in the discourse regarding
usefulness and, ultimately, the public good, even as they excluded Indians from the
republic proper. In 1807, for example, civilizing agent and Quaker William Kirk
proclaimed that his civilizing efforts possessed the power to transform Ohio Country
Native peoples into "peasible good citizens on our fronteers" who would "become a
strength to our Government."214 While his words revealed that he envisioned a nation that
would one day include Native peoples, they also revealed that that day was not yet at
hand. By emphasizing Indians' potential for transformation, Kirk excluded them from the
nation, and, in doing so, contributed to the process of defining the young republic's
citizenry, as well as of the American empire’s subjects. Friends’ agricultural mission
work ultimately employed a discourse of humanitarianism and perpetually ongoing
education in order to ensure that indigenous peoples would act as “useful” non-citizens.
Ideas of education and “usefulness” aided in the creation of ideas of class as well
as gender. “Republican mothers”—also non-citizens—required education so as to
cultivate good male citizens, but again, these women required only a certain form of
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Eighteenth-century Quaker schools offered their pupils a well-rounded

education that aimed to cultivate both practical skills and knowledge of the sciences,
languages, and history. The Ackworth School in Britain, for example, served Quaker
children who were "not in affluent circumstances," and Dr. John Fothergill insisted
"[t]hat the English language, writing and arithmetic, be carefully taught to the sexes."216
Still, one nineteenth-century historian of the Ackworth schools explains "[t]hat the girls
[would] also be instructed in housewifery and useful needlework."217 The school thus
taught girls the practical arts of eighteenth-century domestic life, and it also contributed
to the entrenchment of gendered and classed ideals of labor. Again, as with agricultural
education among Native men and women, “poor,” non-citizens received a labor-based
form of education.
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Similarly, early nineteenth-century Philadelphia charity school reformers—many
of them Quakers—provided more than vocational training but nonetheless provided an
education tailored for pupils who were not among the affluent Euroamerican inhabitants
of the United States. Friends' Philadelphia Adelphi School—a school intended primarily
for African American children—used the Lancasterian method of instruction wherein
older students taught younger students in order to cut costs. In contrast to other Quaker
schools, the school's overseers did not endeavor to teach Quaker doctrine, but rather basic
spiritual concepts.218 Indeed, Adelphi School reformers believed these children required
no more than the "laws of morality, the obligations of virtue and the more obvious truths
according to the Bible."219 Anything beyond that, they contended, would "not be doing
justice to the motives and views of the association."220 These reformers believed that all
youths of Philadelphia should receive education, but also insisted that laboring class
students required "the more obvious" version. Education thus became a means by which
reformers "other-ed" wage laborers, African Americans, and their children. Universal
education, in other words, had its limits.
The proposed Baltimore School of Industry likewise endeavored to provide
Baltimore's poor technical training that would enable them to earn a wage in the
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developing city. The school's proponents hoped to provide struggling individuals with a
place to live while teaching them skills to bolster their ability to earn a living.221 The
school never opened its doors but it was, nonetheless, symbolic of Baltimore leaders'
efforts to find a place for wage laborers at the bottom of the emerging economy. The
implicit philosophy undergirding the School of Industry and other similar efforts was that
certain individuals were impoverished because of a lack of industry, knowledge, and,
often, morality. Such institutions, however, provided education for work only and did not
equip workers with the knowledge to advance above earning a "living wage."222
Likewise, Quakers' agricultural missions did not provide Ohio Indians with basic literacy
or numeracy skills, and they thus relegated Native people to the bottom of the U.S. socioeconomic hierarchy. The forms of education offered by the missions and by urban
institutions alike, then, reinforced assessments regarding both laborers’ and indigenous
peoples’ potential. By emphasizing the acquisition of certain skills—often physically
labor-intensive ones—reformers further entrenched a social hierarchy grounded in ideas
of labor, virtue, and, increasingly, race.
Quakers' agricultural missions, like urban educational reform efforts, thus
emphasized the acquisition of particular kinds of knowledge and "habits of industry," and
they similarly framed the “Indian problem” as a moral problem. According to Baltimore
Friends, however, Indians’ failures were not solely their fault. In 1796, the Baltimore
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Indian concerns committee wrote, "[t]he distresses and difficulties which these poor
people labour under we believe may in a great degree be attributed to their propensity to
the use of Spiritous Liquors introduced among them by Traders and Evil-minded
men...and through this their attachment to this debasing and destructive Enjine of Satan,
they are left destitute and miserable, their morals corruped...their mind embittered against
the white people."223 Here, Friends made clear that it was also corrupt Euroamericans
who were responsible for Indians' "poverty." Instead of setting a moral example, traders
"corrupted" Indians in much the same way that the New York Free School’s "indigent"
parents corrupted their children. This, again, contributed to the notion that there were
those within the American nation—some white men—who actively spread the disease of
vice. Indeed, those Euroamericans whom reformers labeled immoral or corrupt were in
danger of being banished from the nation all together. One Friend wrote that some
Americans’
mannor of living contributes to produce ferosety being continually
engaged in hunting savage beasts...these people live between the law &
the Indians, & as settlement cultivation & law extends further, The wild
game & the Indians retreat, these people keep thier possition & follow the
game & the Indians, & in thier commerce with the latter have borrowed all
thier Vicess, & neglected thier Virtues.224
According to this Friend, these settlers were not "poor Indians" but they were not truly
American "citizens" either. Instead, they lived "between the law & the Indians," a
consequence of their "whiteness," "ferosety," and lack of proper virtue and occupation.
They needed to cease "hunting savage beasts," learn the proper ways of settlement and
223
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cultivation, and, instead of keeping "thier possition," they needed to pick a side. Like
Native Americans, these "white savages" (also described as witchcraft-practicing “Arabs”
in at least one early republic textbook) needed to learn to live within the law and become
civilized for the good of the republic.225
That traders and settlers spread the contagion of vice in lands on the fringes of the
empire was equally disturbing as the problems plaguing the republic’s cities. From
Friends’ point of view, both had the power to affect the nation’s future; Native peoples
did possess, after all, the potential for becoming “good citizens.” Framing Indians'
problems in this way thus was, in part, a neat way of pinpointing the problems plaguing
the republic. It meant that Friends could combat Ohio Indians' problems—and those
facing the republic—by sharing with them their “useful knowledge” of farming, and,
through farming, virtue. With knowledge and virtue the Ohio Country and its inhabitants
would become a healthy portion of the growing republic.226
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Quaker reformers’ readiness to provide Native peoples only with agricultural
instruction reveals that by the early nineteenth century Friends embraced an economic
and social hierarchy built upon assumptions of Natives’ ignorance and material
difference. At an earlier point in their history, Friends once refused to show deference
when addressing their supposed social superiors, and men like George Fox and William
Penn took pains to comment upon Native peoples’ similarities with non-Natives. By the
early nineteenth century, however, Friends’ educational and reform movements embraced
the recognition of a clear difference between Native Americans and African Americans,
and the poor more generally, on the one hand and everyone else on the other. Ohio
Country Native Americans needed to heed the instructions of Friends in order to learn to
raise food that could ensure their survival; Baltimore's African Americans and urban poor
were to go to the School of Industry in order to learn to earn a living wage; all were to
learn to take their place in the developing economy. The most prominent members of the
Baltimore Society of Friends, therefore, were fully entrenched in the new political
economy of the early republic and their benevolence reveals the ways in which these
former social and theological outcasts became, at least in part, simultaneously part of and
contributors to a mainstream culture built around the assumption of inequality. While
some state officials disagreed with their inclusive—albeit stratified—vision of the nation,
it nonetheless shaped U.S. imperial Indian policy. Agricultural education and technical
training remained a centerpiece of Native American boarding schools into the twentieth
century.
Hope for the future was also at the heart of Friends’ mission. Even as traveling
Quakers closed their eyes to Ohio Indians' corn fields, they saw with clarity the region's
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potential to become like the more familiar urban coast. They made frequent references,
for example, to the small villages they encountered during their travels, and they
projected upon them their own prospective visions. One traveler, for example, described
a place on the eastern shore of the river in Virginia, as containing only three houses but
quickly added that "thier was a time when the cittys of London & philadelphia did not
contain more, & I see no reason which it may not grow as large as them or any place, if it
do not it is neither for want of room or Materials."227 Another Friend proclaimed that
"Many difficulties attend new settlers—though the soil in most places is luxuriant beyond
the conception of those who live in our eastern Counties, yet the labour of clearing is
great and the pinching times they experience before they can get much returns ought to
be weightily attended to."228 Life in the "west," Friends contended, was difficult at first,
but they could develop that wide expanse through which they traveled in a way that
would resemble life near home.
Traveling Friends carried visions of their home in Baltimore with them on their
journeys. Friends’ experiences in that booming metropolis influenced their observations
of Native peoples, their dreams for the western lands, and, ultimately, U.S. Indian policy.
Baltimore was a thriving city, however, because of its position as an urban center through
which goods moved: it connected the agrarian lands of rural Maryland with a thriving
harbor. Baltimore Friends understood the importance of economic infrastructure in the
development of lands; their own flour and textile successes were built upon economic
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projects akin to that underway in the Ohio Country. They also understood, however, the
importance of workers and consumers—black, white, and, in the Ohio Country, "red"—
in building cities. Their reform work, then, could build a moral, industrious nation and a
powerful empire, and it could transform a vast west into a place resembling home, one
farm at a time.
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Chapter 4
The Mission Complex: Economic Development, “Civilization,” and Empire in the
Early Republic

Friends’ agricultural mission work offered them a means to better the supposedly
wretched situations of Native peoples. It also, however, offered a way to remake the earth
in God’s image, to cultivate the “outer plantation” by encouraging habits of industrious
virtue among Native peoples and Friends alike, and to spread “moral beauty over the face
of the desart.”229 Ultimately, however, Quakers’ missions had far-reaching economic and
political consequences that extended beyond even their own explicit goals. Agricultural
education offered a means by which to include Native peoples in the republic’s emerging
social hierarchy, and agricultural mission work facilitated the growth of the U.S.
economy. Indeed, agricultural missions transformed landscapes, mobilized capital, and
supported a national effort to build a "great and united empire" through commerce by
both requiring goods and labor and promoting socioeconomic "conversion." With federal
direction and investment, missionaries like the Friends, Indian agents, blacksmiths,
merchants, and manufacturers contributed their work and wares toward efforts to civilize
indigenous peoples in the Ohio Country. In turn, they linked urban and rural economies
and produced agricultural goods, laborers, markets, and, so officials hoped, increasingly
marketable—and taxable—land. When the U.S. federal government recruited and paid
Quaker missionaries for their efforts to "civilize" Native peoples, then, it employed them
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as imperial agents in a mission complex that linked the economies of Indian Country with
those of New Orleans, the urban U.S. coast, and the world.230
The mission complex expanded the influence and power of the United States in
the Ohio Country, the North American southeast, and beyond through mission work and
economic development by linking missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal
employees, and indigenous peoples through networks of markets and capital. It was
imperial, and by supporting Indians' agricultural education, it endeavored to render—if
temporarily—the region's Native Americans an agrarian working class. As chapter five
will show, it also offered opportunities for Native peoples to manipulate U.S. economic
development for their own purposes, even as it transformed landscapes and bolstered the
United States' ability to reap the rewards of expanding agricultural markets in lands that
remained in Indians' hands. In the Ohio Country—a territory of fertile land that banned
U.S. slavery with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787—this state-directed project provided
a cost-efficient means of imperial economic development, and it reveals the federal state's
importance as a pivotal actor in the developing U.S. market economy and its social
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relations. Attention to the mission complex thus adds to our already rich understanding of
market expansion and economic change in the early republic.231
Like Philip Curtin's "plantation complex," the mission complex was, at its core, a
"political and economic order" that fostered economic development, and viewing Friends
and Natives through this lens enables us to situate two central facets of U.S.
colonialism—civilizing plans and mission work—within the social, political, and
economic strategies that advanced U.S. colonialism. What is more, the concept forces us
to recognize missions' power to facilitate broad economic change as well as produce the
more familiar episodes of cultural negotiation in the early republic. The mission complex
was central to the layered economic, social, and political development of the Ohio
Country, and it reveals that there were alternative—though not necessarily competing—
forms of economic development at work in North America. Evidence of the simultaneous
existence of the state-driven mission complex, Native economies, and slavery in the
North American southeast makes this clear. Attention to the complex's functioning in the
Ohio Country, however, allows us to chart the sinews of market development in lands
further removed from the South's developing slave markets. Such analysis then elucidates
the fact that peoples, politics, and policies in Indian Country played critical roles in
producing dynamic ideas of wage labor, private property, and class in the early republic
and its continental empire—and beyond. Attention to the functioning of this system based
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upon free yet hierarchical relations of power ultimately illuminates how the early U.S.
empire thrived off of economic growth, and it reveals that imperial state policy, as well as
a myriad of Native and non-Native actors like the Friends, facilitated the development
and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor in the early republic.232
***
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When Friends traveled to the Ohio Country at the turn of the nineteenth century,
they ventured into a world created by the region's Native communities, British and
French inhabitants, and migrating Americans. The regional economy was built upon the
rules of neighborly reciprocity and the politics of collective economic advantage: it drew
upon the communal labor practices embraced by regional Native peoples for their utility
in efficiently clearing lands and harvesting crops. Euroamerican immigrant families
adopted these practices and similarly sent members to community events such as
logrollings in order to assist new arrivals in the difficult work of clearing and building on
land. The civilization plan in the Ohio Country likewise borrowed and built upon the
region's cultural labor relations: it brought together Quakers and members of Native
communities to transform the landscape, and it thus modeled, at first, existing economic
practices.233
Friends used their government connections to gather information regarding travel
and communication before embarking on their journeys to the Ohio Country. Secretary of
War Dearborn responded to Friend Isaac Tyson's 1808 query regarding his Ohio
destination and informed him that the government had “no messenger going to Fort
Wayne, but the trail for that Quarter leaves the City every Sunday & Thursday. No Post
Office being established at Fort Wayne, you will have to direct to that place by the way
of Staunton, Ohio.” The secretary's response revealed that Tyson would experience a
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deprivation of government facilities in the west, but that there was enough administrative
support to make an organized departure possible. Friends were more fortunate than most
early Americans by virtue of their well-connected government partners, and they used
them to gather information that facilitated their journeys.234
En route to their Ohio missions, Baltimore Friends passed through a region
marked by layers of economic development. Mounds—remnants of the Mississippian
cultures of the Mississippi and Ohio valleys—dotted their path and caused befuddlement
as some struggled to ascertain whether they were the residue of an old European colony
or rather built by northward roaming Indians from "Mixico" fleeing civil war. Surely
"northern Indians," as one Friend wrote, did not build them. Nor did the region's Native
peoples, so Friends thought, produce the abundant fields of corn that appeared so
impressive. By the time Baltimore Quaker Gerard T. Hopkins passed through the eastern
portion of the upper Ohio Valley in 1804, however, westward travel was in the process of
adding another layer of change to the lands already altered by millennia of economic
development, centuries of fur trading, and imperial conflicts. Friends' journeys, like those
of others, bolstered the economic development of a number of Quaker and non-Quaker
towns between Baltimore and Ohio or Indiana by feeding local economies that profited
from an increasing stream of provision-seeking, migrating travelers.235
Indeed, the Ohio River was the primary artery westward, and towns such as
Wheeling and Marietta reaped the profits by offering wares, boatmen, and guides. One
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Friend traveling near the Scioto River, for example, remarked that “the people in the
town endevour to suply them & make them pay well for it." Though traveling Friends
made up a small percentage of westward-bound immigrants, their federally sanctioned
travel contributed to the small-town profits that, in turn, encouraged both migration to
and settlement in the region. Legal settlement had the potential to generate federal
revenues and expand emerging markets, and federal officials endeavored to divide the
Ohio lands into townships and expedite their sale for such purposes. At the turn of the
century, however, land sales were slow; legitimate migration to the region proved
insufficient to produce relief for the debt-ridden federal government. With squatters
filling the region, the government failed to reap its desired revenues even after the 1787
Ordinance opened the lands to large speculation. Congress initiated a system of credit
with the Frontier Land Bill in 1800 in an effort to attract smaller purchasers, but such a
scheme likewise failed to open the lands to small buyers who too frequently failed to pay
off their debts.236
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Government officials, hopeful that migrating settlers would buy and fill the lands,
conceptualized plans for the lands even if revenues, because of loan defaults, were less
than expected. Governor Harrison's 1802 scheme for Jeffersonville near the Ohio River in
Indiana Territory, for example, resembled a checkerboard with open lots adjacent to those
that were to be occupied. President Jefferson found Harrison’s idea "handsome, &
pleasant," believing "it to be the best means of preserving the cities of America from the
scourge of the yellow fever which being peculiar to our country must be derived
from...our cloudless skies, [for]...Ventilation is indispensably necessary." Jefferson
envisioned "the cities of America" flourishing in the region, and, with keen interest, he
sent a sketch of the proposed town for Harrison's perusal since he could not "decide from
the drawing you sent me, whether you have laid off streets round the squares thus or only
the diagonal streets therein marked. The former was my idea, and is, I imagine, more
convenient." Not surprisingly, Jeffersonville's original design was abandoned by 1810
due to the impracticalities of so many open lots in a state that saw massive population
growth—a staggering 413%—during the first decade of the nineteenth century.237
While the federal government struggled to determine the best means of reaping
revenues from settlement in the region, land speculators such as John Armstrong and
William Wells (the latter was a speculator in the 1790s and an Indian Agent for the U.S.
in the 1800s) endeavored to turn a profit by buying extensive tracts and offering loans to
individuals with signed contracts. Like federal policies, Wells' correspondence reveals
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not a lack of settlers but rather a frustrating lack of legitimate settlers in the region. Wells
informed Armstrong that he encountered "numbers of people" wanting "to purchase lands
but they are mostly poor, destitute of money, and wish to purchase on long credits." As a
result, "the sales of lands at Cincinnati were very small, when we consider the number of
settlers, and the immense quantity of superior lands there offered for sale." With
legitimate settlement and land purchases, speculators and the government alike hoped to
reap revenues and manage squatters.238
Federally directed economic development promised to boost the evolution of the
regional economy already underway and generate revenues for the government and
speculators alike. Friends' missions thus complemented the federal and speculator quest
for legal settlement in both the long and short term. And not simply because farming
would free Native nations to sell much of their increasingly commodified lands to the
United States—though that was, of course, part of the story. The Northwest Indian War
was a still-fresh memory to many Americans—particularly in Ohio and Indiana
Territory—and Friends' work offered a means by which the federal government could
deal peacefully with Native peoples. Friends' work targeted, in particular, Native nations'
young men, and those men were often in fact and certainly in Euroamericans'
imaginations the warriors who wrought bloody havoc among settlers and their property.
Many government officials, Friends, and settlers hoped Natives’ “transition” to farm life
would secure peace. With peace—or with the illusion of peace—secured by educators
who enjoyed a positive reputation among the region’s Indian nations (as opposed to the
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generally suspect reputation of government officials) would come, in the minds of many,
regional stability; with that would come increased land sales, settlement, and state and
federal tax revenues. Because peace was a protracted process, however, Baltimore
Friends' agricultural mission efforts were also crucial to the United States' short-term
economic policies: they aimed to convert to the ways of civilized economy those who
many Americans deemed agriculturally-deficient "heathens." In turn, they created and
expanded U.S. markets and consumerism.239
Indeed, in many ways the aim to convert was, for economic and political
purposes, most important. Both the nation's finances and its humanitarian reputation were
at the forefront of officials' thinking. Governor William Henry Harrison pondered in
1801, for example, "Whether some thing ought not to be done to prevent the reproach
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which will attach to the American Character by the extirpation of so many human
beings." Though he ultimately concluded that such matters were better left to the
president to decide, his concerns echoed those of the first Secretary of War, Henry Knox,
who in 1789 contended, “How different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to
reflect that instead of exterminating a part of the human race...[we] had imparted our
Knowledge of cultivation, and the arts, to the Aboriginals of the Country.” Paternalistic
rhetoric bolstered U.S. claims to benevolent power fit for a republic even as it facilitated
the development of an imperial market system; it was "knowledge of cultivation," after
all, that mattered most to men like Knox. Such an emphasis on agriculture not only
required an expanded market economy, but it also contributed to the development of class
hierarchy in the United States: Native peoples were fit for farming, these men
determined, and so agricultural education alone would prove their savior. The veneer of
benevolence was central to U.S. imperial economic transformation.240
As chapter three demonstrates, Baltimore Quakers' brand of mission work was a
product of their experiences in their urban environment and its economy of wage laborers
and slaves. They determined European-style farming to be the best means of eradicating
Natives' "savagery," and, from their perspective, cooperation with the War Department
and the small federal state facilitated the expansion of their efforts to save impoverished
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Indians from extinction. Their work also, however, supported U.S. policies that, in turn,
developed capitalist markets and forms of labor. Baltimore Friends’ mission work,
focused on "useful" agricultural education, encouraged a commodification of Native
labor that erased the individual and his need for numeracy as part of an agricultural
education, even as it mobilized Friends' own work on behalf of their religious society and
the state.241 Indeed, for their work they received pay from the federal government in ways
similar to the tax benefits, grant money, and funds granted to other voluntary
organizations in the nineteenth century and beyond. Though Friends' compensation was
piecemeal at first, the Civilization Fund of 1819 institutionalized their pay and
guaranteed that missionaries received $10,000 annually. State power mobilized Friends
and, later, other missionaries in the effort to solve an ongoing "Indian problem."242
Indeed, similar to ideas of "disciplined labor" in other imperial contexts, the U.S.
state worked with missionaries to define and class its labor force using categories of
civilization and savagery. Quakers’ efforts helped shape nineteenth-century rhetoric that
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proclaimed indigenous populations to be working toward civilization—they were never
all quite "civilized" despite the rhetorical exceptions of the "five civilized tribes." The
civilization project was, then, a constant work in progress, a never-to-be-completed work,
and it set precedents for the federal management of labor on the continent and abroad,
even as it contributed to economic transformation. The complex was a "benevolent," free
labor answer to the problems presented by federal desires for land, revenue, economic
development, and remaining indigenous communities: agricultural uplift produced
agricultural production, markets for American manufacturers, and, in turn, increasingly
valuable land.243

***
Armed with both a mission and federal support, Baltimore Quaker Phillip Dennis
arrived in Indiana Territory in 1804. He there embarked upon the first of Friends’
agricultural efforts by forming "Dennis's Station” for the benefit of Miami, Eel River, and
Delaware Indians on the Wabash River thirty to forty miles southwest of Fort Wayne.
Friends later formed at least two other missions at Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) and
Wapakoneta both among the Shawnees in western Ohio. The Miami chief Little Turtle
positioned Dennis's Station or "Little Turtle's Farm School" at a location several miles
away from the village in which the theoretical pupils lived, likely in an effort both to
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assert control over the Quakers' work and keep the Euroamerican men at a distance. The
mission was nonetheless just south of the Forks of the Wabash—a valuable location
where the Little River joined the Wabash in Indiana. Though it took over twenty years for
the United States to claim ownership of the spot, Dennis's work of clearing and fencing
fields, producing crops, and constructing a cabin for his residence not only showcased for
the local Miamis and some Delawares the intricacies of becoming a “proper”
agriculturalist, but offered an opportunity to expand an agricultural market at a lucrative
location.244
By the end of 1804, only one Delaware family relocated to the farm school lands,
but Dennis offered his colleagues in Baltimore hope for the future by noting "that 55 Eal
river Indians had been at his station.” Such rhetoric of success encouraged the
maintenance of the mission complex and ensured that the state continued its efforts to
manage the labor of missionaries and their pupils. In 1807 Wapakoneta, Quaker William
Kirk agreed to bring civilization to the Shawnees there for "one thousand dollars, as pay"
along with a federal budget of $6,000 "on condition" that he would "undertake the
Superintenency and...procure the necessary Assistants and labourers, together with such
implements of husbandry and horses as [his] proposed system embraces." The Quaker
kept Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed of his progress and in doing so revealed
the vast amount of physical work that he, his Quaker employees, and the Shawnees
performed. After several months in Ohio, he had "placed all the young men among the
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Shawnees (except while three of them were imployed in making a small improvement for
a few Dellawares...)" and had high hopes that he was "likely to succeed as fast as the
most Sanguine could have expected as they work constantly with my young men."
Together, Shawnees and Friends "built several Cabins," "made Rails & fenced in about
one Hundred Acres of Ground," "cleared about thirty" more "& planted in Corn better
then two Hundred Acres." By 1816, moreover, Baltimore Friends' mission among the
Shawnees at Wapakoneta yielded "between 7000 & 8000 Bushels" of corn, and they
"found many of [the inhabitants] at work, in their fields" with "a considerable portion of
them...becoming industrious" and raising poultry.245
Through missionary and indigenous labor, the federal government produced and
managed workers but also transformed the landscape and expanded present and future
markets. The missions were thus labor-intensive ventures that fostered U.S. economic
development, and the federal state viewed them as worthwhile investments. Kirk's
mission at Wapakoneta, located just north of the Greenville line that separated Indian
Country from the United States in Ohio, offered an opportunity for the U.S. to reap
economic benefits from lands that remained unceded by Native peoples. Though Kirk
departed the region in 1808, Friends agreed to sustain the mission site in 1810 after
Secretary of War William Eustis wrote that "the Government has consented to
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relinquish...the public property at that place to [Friends'] discretion and management" and
that "the Government is to be at no expense hereafter in conducting this establishment."
The deal saved Friends the cost of buying land for their missions, minimized federal
costs, and allowed the government to pay for services with a currency that was, at the
moment, much more readily available than government cash—land. It also pleased
regional Indian agent John Johnston who, prior to the agreement, argued that
abandonment of the settlement at Wapakoneta would "give a stroke to the buisness in this
country from which it will not soon recover." He explained that, "all the Tools necessary
for the purpose of Farming on a large scale is on the spot," that "a waggon road from the
Settlements in ohio to the Town is cut out," and that he knew "of no place in the Indian
country where money could be so usefully expended as with the Shawanoes at Kirks
Settlement."246
Johnston's words, coupled with the actions of Friends and government officials,
reveals that the civilization plan in the Ohio Country promoted not just subsistence
farming among "poor Indians" but "Farming on a large scale." Friends noted in 1813, for
example, that 3,000 bushels of corn were sold that season but also explained that "when
Peace is restored in that Country, these People will be more than Ever disposed to pursue
the farming business." "Indian country," both Friends and officials thought, could
contribute to the development of U.S. territory, indigenous communities, and agricultural
markets, but it was no easy task. Missions required roads to connect the farms with
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nearby towns, and the work of civilization required textiles, agricultural implements, and
stores for Native peoples' future consumerism. Friends' agricultural education work
bolstered trade in Indian wares, and by doing so, it incorporated Ohio Indian nations and
their resourceful lands into the U.S. market economy.247
None of this would have been possible, however, without U.S. government
officials' efforts on the ground. These men sold and distributed farm implements such as
rails for fences and supplies for the construction of mills. Moreover, they constructed
political alliances with settlers, Native chiefs, Quakers, and government officials. Indian
agents William Wells and John Johnston, for example, worked with Baltimore Friends
and kept them abreast of developments in the region. Wells informed Quakers in 1805,
that "there would be 100 acres of Land under good fence at the Little Turtles Town (15
miles north of Dennis' Station) by the 1st of the 6 mo" and "that they had obtained a large
number of Hogs and some Cows." When Philip Dennis returned to his family in
Maryland, Friends asked Wells to place one of his men at Dennis's Station, at Friends'
expense, until they could find another Quaker to carry out the work. Friends likewise
informed Johnston that "we request thee to do us the favour to hire two suitable men...and
draw on our Treasurer Elias Ellicott at sight for the amount of expence incured; we also
request thee to write to us about the middle of the 7th mo (July) and let us know what aid
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is rendered." Wells, Johnston, and other Indian agents thus oversaw U.S.-Indian relations
at Fort Wayne, Piqua and elsewhere in the region, but they also maintained connections
with the society that provided diplomatic and educational support to the federal
government's plans. They served as the crucial links between Friends, the federal
government, and Native peoples on the ground.248
These relationships, particularly those with high ranking officials, offered Friends'
efforts the federal seal of legitimacy. Friends often arrived at western posts carrying
letters signed by the secretary of war mandating that post officials welcome them and
treat them with hospitality. Secretary Dearborn wrote to territorial Governor William
Hull and John Johnston in 1808, for example, in order to ensure that they offered Elisha
Tyson and James Gillingham a warm reception. The secretary informed his men that “any
civilities you may afford them in the execution of their benevolent intentions will be
grateful to them and their Society & pleasing to the Prest. of the U.S.” When Friends and
other missionaries carried such letters they not only showcased federal officials' approval
of their work, but they supported implicit federal claims to control citizens' movement.
Such letters would not have been necessary if movement was entirely free in Indian
Country. The federal government enhanced its authority over both citizens and noncitizens by managing its laboring and administrative bureaucracy; Friends’ agricultural
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mission work thus contributed to a western state-building project that took place in many
forms.249
Baltimore Friends relied upon men like Johnston for assistance, but they also
influenced agents' hiring. After Johnston replaced Wells as Indian Agent in Ohio, the
War Department recruited Quaker John Shaw to serve as Johnston's paid assistant. Shaw
continued the work at Dennis's Station after Philip Dennis and then William Kirk
returned to Maryland. Baltimore Friends' influence, however, extended further. They
encouraged federal officials to hire Hendrick Aupaumut as another of Johnston’s
assistants in 1809. Friends deemed the experienced Mohican go-between "to be a
judicious intelligent, worthy man, and well qualified for extensive usefulness" among the
Miamis at Dennis's Station. Friends explained that "we so far interested ourselves in his
behalf with the Government as to solicit some assistance for him, which has been granted
and placed under thy superintendence, and we take the liberty to request thy friendly aid
and attention to him, which will very much oblige us, and promote the benevolent view
of Government." In part because of Friends' influence, Aupaumut found employment
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with the War Department and maintained a vital presence in the Ohio Country during the
War of 1812.250
Relationships with Indian agents, perhaps most importantly John Johnston, with
the secretary of war, even with the president of the United States, were vital to Friends’
work, but so too was their connection with developing economic posts. Indeed, the early
republic's Indian factory system connected eastern manufacturers and developing
regional centers such as Cincinnati with the rural interior, and, the factory stores, along
with the civilization plan, were key components of the mission complex in the Ohio
Country. The factories offered for sale the manufactured agricultural implements,
textiles, and other goods requisite for Natives civilized lifestyle—the Fort Wayne factory
store, for example, had nearly 500 hoes on-hand in 1806. More broadly, however, the
factories aimed to wrest control of the fur trade from private traders and establish stores
and an administrative hierarchy of Indian factors and agents in Indian Country. By
attempting to monopolize the sale of agricultural manufactures, linens, and other goods,
moreover, it contributed to federal overtures of Native dependence on U.S. manufactures
during the early nineteenth century. The stores, along with the Trade and Intercourse Acts
that established the federal government as the overseer of the Indian trade, meant that the
federal government controlled both trade and market expansion in Indian Country.
Because "Indian Country" was so near the official boundaries of the United States in the
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upper Ohio Country, federal expansion of markets there expanded both Euroamericans'
access to markets and, in turn, the regional and national market economy.251
The work performed by the purveyor of public supplies and later the
superintendents of Indian trade offered federal backing to the creation of an economy
built upon the shared interests of agriculture and manufacturing. Tench Coxe, in
particular, as one of the first to procure goods for the federal Indian trade and factory
system, set the model for the later superintendents. Coxe was a strong supporter of
manufacturing and industry, and he supported government regulation of "revenue and
commerce." He argued that manufactures should aim at "accommodating the interests of
agriculture, manufactures and commerce in such a manner, as to render them reciprocally
a support to each other, and mutually beneficial to the interest of the nation." For Coxe,
agriculture and manufacturing went hand in hand and, together, they contributed to
national political independence and power.252
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The purveyors and later the Superintendents of Indian Trade procured goods from
merchants and manufacturers in cities such as Philadelphia and Baltimore, or in western
towns like Cincinnati, and they utilized the republic's rivers and fields to ship the wares
to factory stores for both purchase and distribution as Indian annuities. In 1810, for
example, Coxe paid one man $837.42 for "ironmongery," another $111.90 for "50 axes &
40 grubbing hoes," and still another $1,426.35 for "axes, ploughs, etc." "Blacksmiths
tools" from Philadelphian Nicodemus Lloyd and 120 medals from the silversmith Liberty
Brown were also paid for with federal funds. In 1814, moreover, the Superintendent of
Indian Trade John Mason informed then Secretary of War John Armstrong that "a
considerable portion of Woolens can be bought at Cincinnatti on pretty good terms." As
Mason's statement suggests, federal officials sought the best prices for their business.
Once officials were satisfied with the specifics of procurement and shipment, the items
traveled to the factory stores at Fort Wayne and Piqua in the Ohio Country and elsewhere
throughout the heart of the continent, and the trade thereby supported U.S. manufacturers
but also those engaged in occupations such as shipbuilding, road-building, and transport.
The expansion of markets in Indian Country had far-reaching and often profitable
economic consequences.253
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Once procured, Native nations and individuals purchased and received trade
goods with their annuity funds. In 1802, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas,
Chippewas, and Potawatomies obtained $1,000 per nation in the form of "Thirty Rifles,
Thirty pounds of Powder, sixty pounds of Lead, one hundred small corn Hoes, and sixty
small axes." Eel River Indians, Wyandots, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and
Kaskaskias received similar items but in proportion to their number such that each nation
received $500 worth of goods. Offering such goods as Indian annuities translated
rhetorical support of urban manufacturing into real federal financial backing: the
purchase of goods aided manufacturers in the short term, while the potential to expand
markets in Indian Country offered hopes for a new consumer base that included both
Indians and, with regional peace, migrating Euroamerican settlers. The United States thus
compensated Native peoples for their lands with annuities, but then used those annuities
to invest in its own economy.
Because the wares possessed the power to transform U.S. officials' economic
aspirations into reality, their quality mattered. When John Johnston complained that some
wares were defective, Superintendent Mason therefore informed him that "The Rifles you
complain of were made in Philad....I request you will continue to make your observations
on the goods sent, to forward samples, to describe the articles best suiting Indian Trade
out of this much good will grow & every attention shall be paid in the soliciting." The
stores' accounts thus reveal the simultaneously diffuse and centralized power necessary
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for the maintenance of the mission complex as well as the extent to which Native nations'
consumerism influenced the development of the U.S. economy.254
Between 1807 and 1811, the factory store at Fort Wayne made a profit of
$10,502.77—a pittance in terms of the national GDP but a large sum in Indian Country
nonetheless. The decreased military activity in Indian Country, in part the result of
Friends', Indian agents', and Natives' diplomacy in the region, combined with these
profits and the expanding reach of U.S. markets to render the factory system and
missionaries' efforts worthwhile, co-constitutive investments. In 1806, moreover, the
factory's accounts reveal that more than one-third of the debts owed the store—
$1,203.00—belonged to Native American individuals. The stores therefore not only
encouraged Native people to participate in the U.S. economy, but they also welcomed
them—along with the Euroamericans who owned the remaining two-thirds of the debt—
into a cycle of credit and debt. Though the factory system stores' success was
inconsistent, and "factory" stores ceased to exist after 1822, government-run stores and
Indian agencies remained central to Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century, and
their connection with officials' desire both to expand the U.S. economy and undermine
private and foreign traders aligned with broader U.S. policy.255
Just as popular notions of the national defense supported both the development of
the U.S. standing army and tariffs on domestic military manufactures, similar concerns
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about the virtue and industry of the nation's republican citizenry rendered any statedirected commerce required to "civilize" Native Americans commensurate with notions
of the nation's benevolence. In many Americans' political imaginations, Indian factories
and annuities likely were connected with the "Indian problem" and notions of U.S.
benevolence—not to federal economic policy. Because of this, neither Federalists nor
Democratic-Republicans bemoaned—or explicitly recognized—the expansion of the
mission complex in the Ohio Country, and Indian policy changed little as a result of the
"Revolution of 1800."256
So subtle—from the perspective of the average U.S. citizen—was the costefficient development of the U.S. imperialist mission complex in the Ohio Country, that it
facilitated the transformation of the region's political and economic order with little
fanfare. Most contemporaries—and many historians—saw the 1795 Treaty of Greenville
as the death knell for Native sovereign power in the region, but only because "peaceful,"
economic imperialism was less obvious—if no less violent for its social, economic, and
political consequences—than war. Together civilizing policies, market expansion, and
federal investment in Indian Country transformed Ohio Country inhabitants' ways of life.
They also, however, enabled indigenous peoples to continue to shape the diffuse state's
policies, the U.S. economy, and American imperialism.
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***
The mission complex accelerated the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the
U.S. market economy and offered them additional power as consumers in the early
republic—even as it encouraged Native peoples’ disengagement with other Atlantic
markets. Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors, however, continued to make daily
decisions based upon their needs and desires as well as upon the opportunities at their
disposal. U.S. policies constrained these opportunities, but they did not eliminate them.
Indeed, the labor relations that accompanied the mission complex rendered Shawnees and
their neighbors key creators, links in, and manipulators of the U.S. economy, and this
continued even during the volatile years of the War of 1812. Because the War
Department partially funded the civilization project by allocating annuity funds toward
agricultural tools and missionary labor, in essence Native nations paid Friends and
government officials to clear their fields, build mills, plant corn, fence lands, and build
the roads that connected their crops with Euroamerican markets. Shawnees, Wyandots,
and their neighbors therefore found ways to take advantage of the United States'
commodification of their lands: they adopted the practices undertaken by missionaries
and the federal state, blended those with their own ideas of economy, and used
Euroamerican labor and resources, purchased with their annuities, to invest in their lands.
They ultimately, then, helped shape the expansion of the U.S. market economy in the
nineteenth-century Ohio Country before, during, and after the United States' war with
Great Britain. Even more broadly, they continued to act as active participants, affected by
the same squabbles, opportunities, and obstacles as their Euroamerican counterparts, in
the politics and economy of North America.
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The economies of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors prior to U.S.
mission work were subsistence based and built upon a foundation of agricultural
production, hunting, and international trading networks. In addition to trading with
indigenous polities, the Miamis, for example, cultivated especially close relationships
with French traders, while the Shawnees historically traded with both the British and
French. From the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, fur-trading partnerships, in
particular, often blossomed as a result of intermarriage and the subsequent establishment
of kinship ties by Euroamerican men and indigenous women. For some Ohio Country
Indians, relationships with Quaker missionaries became an additional means by which
their networks produced economic advantage. The mission complex in Indian Country
thus enabled Native peoples to continue to employ Euroamericans and their policies for
their own purposes, albeit in new ways, even as it fostered economic change.257
Indeed, for some Shawnees and Miamis, Friends' primary value was not in their
instruction but in their ability to produce crops. In 1808, for example, when the Miami
chief White Loon complained to Friend Elisha Tyson that some Quakers and government
officials were being dishonest, he contended that they worked their own fields for profit
and that the corn "was all gone" when his "people went down to receive it." Upon Tyson's
inspection of the mission, White Loon proclaimed, "You expected to find your young
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men working in our fields; instead of which you found them working in a field by
themselves, we would like it much better if they would work in our fields." If Friends’
efforts “taught” Native Americans anything, it was how to hire, deploy, and manage
Euroamerican workers with both cash and their federal annuities.258
With missionaries and Euroamericans providing them with the agricultural
infrastructure, labor, and goods that produced crops and further connected their lands
with diverse markets, some individuals and communities sought to reap the benefits of a
diversified, increasingly global economy while remaining on their lands. As a result, a
myriad of competing political opinions regarding the extent to which individuals should
engage with the Euroamerican economy developed. Indeed, just as one scholar deems the
War of 1812, a "civil war" among Americans and British, so too were there divisions
among the inhabitants of Indian Country.259 In a report concerning Tecumseh's visit to
the Shawnees at Wapakoneta in 1810, for example, Indian agent John Johnston informed
Governor Harrison that the Shawnee leader "made no impression on the [Wapakoneta]
Shawanese, and went away much dissatisfied at their not coming into his views.”
Johnston went on to say that he “indirectly encouraged their emigration westward, and
told them that their annuity should follow them. They appear determined to remain, and
are much attached to the town and the improvements, which are considerable." One
should analyze such statements with care, but given that the Shawnees' appreciation of
the town's "improvements" opposed Johnston's stated desire to push them west, and that
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they also refused to join Tecumseh's war against the United States in 1812, it appears that
the Shawnees at Wapakoneta not only wished to remain on their lands, but valued the
results of Friends' labor. In part then, political divides between so-called
"accommodationists" and "nativists" during this period were, just as among U.S. citizens,
political debates produced by a changing economic world.260
Tensions among regional Indian leaders were on full display at an 1809 treaty
between Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison and the region's Miamis,
Delawares, and Potawatomies. The United States endeavored to buy a tract of land
inhabited by the Weas on the Wabash, and Harrison promised the Potawatomies a share
of the proceeds if the Miamis agreed to sell. The Potawatomies consequently pressured
the Miamis to give up the lands in exchange for annuity payments, and, though Little
Turtle expressed interest in selling, the Mississinewa Miamis refused. By this time, the
Miami Little Turtle's influence was on the wane while that of Jean Baptiste Richardville,
chief at the Mississinewa villages, was ascendant. Richardville did not attend the treaty,
but rather sent words of support for a treaty agreement, a move that suggests that he
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anticipated complications would arise that would potentially harm his own trading
business relations with the British, Americans, or both. Both Richardville and Little
Turtle supported a Miami political future based upon private property and wealth
acquisition and also one situated in Indiana along the Wabash. Little Turtle, however,
supported selling the Weas' lands in return for increased annuity payments, but the
Mississinewa chiefs told Harrison that "you know when things are scarce they are dear,
you know the price of lands. We are willing to sell you some for the price that it sells for
amongst yourselves." The Mississinewas ultimately suggested that they would "sell their
lands by the acre & that they should receive two Dollars for it."261 Though Harrison
refused the latter offer and Miamis ultimately agreed to accept annuities, the
Mississinewas' proposal nonetheless reflects the reality that some Native peoples wished
to negotiate as inhabitants of Euroamericans' economic world while others, like Little
Turtle, were content to accept annuity payments.
Just as Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and Stockbridges debated their economic
and political futures, Euroamericans debated their own. In Philadelphia, the issues of
profit and economic disparity intersected with the politics of embargo in 1813 during the
height of the war with Great Britain. One citizen, William Groves, informed a friend that
five hundred of the city's residents met in the city's Northern Liberties section to declare
their abstinence from sugar, tea, and coffee. Brown sugar cost residents thirty-two cents,
coffee, forty he complained—a good ten to fifteen cents above the standard price. All, he
explained, was the result of "Acompony of speculaters to sett the People Agane the war."
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Speculators' profits, gathered to push people against war with Britain, would not prove
sufficient for men like Groves since he claimed that "the war party has Gott stronge by it
for they See that the Big fish will eat them." Profit, speculation, consumerism, and war
intertwined in Philadelphia and both reinforced and created political divisions: political
debate often was cast in terms of economy and vice versa. And the same was true in
Indian Country.262
Natives’ political debate also centered around the question of how closely to ally
with the Americans. Indeed, some Ohio Indian Nations attacked the United States before
war with Britain broke out in 1812. The Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa
endeavored to rally together a pan-Indian coalition of forces in an effort to halt
Americans’ territorial encroachments in the region. The Shawnees at Wapakoneta chose
not to participate in the attacks as did many others, particularly Delawares in the region,
but some Ohio Indians did join the effort. The Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa
established Prophetstown as a base from which allied Indians launched attacks between
1809 and 1812. William Henry Harrison, former territorial governor of Indiana and new
leader of the U.S. army, attacked the town during the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811,
dealing Tenskwatawa and his allies a severe blow. Shortly after the United States’ victory
there, regional Indian leaders who tended to ally themselves with Americans, gained the
political upper hand among their people.263
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Politics remained largely divided, however, among Ohio Indians. The situation
continued to deteriorate with the United States’ formal declaration of war against Great
Britain in June 1812. That summer proved a tumultuous one: the Miami leader Little
Turtle died, and the United States suffered a number of blows early on. The United States
evacuated Fort Dearborn at present-day Chicago, and William Wells, former Indian agent
among Ohio Indians, was killed during the evacuation. Fort Wayne endured a siege,
though its factory buildings burned, and some forces, including some Miamis, attacked
Fort Harrison that first year as well. For the most part, however, Miamis endeavored to
remain neutral in the conflict. Nonetheless, the U.S. army attacked numerous Miami
villages near the Wabash. Harrison’s army attacked Little Turtle’s Village as well as
three others near the Forks of the Wabash. In December, Lieutenant Colonel John B.
Campbell attacked the Mississinewa villages, though he received orders to avoid harming
prominent leaders such as Richardville, White Loon, and Pacanne who were open to
working with the Americans.264
The war continued into 1814. Tecumseh died at the 1813 Battle of the Thames,
and, finally, in July 1814, most regional Native nations treated for peace with the
Americans. The peace gave Americans the upper hand, and diminished Britain’s ability
to pose a significant threat in the region. Though Native peoples’ politics shifted after the
war, they were left by no means powerless.

Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Campaign, IL: The University
of Illinois Press, 2007).
264
For Miamis’ experiences during the war see Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A
Persistent People, 1654-1994 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 73-76.

171
Indeed, even during the years of conflict, individuals as well as groups found
ways to benefit from the situation as best they could. Native peoples' connections with
War Department officials and missionaries expanded their ability to take advantage of a
variety of money-making opportunities in the region during the war. Like civilizing
mission work itself, war with Britain provided an impetus for federally mobilized labor,
and it stimulated the U.S. economy by requiring the increased production of wares, the
shipment of manufactures, and the building of infrastructure. In short, it made available
new economic possibilities for war-torn regions' inhabitants, even as it produced death
and destruction in its wake. Thanks to the economic ties wound tighter by civilizing
mission work, Miamis, Shawnees, and others too participated in the regional wartime
economy.
During the war, the U.S. Army Quartermaster paid Ohio Wyandots forty-eight
dollars for 1,200 pounds of beaver, it offered the Seneca Tommy Smith forty-eight
dollars for "one grindstone, one drawing knife and one Chissel for helving & repairing
axes," and it paid the Shawnee Chief Captain Lewis sixty dollars for "One Horse pressed
into the public service." Some individuals thus combined their existing economies with
the emerging trend toward work-for-hire labor, while others provided a good or service
for individual profit. Emerging American economic practices traveled to Indian Country,
and there combined with Native nations' understanding of economic relations to create an
economic system that was marked, increasingly, by developing ideas of investment and
production.265 Individuals like Tommy Smith, Captain Lewis and others who provided
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goods or services for the U.S. government participated in the wartime economy in much
the same way as did their Euroamerican neighbors.266
The War of 1812 thus created economic opportunities, but it also disrupted life in
the region in profound ways. Baltimore Friends' mission work stalled during the years of
the war, but John Johnston remained in the region. He retired from his post at Fort Wayne
at the start of the war, but after removing to Piqua, Ohio, he nonetheless continued to
serve the United States. The War Department, hoping to keep a man who maintained
good relations with the region's Indian nations in its employ, opened an agency at his
home. Delawares who desired to remain neutral in the conflict sought the assistance of
agent John Johnston to do so, and the Indian agent hosted many of them—to the chagrin
of his Euroamerican Piqua neighbors—at his farmstead at Piqua during the height of the
war. Acting on instructions from General William Henry Harrison, Johnston sold
clothing, among other goods, and he reported in 1813 that such offerings would "take all
that remains on hand." When wartime rendered Delawares wanting, their relationship
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with Johnston enabled them to maintain their politics either in support of the war or of
neutrality.267 Delawares' stay at Johnston's Piqua farm reveals not that they were
"accommodationists" who sought either to support the United States or remain neutral
but, rather, that they supported a policy of alliance with the United States and its
representatives—whether missionary or Indian agent. Such an alliance, they determined,
offered the best prospects for the future but also for their endurance during the war.
In a myriad of ways, then, members of the Ohio Country Indian nations continued
to create, adapt to, and manipulate a dynamic economic world. The later history of the
Friends' mission at Dennis's Station, however, illuminates the contentious trajectory of
Natives' and federal power as well as U.S. economic development. Neighboring settlers
destroyed most of the original mission infrastructure at the start of the War of 1812, and
such actions suggest that they viewed the site as an economic and political threat. Native
nations possessed the power to take advantage of the mission complex, but that power
could also make them visible targets of an ambitious empire—an empire that profited
from economic growth in Indian Country.
Though Native peoples' manipulation of the mission complex threatened
Americans' dreams of an empire whose economic heart lay in Ohio Country fields, it also
bolstered U.S. claims to Indians' economic dependence. Though this dependence was
mainly rhetorical, U.S. officials nonetheless used the notion to promote, in turn, fictional
ideas of Native nations' political dependence. Much of Indiana Territory Governor
William Henry Harrison's correspondence dealt with the problems of Indian affairs, and it
reveals the extent to which Native nations continued to wield power in the Ohio Country.
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Despite this reality, the governor informed his territorial legislature in 1805 that the
region's benevolent Indian policies had secured Native nations' "entire dependence."
Recognizing his territory's incredible potential and emphasizing peace, he continued to
remark that, "the mighty river which separates us from the Louisianians will never be
stained with the blood of contending nations; but will prove the bond of our nation, and
will convey upon its bosom, in a course of many thousand miles, the produce of our great
and united empire." Indian affairs, statehood, and economic production were linked in
Harrison's mind, and the mission complex offered evidence of "dependence;" it offered a
veneer of legitimacy to U.S. political claims in Indian Country.268
For Harrison, Natives' "entire dependence" led to increased land sales, "settlement
and improvement," "produce," tax revenues, and economic stability. The mission
complex was thus crucial because it aided in the distribution of farm implements, gave
the federal government hope that those tools would, in fact, find use among Native
populations, and offered officials like Governor Harrison evidence of Native economic
and, in turn, political "dependence." Such "evidence" would, officials hoped, encourage
the settlement of the "right sort" of people and, in turn, boost land sales and increase
revenues. These points were crucial in the maintenance of the civilization project in the
Ohio Country, and they explain why, despite the limited success of the explicit goal of
complete assimilation, it endured and shaped U.S.-Indian—and, ultimately, foreign—
policy throughout the nineteenth century and beyond.
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***
When one travels through Wapakoneta, Upper Sandusky, and Lewistown, Ohio as
well as Fort Wayne and Huntington, Indiana—all central locations of missions and Indian
trading posts—the remnants of old railroads and canals still remain, many of which were
built not long after Quakers and Native peoples helped build the mission complex and the
U.S. imperial market economy. These remains reveal, however, that the layered
development of the U.S. economy—but also American imperialism—was both a "top
down" and "bottom up" affair. As such, tracing the federal state's power in building a
mission complex reveals that Friends’ missions and the "civilization plan" not simply as
tools for “assimilating the Indians,” but rather were crucial means by which the U.S. state
consolidated its power and spread its economic influence in the early nineteenth century.
At the same time, Friends’ mission work and the relationships that grew between Indians
and officials as a result of federal Indian policies likewise offered ways by which Native
peoples could make a living during the War of 1812, and they enabled Indians to use
missionary labor to their advantage. Such trends continued even after the war. Indeed,
Indian peoples employed and manipulated Euroamericans' ideas of "civilization" and
economy for their own purposes beyond the War of 1812 in ways that had lasting
consequences.269
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Chapter 5
“A Damnd Rebelious Race”: Native Authority in the Aftermath of War
These Miamies Genl are a damnd rebelious race and I believe it true what
Lafountain tells me that Richardville caries the Key and nothing can be
done without his assent
—Hugh B. McKeen, 1826270
When peace returned to the towns and fields of Ohio and Indiana in 1816, the
economic and political changes underway in the region continued apace. For some, the
year ushered in cause for celebration: the Euroamerican inhabitants of Indiana Territory
found themselves citizens of the United States endowed with all of the political rights and
privileges (if they were male) that accompanied statehood. Indiana's Indian peoples,
meanwhile, continued to cultivate and dwell upon their lands much as they had prior to
the state's incorporation into the official limits of the metropole. Statehood meant,
however, that Indiana—and Ohio as well—boasted a robust population. And both states
were growing. Surges in population continued after statehood, and it encouraged the
ongoing development of interstate infrastructure that facilitated immigrants' movement
and employment. In the ongoing struggle to give order to the chaos of U.S. immigration
to the region, additional non-government agencies materialized to address the problems
of labor and economy that accompanied U.S. colonialism.
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In 1817, for example, Nathan Guilford, Ethan Stone, and Daniel Roe organized
the Western Emigration Society in order to facilitate American movement into this
"Western Country," newly free from British occupation. They declared Cincinnati "the
most proper place for such a Society" because of its size, "local situation," and the fact
that it operated as "a thorough-fare through which much of the migrating population
passes."271 By the time of the society's founding, Cincinnati contained a much larger
population than either the more northern expanses of the state or its neighbor to the west,
Indiana. One inhabitant estimated that the city boasted "about 9,000 inhabitants, 15
lawyers, not the most eminent, 20 physicians" and that "the number of emigrants that are
daily arriving are imense."272 The emigration society eased the "great uncertainty and
embarrassment" in "not knowing where to seek employment, where to apply for
information," or knowing "where they can find a situation best suited to their
circumstances."273 The society thus functioned as a matchmaker in the business of
employment, receiving applications from "persons wanting to employ Mechanics,
Tradesmen, Labourers, &cs.," as well as from "persons wishing for employment of any
kind," and it connected them with employers seeking to bolster their fortunes through
hired labor.274 These connections proved essential to the practical functioning of
everyday life in the nineteenth-century Ohio Country, and by the 1820s, the practical
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problems of making ends meet shaped the lives of Euroamericans and Native peoples
alike.
Native nations and individuals used their market and government connections to
earn a wage and assert authority during the War of 1812, and they continued to do so
through the 1820s and 1830s. The mission complex established a space within which
indigenous peoples could still, even after statehood, navigate and confront U.S. imperial
power. The discourse of civilization offered them a language—mutually intelligible to
Native peoples and U.S. citizens and officials—to demand goods and labor and to
complain when such things failed to materialize. Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors,
accustomed to dealing with U.S. officials and their missionary partners, thus manipulated
the tools and language of "civilization," and they employed a variety of strategies that
ensured that they continued to possess and wield authority in the region despite the
increasing pressures of U.S. settler colonialism.
Many who remained in Ohio and Indiana after the war became neighbors,
employees, and employers in a region that boasted a growing Euroamerican population.
Some used their connections with Euroamericans to make claims upon the U.S. state and
individuals, others employed the discourse of civilization to secure both material goods
and bolster their political agendas, while others contemplated the advantages of
participating in nation-building projects in places as far flung as Missouri. Such strategies
illuminate the ways in which Shawnees, Miamis, and others found ways to remain
connected to their lands and, when that appeared impossible, their people. While many
scholars view the War of 1812 as the death knell of indigenous authority in the "old
Northwest," attention both to the strategies that emerged as a result of the mission
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complex and to indigenous peoples' roles in developing and participating in the dynamic
Ohio Country economy after statehood reveals that their authority endured.
Such efforts did not come, however, without a price. Indians' claims making
bolstered the U.S. federal state apparatus, and it linked them ever closer with the legal
and bureaucratic policies of the United States. What was more, when Native peoples
dared deviate from U.S. officials' ideas of "proper" Indian behavior—when they actually
succeeded in adapting and adopting the ways of the American Empire—they fueled calls
for their removal. As chapter six demonstrates, by appropriating U.S. Indian policies for
their own purposes, some indigenous peoples forced Americans to grapple with the
contradictions that lay at the heart of their civilization schemes. Ideas of race, class, and
difference increasingly rose to the fore of discourse as, ironically, the differences between
Euroamericans and many Native peoples eroded.

***
After the War of 1812 concluded, the Shawnees and their neighbors in the region
endeavored to take advantage of missionary and federal labors. Leaders like Captain
Lewis at Lewis Town and Black Hoof at Wapakoneta maintained relationships with
Friends in order to secure material advantages, organize their own labor force, and
cultivate closer political relationships with U.S. officials. Despite their expertise in the
arts of agriculture, they requested and accepted Friends' assistance and instruction in
cultivating crops. Though sources indicate that Wapakoneta's inhabitants remained on
relatively stable footing following the War of 1812, the Shawnees claimed strategically
that "the war swept away every thing from us, and plunged us in the same situation, or
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near the same, notwithstanding the United States have been very charitable to us, as well
as our good friend John Johnson."275 The Shawnees at Wapakoneta suffered losses during
the late war, but nothing like what Miamis suffered, for example, along the Wabash.
Indeed, when Friends visited Wapakoneta in 1816, they noted that several hundred acres
of corn and other infrastructure remained intact. Black Hoof and his people nonetheless
endeavored to take advantage of the benefits Friends offered, rejoicing at the "prospect of
the same help that we received from our friends the Quakers before the war."276 As
political allies who had historically advocated for Shawnees, Friends offered the means to
facilitate Shawnees' own economic development projects. In maintaining and cultivating
their connections with missionaries, Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors engaged a
strategy that drew upon older paradigms of Native-Euroamerican interaction and offered
opportunities for indigenous peoples' success in a region undergoing increasingly rapid
economic development.
For their part, the Baltimore Friends wasted no time in traveling to Ohio and
Indiana to assess the condition of the region's Indian peoples.277 Their report to the
Secretary of War William H. Crawford stressed that the Shawnees required further
instruction from Friends to complete their transformation into civilized peoples. Writing
to the secretary from Baltimore in August 1816, James Ellicott and Philip E. Thomas
informed him that they had recently traveled among the Shawnees at Lewis Town and
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Wapakoneta and found both Shawnees and Wyandots in Ohio "anxiously disposed to
obtain instructions relative to the cultivation of their lands."278 In a population of 800 at
Wapakoneta, for example, the Shawnees had "400 acres of ground enclosed by tolerable
good fences, 250 acres being planted in Indian corn."279 They cultivated that land
"principally with hoes," however, because they had only two ploughs. That lack
encouraged Ellicott and Thomas to reiterate that the Shawnees and Wyandots yet
required instruction—the use of hoes seemingly indicated their continued ignorance of
agricultural techniques. The Friends had successfully overcome the Shawnees' "general
indisposition" to work, "which prevailed...when the Society of Friends first embarked in
this concern," and they were pleased that "the principal obstacles which retarded our
successes are in a great measure removed" thanks to the mission foundation laid by
Friends before the war.280 If they obtained their projected budget for work among the
Indians ($4,720), Ellicott and Thomas concluded, the Friends could alleviate "[t]he
situation of these Indians," which was "peculiarly calculated to awaken the
commiseration and excite the benevolence of all who feel for the sufferings of their
fellow men."281 The Friends' report to the War Department reflected a strategic blindness
to Shawnees' economic ingenuity and success as agriculturalists: they either could not see
the Shawnees as proficient or they weighted their record to reflect their own agenda.282
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Whatever the case, Friends' partnership with the War Department established a
foundation for missionary-government cooperation on the continent and abroad. As
earlier chapters demonstrated, the War Department relied on Friends as correspondents
prior to the War of 1812 in part because their funds and organizational strengths made
them efficient and useful partners. After the United States settled the dispute with Great
Britain, the War Department gradually incorporated other societies into its cadre of
philanthropic partnerships, particularly the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810.283 Increased religious fervor and
immigration to the region after the conclusion of the war fueled multi-denominational,
federally funded mission work that modeled Friends' labor-intensive civilizing mission
work.284
When the Civilization Act of 1819 passed—guaranteeing $10,000 annual support
for missionary projects—it codified twenty years of partnership between Friends and the
federal government. Drawing on the example offered by Friends' cooperation with the
state, it opened opportunities for a larger variety of voluntary and religious societies to
participate in the civilizing project. With the passage of the act, the federal government
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wrote into law its determination to transform non-citizens into potentially assimilable,
culturally homogenous co-inhabitants of North America. Individuals and societies
received the funds for building construction and the running of schools and institutions of
learning for Native peoples, and the monies were contingent upon schools’ success.
Unlike Baltimore Friends’ efforts, many of those schools included literacy education,
though manual and agricultural labor remained a centerpiece as well.285 The government
also expected those employed by funded institutions to “impress on the minds of the
Indians, the friendly and benevolent views of the government towards them.”286 In
addition to bureaucratizing the missionaries' relations to the state, the act institutionalized
the United States' economic and imperial ambitions.287
The U.S. imperial market economy encouraged missionaries to conceive of and
brand their mission endeavors in a manner tailored to ideas of development,
"improvement," and profit. In the early 1820s, Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy centered
his mission work at a school that offered reading and writing instruction, and ensured that
males were "instructed in agriculture, and Mechanic Arts," and "the Females in Spinning,
Weaving, Knitting, Sewing &c."288 Missionaries in the field, most notably Friends,
Moravians, and Jesuits during the preceding centuries, usually wrote to their home

285

Students at a school in Cornwall, CT, for example, spent two and a half days laboring the
“school’s agricultural property.” See John Demos, The Heathen School: A Story of Hope and
Betrayal in the Age of the Early Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 72.
286
February 29, 1820, regulations for the civilization of the Indians, Department of War. NARA
M15, 379.
287
Civilization Fund Act. March 3, 1819, in Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Documents of United States
Indian Policy, 3rd. edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 33.
288
McCoy, Isaac to J.C. Calhoun, Fort Wayne, October 1, 1821, Secretary of War, Letters
Received, M-145 (15), RG 107, NARA in Shawnee File, Box #8029, folder 1 of 1 (1821),
Ethnohistory Collection, Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana.

184
congregations with news of their feats of conversion among the "heathens" in efforts to
solicit funds for future work. McCoy and Friends, on the other hand, wrote not of
religious triumph over savagery, but of economic development, and they solicited funds
from the United States government. In an effort to obtain federal support for his mission,
McCoy informed Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1821 that "[o]ur prospects in
relation to those several tribes (the Scattering Mohigans Accepted) are truly inviting. And
we trust that the patronage of the Government, And the liberality of the public, will
render our funds adequate to the undertaking: I therefore humbly solicit a share of the
10,000 Dollars appropriated by Government for Indian reform."289 To bolster his
argument for funding, he detailed both the immense labor required for his mission work
as well as ample evidence of his mission's economic contributions. He explained that
"[b]eside the Superintendent & the Directress, there are belonging to the Establishment.
A School Teacher, An Agent to procure Supplies of provision &c- And four labouring
men. two assistent females. and a labouring woman." McCoy then wrote that "[w]e have
cultivated this season 35 Acres of Land, 100 have 8 spinning wheels and a Loom-- The
property belonging to the Mission consists of Land improvements, Horses, Cattle, Hogs,
farming utensils, Houshold furniture. &c—and estimated at 1,800 Dollars."290 Thus,
while his evangelical work still mattered, McCoy recognized that a successful appeal for
federal monies depended upon the extent to which he could make a case for his essential
role in economic progression. The prospect of receiving U.S. federal funds encouraged
him and other missionaries to offer a certain type of missionary work and reporting.
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Meanwhile, Native peoples continued to engage the imperial market as
consumers, employers, and manipulators. Just as they had with Baltimore Friends before
the war, the Ohio Country's Indian peoples capitalized on the economic opportunities that
the new missions engendered. McCoy's report to the federal government, for example,
confirmed that Shawnees and their neighbors remained the beneficiaries of missionaries’
labor. Moreover, as Euroamerican population numbers increased, Indian leaders
increasingly took advantage of that growth when they could by hiring immigrant men on
their lands. They incrementally embraced the Euroamerican economic model, and they
exploited their role in the U.S. economy to assert their own political authority and
independence.
In 1820, for example, a group of Shawnees and Delawares who migrated from
Ohio informed President James Monroe that since "our Tools will need frequent repair,
and our Horses Shod, we ask if you are willing to give us a Black-Smith for five years
only, to mend our ploughs &c. during that time, some of our Young Men, will learn with
him to do it for us."291 The stipulation that the blacksmith should stay for "five years
only" suggested that the Shawnees and Delawares desired to extract knowledge and labor
from the hired man but did not wish to tolerate an open-ended engagement with the
American. Instead, they maintained a preference for reciprocal, gift-based relationships
that strengthened political ties between nations, even as they asserted themselves as
employers with the power to re-hire or dismiss contracted labor at the end of a specified
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The Shawnees and Delawares integrated Euroamerican ideas of

apprenticeship, hired labor, and contract, but, as they built their own economic
infrastructure, they asserted their relative autonomy, created and reinforced their political
connections to the United States as contracting nations.
The Shawnees embraced and manipulated commercial market relations, but they
also combined the concepts of debt and market exchange with those of older, trade-based
forms of exchange with which they were familiar. According to George Johnston's 1829
promissory notebook (a collection of receipts that record Wapakoneta Shawnee's names,
debts, and the items they purchased), approximately 200 Wapakoneta Shawnee debtors
failed to pay off their loans, and a roughly equal number of receipts were torn out of the
notebook, signifying debts canceled (figure 5.1). Johnston's notebook thus provides
evidence of the Shawnees' participation in a cycle of credit and debit and in the larger
U.S. economy, just like the large number of Euroamerican debtors of the republic.293
Indeed, every needle and yard of cloth marked as sold signified the profits of merchants
and entrepreneurs elsewhere. Given that the Shawnees possessed a robust gift-exchange
tradition, they may have viewed the goods as gifts. What is certain, however, is that they
borrowed Johnston's money to secure items such as cloth, knives, bridles, and teakettles,
and they did so to the detriment of Johnston's finances. The ambiguities of the evidence
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reveal the consequences of the intertwining of a variety of economic understandings.
While President Jefferson and William Henry Harrison conspired to drive up Indians’
debts in an effort to facilitate land sales in the early nineteenth century, some Native
peoples nonetheless found ways to take advantage of those schemes.294

Figure 5.1. George C. Johnston’s promissory book, Ohio History Center, Columbus, OH.

While most Shawnees obtained these goods in cash or future cash payments,
some secured the wares or canceled their debts through barter. Such transactions included
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Native women in the republic’s emerging economy, and they offer a means to expand
historians’ understanding of women’s roles in the development of early American
markets. “Turkey Feathers wife” (Figure 5.1) obtained goods at Johnson’s store, as did
the Shawnee Mary DeShane who paid off part of her debt with "winter Deer Skins" in the
"amount of fifty cents." The latter transaction offers a glimpse of the ways in which
multiple economies collided with and became intelligible to one another in Wapakoneta.
In this instance, DeShane exchanged skins, once the basis for trade in the region along
with furs, for both a good and for a cancellation of standing debts. This system of market
exchange shaped Ohio Country Indians' ideas of gift-giving and reciprocity, and it also
produced a regional economy built through economic syncretism.295
Wapakoneta Shawnees welcomed Quakers to their town and accepted the
agricultural infrastructure they offered, but their willingness to use Friends and other
Americans like George Johnston for economic investment purposes suggested a kind of
economic translation rather than assimilation. When Friend Isaac Harvey, then
missionary at Wapakoneta, attended the funerary services of the aged Shawnee chief
Black Hoof in 1831, he observed that the Shawnees intensely grieved the man's death,
and that they marked their loss with food and ritual. He noted that "[t]wenty deer were
killed, beside a large number of turkeys and what smaller wild animals they considered
fit to eat—no tame animal or fowl was suffered to be eaten on that occasion, though there
was a large quantity of bread prepared."296 Here is revealed Shawnees' selective
appropriation of Euroamerican goods and practices and the complicated nature of their
295
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politics: "tame" or domesticated animals had no place in this ritual of death. In 1810
Wapakoneta Shawnees had turned Tecumseh away from their midst and refused to buy
into Tenskwatawa's spiritual message of difference. In 1831, they maintained their
acceptance of Euroamerican labor and infrastructure, but also revealed that they too
valued their own cultural practices. Such episodes further demonstrate that cooperation
with the U.S. government and its imperial agents was selective and politically and
economically purposeful rather than mere "accommodation" of U.S. "expansion."297
Labor, trade, and cultural practices thus remained arenas within which indigenous
peoples could exercise power. Indeed, the Shawnees and Delawares' request for a fiveyear contracted blacksmith demonstrates that Native peoples invested in their lands by
taking advantage of Euroamerican labor, government money, and their annuity payments.
At the same time, however, the War Department bolstered the local economy and
facilitated settler colonialism by hiring men in need of work. Though the number of men
hired to labor on Indian lands was relatively small, they were hired to perform the same
tasks that Friends once handled. John Johnston wrote to William H. Crawford in 1816
that "labouring men is much wanted to instruct them [the Indians] in farming and to
enable them to live on their own industry."298 He went on to request a budget of $2,000
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that included payment for the labor, sustenance, and tools of six men, two each for
Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, and Senecas living near Johnston's Piqua agency.299 By
1829, the Miamis were due to receive the services of "10 Labourers" as part of the
fulfillment of their annuity payment for that year.300 Those ten hired hands each received
forty-five dollars and worked at either the "Miamie Villages" or they received their
compensation for "[l]abour performed for [the] Thorntown party [of Miamis].”301 These
workers may have thus supplemented their household subsistence economy with wages
earned for work performed on behalf of the Miamis.302
The relationship between market development and "civilization" established by
the mission complex, then, endured after the War of 1812, and it broadened to draw upon
the labors of missionaries and non-missionaries alike. U.S. immigration to the Ohio
Country thus offered Native peoples and the War Department a growing labor force, even
as it increased tensions between Euroamericans and their Native neighbors. That some
migrants labored for Native peoples, moreover, reflects the contingencies of U.S.
political and economic development: the mission complex, replete with its message of
assimilation, offered both the possibility and the tools, labor, and infrastructure required
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for indigenous peoples to remain in the region and become either masters of Ohio Valley
farms or yeoman farmers themselves.
Indeed, while the federal War Department arranged for Euroamericans to labor on
Ohio Indians' lands, Miami and Shawnee leaders such as the prominent Richardville
family among the Mississinewa Miamis contracted Euroamerican laborers on their
nations' lands to perform the same tasks as Quaker missionaries like William Kirk once
had. While scholars such as Stephen Warren view Shawnees and their neighbors'
cooperation with both Quaker missionaries and the civilization plan more broadly as
evidence of their desire to appear as a peaceful people capable of living among the white
Euroamerican population of Ohio, such an interpretation overlooks Native peoples' desire
to manipulate U.S. policies for their own proactive—as opposed to reactive—economic
and political purposes.303
The Richardvilles, like Little Turtle among the Miamis during the first decade of
the nineteenth century, cultivated connections with Euroamericans that facilitated
Miamis' ability to hire and manage labor on their lands. These relationships similarly
served to bolster Jean Baptiste Richardville's political position in Miami Country, even as
it offered opportunities for the region's immigrants to find work. Though Miamis'
relations with Friends were more distant and infrequent after both the War of 1812 and
the destruction of Dennis's Station, the mission complex facilitated and diversified the
ways in which Miamis took advantage of expanding Euroamerican markets and the
presence of U.S. officials. Friend Philip Dennis's labor at Dennis's Station, moreover,
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remained a not too distant memory, and because the mission complex contributed to the
region's economic development, Miamis took advantage of the shared language of
economy and improvement that was, in part, a consequence of the U.S. civilizing project
and its rhetoric.
Jean Baptiste Richardville, in particular, used his presence in both the regional fur
trade and as an employer in Indiana to cultivate connections with the U.S. federal
government. Richardville's father was a Frenchman and his mother was a prominent
Miami. He received a Euroamerican education and was well-schooled in the ways of
European politics, economy, and diplomacy. Richardville profited from both the fur trade
and Euroamerican immigration to the region, and his accumulation of wealth—he was
the wealthiest man in Indiana by 1840—suggests that his economic aims were personal.
He nonetheless worked to secure a prosperous future for the Miamis in Indiana by
ensuring that his economic interests intertwined with Miami political interests.304
To that end, Richardville and his son John secured laborers for work on Miami
lands. They hired out tasks that reflected what U.S. officials understood to be "civilized"
ideals, and their efforts suggest that Miamis and their neighbors endeavored to use
Euroamerican conceptions of economy: they invested in their lands in order to become
formidable economic players. In 1824, for example, the Richardvilles arranged for
William Ewing to make "a Contract with the Miami's to Make rails and fence their
ground" and, the following year, William Caswell earned $3.00 in return for making a
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In the case of Ewing, the elder Richardville, in particular, used the

resources available to his people to hire out work that promised future returns. Ideas of
investment, gaining prominence in the United States and the Ohio Country, lurked behind
such labor contracts. Hiring Ewing to fence ground with a contract, moreover, suggests
the adoption of evolving ideas of free labor and private property. U.S. market practices
combined with the existing exchange economy in the Ohio Country to create a market
system characterized, increasingly, by dynamic ideas of investment and production and
that included Native and non-Native workers and employers. The emerging Ohio Country
economy was one wherein all inhabitants struggled to assert themselves at the top of an
economic hierarchy. The fact that Euroamericans were willing to perform such tasks
reveals both their desire and need to work and their willingness to labor for Miami or
Shawnee masters.
Richardville was largely responsible for cultivating a connection with the Ewing
brothers, and while he used them to invest in his peoples' lands by contracting them to
fence, clear, and plough lands, he also used the relationship in other productive ways. The
Ewing brothers and their father were experienced traders who sought profit, and they
demonstrate the extent of economic change underway in the nineteenth-century Ohio
Country. Whereas regional traders once offered goods in exchange for valuable furs,
these men made their profits by offering goods on credit, and they often succeeded in
racking up Indians' debts that could then translate into profit during treaties with the U.S.
government since debts were often deducted and paid out of treaty annuities and
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payments. Richardville was himself a shrewd businessman, however, and he knew the
power of consumerism. As historian Stewart Rafert makes clear, "[t]he Ewing firm could
not survive without Miami annuities, and the Miami could not have resisted demands for
removal as long as they did without the influence of the Ewings."306 Thus, as Miamis
secured annuities from various land deals, they offered business to the profit-minded
Ewings who supplied them various goods; this, in turn, ensured Richardville and his
countrymen Euroamerican allies who shared an interest in Miami persistence in Indiana.
Emerging capitalist ideas thus offered Miamis opportunities to thwart both U.S.
imperialist ambitions and U.S. colonists' efforts to remove them until 1846. Even then,
many Miamis remained in the state after Richardville and another chief, Francis Godfroy,
purchased lands and allowed their countrymen to remain on those lands after removal.
In addition to forming connections with regional economic players such as the
Ewing brothers, Richardville maintained a public role as a chief among the Miamis, and
he attended many treaties and councils prior to and after the War of 1812. As a
consequence, he cultivated and maintained connections with both Miamis and federal
officials, and such a strategy served him well as a political and economic leader in
Indiana. When in 1824 Indian agent John Tipton declared that traders in the region were
"not to employ directly or indirectly any other than natural born american citizens of the
united States" whether "as clerk or otherwise," Richardville made sure to apply for a
trading license regardless.307 Upon hearing of the application, and the subsequent
political problems that Richardville's application created due to his position of power,
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then territorial governor of Michigan Lewis Cass urged Tipton to approve the application
since "it is impossible to mark the difference between whites and Indians, so as to
determine where the political rights of the one cease and of the others begin. It is a mixed
question, depending for its solution, not so much on the relative quantity of Indian or
white blood in the veins of the person, as upon his education, habits or pursuits."308
Richardvillle thus frustrated U.S. desires to render indigenous peoples culturally
dead or vanished as a result of civilization policies. As Cass's statement to Tipton
suggests, the civilization plan and the economic and social relations that resulted from the
mission complex meant that race alone would not serve to "other" all Native peoples.
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trade in ways similar to the embargoes and trading restrictions adopted by the United States at
various times before.308 It was a move that combined older notions of leadership grounded in
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Whereas Native women played crucial roles in cultivating networks of economic and
political interests in pre-nineteenth-century Algonquian societies, increasingly this power rested
with male leaders. Richardville stood to profit handsomely by controlling trade with the Miami
nation, but he also stood poised to ensure that his people would receive both fair treatment and
pricing. His was, in many ways, a progressive vision, tinged with self-interest as it was, of
political authority in Indian Country. Economic and political power thus intertwined among the
Miamis in ways both old and new. Though Le Gros's appeal to grant Richardville exclusive
trading rights with the Miamis in Indiana ultimately failed, it nonetheless reflected Miami leaders'
awareness of their bargaining power—Richardville did, after all, acquire a trading license. As
both Richardville's power and the relationship between Richardville and Le Gros demonstrates,
economic power combined with Miami politics to bolster that nation's claim to authority by the
1820s.
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Cass seemed to suggest that Richardville was Metis, but “education, habits, or pursuits”
mattered as well. Expanding markets in the Ohio Country meant not only that the United
States economy grew, but that Miami and Shawnee businessmen could grow their profits
and connections in the region as well. This in turn meant that men like Richardville were
important politically but also economically: it was in U.S. officials' interests to keep such
individuals satisfied. Richardville possessed the power to contribute to both U.S.
economic growth and the maintenance of U.S. imperial dreams of uncontested rule in the
region while also claiming power for himself and the Miamis in Indiana. Richardville's
application for a trading license ultimately reveals, then, that in the early nineteenthcentury Ohio Country, practical concerns of politics and economy could trump blood
quantum, and economic success and Euroamerican ideals regarding education proved a
gateway to political power.
Richardville's economic and political power in Indian Country, moreover,
intersected with U.S. state and national politics in crucial ways. His efforts make clear
that racial politics in Ohio and Indiana were complicated.309 When John Tipton became
Indian agent for the Miamis in Indiana, he made the mistake of complaining about the
ways in which Richardville conducted himself as leader of the Miamis. Interpreter John
Boure informed Tipton in 1829 that he should be acquainted "with the feelings of Cheef
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Boure continued to explain that the powerful Miami "was

very much dissatisfied with you sow far as to say should thay Bee a treaty hee wood treet
with Govr Cass But not you."311 By 1830, the Miamis wrote a memorial to Lewis Cass,
the superintendant of Indian Affairs, complaining of Tipton. They informed Cass that "it
seems as if our Agent wished & has usurped a power which we do not believe properly
belongs to his office."312 They went on to say that Tipton "selected a place for the
payment of our annuities contrary to our wishes. Our Principal Chief T B Richardville
remonstrated & positively objected going to the place selected by our Agent & requested
him to pay the annuities at or near the same place they were paid last year./ on a reserve
made at the Wabash Treaty expressly for that purpose/. to which he objected."313
What began as a dispute between Richardville and Tipton thus escalated to
involve key federal officials like Lewis Cass and the Secretary of War. After the Miamis'
memorial, Tipton wrote to Secretary of War John Eaton and informed him that "in 1828 I
paid these people at a place selected by their chiefs where there was no good water, in a
river bottom covered with nettles. I told the chiefs I would not pay at that place again. in
1829 I proposed to pay on their reservation near the Treaty ground 20 miles nigher to the
residence of the principle chief. but this was ten miles from a point where two chiefs have
stores. I then appointed a place 8 miles below on the wabash to which the chiefs would
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The Miamis' grumblings thus forced Tipton to explain himself to his

superior. Such politicking demonstrates the authority that Ohio Indian leaders yet
possessed. In that same letter to Eaton, Tipton warned that "the chiefs of this Tribe will
controul the operations of the Government unless the Department sustain the ground I
have taken."315
The dispute would have been problematic for any U.S. Indian agent interested in
removing Indian peoples, but it was particularly troublesome for Tipton, a Democrat, in
1830. That year William Ewing, a pro-internal improvement Whig, wrote to Tipton
supporting the state legislature's recent passage of a Canal Bill. Ewing's connections with
Richardville, the Miamis, and U.S. officials like Tipton positioned him as a nineteenthcentury go-between who, in an effort to best satisfy his own financial interests,
encouraged Tipton to facilitate a policy that was amenable to the Miamis. Though
Indiana citizens sent a memorial to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
demanding Miamis' removal westward in order to make room for the proposed Wabash
and Erie Canal, Ewing told Tipton that "their Removail from the State now I believe to be
impracticable--would it not be well to suffer them to occupy back & unimportent
situations for a while, as their increased annuity will be of material benefit in the first
settleing of our county and there is yet room for all."316 Ewing, then, in an effort to ensure
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continued profit from Miamis' annuity, encouraged Tipton to "restore…influence over
old Richardvill" in order to "[gratify] the Malicious Minority, and false faced, formerly
your hypocritical friends, who hope to throw obsticles in your road, when serving your
country & its best interest."317 Gratifying Richardville and allowing the Miamis to remain
in the state benefitted not only the Miamis, but it enabled Tipton, a Democrat, to indulge
his Whig political opponents.318 What was more, Ewing openly stated that Miamis'
annuities stimulated Indiana's economy. Indian affairs were bound up in individual profit
schemes as well as state and federal economic policy.
When, in the early 1830s, the United States endeavored to buy the remaining
Miami lands in Indiana, Tipton and others knew that Richardville was savvy, and they
knew that he stood in the way of completely swindling the Miamis. George B. Porter, a
U.S. commissioner, wrote to Cass in 1833 that he "cannot...believe that these Indians will
dispose of the whole of their Lands:—nor are they willing now to move West of the
Mississippi:—nor is fifty cents per acre a sufficient price. Chief Richardville knows, as
well as anyone else their value. They are worth at least two dollars per acre."319 Playing
the property game according to Americans' own rules of market economy and value
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increased Miamis' ability to remain on their lands, and it explains, in part, why they were
able to maintain much of their territorial holdings into the 1840s and beyond the time
when most other regional nations sold their holdings to the United States. Though it is
quite possible that Tipton was truthful when he informed Eaton in 1830 that many
Miamis "have many times requested me to pay the heads of families, or individuls,
alledgeing that the village chiefs cheate them," cheating their fellow countrymen or no,
Miami leaders such as Richardville cultivated connections with Euroamericans and their
economy in an effort to ensure the best possible political and economic future for his
people even as he turned a profit for himself.320
The Shawnees at Wapakoneta also utilized the connections established by the
mission complex to invest in their futures, but unlike the Miamis, they maintained closer
connections with Friends after the War of 1812. Black Hoof and other Wapakoneta
Shawnees invited Friends to visit their town and resume mission work there in 1815, and,
in response, Friends arranged for Joseph and Martha Rhodes to offer instruction in the
agricultural arts, domestic production, and literacy. When Martha died in Ohio, Black
Hoof and his countrymen grieved her passing alongside Joseph, and they lamented
Rhodes's departure from the mission.321 The relationship between Friends and the
Shawnees thus continued to be simultaneously personal and practical, with the lines
between the two blurred. Friends were political allies and useful sources of economic
assistance, and their personal relationships with Native peoples, built upon a century and
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a half of cooperation, facilitated Indians' efforts to remain in their homes and ancestral
lands. Securing labor and maintaining connections with government officials and
missionaries proved crucial for Native leaders, but those Shawnees, Miamis, and their
neighbors who did not occupy positions of leadership also found ways both to participate
in the expanding market economy and manipulate U.S. policies to their advantage.
Shawnees at Wapakoneta adapted to the emerging regional economic order bolstered by
Friends' mission work in their town, and they invested in their future. By the 1820s,
Baltimore Friends partnered with Ohio and Indiana Friends to run mission schools at
Wapakoneta, Lewis Town, and Upper Sandusky.322 With the new influence of these latter
Friends, the schools began to offer not only agricultural instruction but lessons in reading
and writing as well. In 1823, however, Baltimore Friends reported that many Shawnees in
Wapakoneta "expressed a wish that their children might be taught to work as well as read
and write...they had also wholly abandoned all intention of removing, and appeared very
desirous that Friends should continue the school."323 Friends may have included the
statement in order to justify their own conceptions of what a "proper" education for
indigenous children should look like. Sources suggest, however, that the Shawnee parents
at Wapakoneta valued the "improvements" made by Friends there, and they in turn likely
encouraged their children to learn to labor in order to continue to invest in Shawnees'
future in Ohio. For some, the key to maintaining a foothold in their home hinged upon the
next generation acquiring trade skills and learning to take advantage of and maintain
agricultural infrastructure.
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Wapakoneta Shawnees' belief in the economic advantages afforded from Friends'
labor are perhaps most obvious in their reaction to an 1831 treaty in which they sold their
lands to the U.S. government. After misunderstanding treaty deliberations, the Shawnees
sought out the assistance of Quakers. In looking toward removal they explained,
[w]e are sorry to find that it is to be the price of our farms that is to take us
to our new homes. We expected no such thing—we understood plainly that
the government was to be at all that expense, and that what our
improvements here were worth, after being valued by good men, was to be
paid us in money, to assist us in making farms at our new homes. We have
good homes here, and had abundance of labor and pains to make them. We
wanted good men to value our improvements, for we are not ashamed of
our homes...We cannot let our property go in this way; if we do, we are a
ruined people.324
While Shawnees' plea to Quakers reveals them as peoples attached to their lands, the
passage also clearly speaks to their hope that investment in their lands—not merely
accommodating or accepting Euroamericans' prescriptions for their endurance—would
enable them to keep their homes. When confronted with sale, these Shawnees understood
their improvements as investments that could yield higher returns during land
negotiations. Indeed, as chapter six reveals, U.S. officials also acknowledged those
improvements when negotiating removal. While Ohio Country Indian leaders were
crucial to efforts to carve a place for their peoples in the region, the individuals who
supported Friends and their leaders' "improvement" efforts and who built fences and
contributed to the efforts to invest in their lands, also envisioned and used the tools of the
U.S. market economy to work for a future among the growing Euroamerican population
in Ohio.
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Ohio Indian leaders and their peoples in the early nineteenth century often
possessed, wielded, and supported economic and political power in ways that harkened
back to the ideals of reciprocity and leadership common among many of the region's
peoples. Generous gift-giving once cemented hereditary chiefs' authority among their
people, and chiefs' oversight of the distribution of annuities or land operated similarly in
the nineteenth century. When Richardville or Godfroy offered their people the
opportunity to remain in Indiana by offering a place for them on their recently purchased
lands, they not only bolstered their own power, but they served their people in much the
same way as their forefathers had for centuries. These leaders took advantage of the
connections established by the mission complex, used them to serve their people as best
they could, and, while they were at it, continued to mold, as employers, traders, and
farmers, the creation and expansion of the U.S. market economy in the Ohio Country.

***
Mission work and the civilization plan linked Ohio Indians ever closer to the U.S.
market economy, and they opened new avenues of economic manipulation and strategic
persistence for Native leaders and their peoples—avenues that simultaneously borrowed
and diverged from earlier imperial precedents. As was the case prior to the War of 1812,
such economic engagement continued to influence indigenous peoples' politics. As the
Miamis' 1830 complaint regarding Tipton's reported abuse of power suggests, indigenous
strategies for combating U.S. power increasingly involved claims making, petition
writing, and a general willingness to issue complaints to state officials. Such appeals
often involved matters of investment, labor, debt, or claims for economic redress.
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Sometimes these requests were successful, and sometimes they were not. Regardless,
they strengthened the bonds between Ohio Country Indian leaders and government
officials and Native nations and the U.S. state, just as economic strategies linked Native
peoples closer to the U.S. market economy that they helped to create. As Native leaders
like Richardville employed a variety of strategies to secure a future for their people
amidst a rapidly growing Ohio Country population, they participated in the creation of
the U.S. economy, and they continued to contribute to the growth of the U.S. state.
The ability to make claims upon the U.S. federal government offered Ohio
Country Indians an opportunity to engage with the state, but it also reveals that while
there was power in making such appeals, indigenous peoples' opportunities were
increasingly defined by that growing state.325 Native peoples in the Ohio Country used
their connections with John Johnston, missionaries, and others to learn and navigate the
evolving U.S. bureaucracy and legal system in order to claim what was rightfully theirs,
and they could do so in large part because of the authority of indigenous leaders, the
desires of U.S. officials, and the pressures of land hungry United States immigrants. As
Richardville's successful application for a trading license suggests, Native leaders' power
and relationships with traders and officials meant that regional peace and U.S. hopes for
eventual removal often hinged upon these leaders' happiness; as a result, these
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relationships became crucial for Americans’ own economic and political gains, just as
they had during the heyday of the fur trade in the pays d'en haut.326
Political efforts to seek redress were not new, but by the 1820s, Ohio Indians'
methods of seeking and exacting compensation for losses or grievances revealed the
extent to which market considerations were at the forefront of their thinking, the extent to
which Native peoples' practical concerns had shifted by the nineteenth century, and the
ways in which they used and grew the U.S. state apparatus. Rather than seek gifts or
adopt kin to remedy their losses during war with Osages, for example, Ohio and Indiana
Indians in 1822 bargained for land. They "set up a claim against the Osages, of one
thousand Dollars, for damages Sustained," and they rejected $500 worth of material
goods in favor of a tract adjacent to their own in Missouri.327 Employing U.S. officials in
these claims-making endeavors became a key strategy for some Native peoples in the
early republic, and the allied Indians' claim, in particular, demonstrates that the desire to
remain a united people drove Indians' politics. The aftermath of war with Osages offered
an opportunity to use U.S. policy to their advantage: the commoditization of lands meant
that Delawares, Shawnees, and their neighbors could bargain for Osage land in an effort
to expand a territory in the west intended for the use of their people.

326

Women, in particular, played vital roles in the cultivation of political connections with
Euroamerican economies. See, in particular, Susan Sleeper-Smith Indian Women and French
Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst, MA, 2001); Lucy
Elderveld Murphy, A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Metis, and Mining in the Western Great
Lakes, 1737-1832 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
327
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Osage, and Delaware, Shawnee, Wea,
Piankashaw, Peeoria and Kickapoo, September 21, 1822 (from RG 75, Letters Received,
Secretary of War, NARA), Shawnee File, Box # 8029 (1821-1829), Folder 1 of 1 (1822-1823),
Ethnohistory Collection, IU.

206
Though some Native peoples used their connections with U.S. officials or
missionaries to make claims against their Native neighbors, they also made claims upon
the U.S. state for redress whenever they perceived a failure to fulfill a political or
economic obligation. In 1826, for example, Le Gros, Richardville's Miami compatriot,
issued a lengthy complaint on behalf of his nation that weaved together economic
concerns with an assertion of political authority. He informed the Secretary of War,
James Barbour, that, while the United States had fulfilled most of the provisions of the
1818 Treaty at St. Mary's, it had promised the Miamis a blacksmith and a gunsmith, two
laborers whom had yet to be provided to his countrymen. Weaving ideas of economics,
reciprocity, and sovereignty into his appeal, Le Gros asked, "Now father, who is to pay
the damage which has accrued to my nation in consequence of this failure?" and he
followed this query with a remedy for the United States' misstep.328 He declared, "I wish
to make a proposition to you, which is, that you will authorise our Agent, to employ a
good blacksmith, who can repair our guns likewise, and a good trusty Miller in lieu of the
gun smith as promised by the Treaty, to be placed at the mills, as that position will be
central to the nation."329 Though the treaty stipulations were eight years old, less than one
week after the Miami's complaint, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Thomas L.
McKenney agreed to find, employ, and send Le Gros his miller; by the summer of that
same year, the miller was in Miami Country.330
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Le Gros's success reveals the extent to which Native nations in the Ohio Country
continued to wield power in their interactions with the United States into the 1820s and
beyond despite the political consequences of the War of 1812. Though U.S. policies
constrained their actions to some degree, Native peoples still found potent ways to
negotiate for power, just as they had when they forged partnerships with Quaker
diplomats in the 1750s and 1790s. Le Gros's manner of bargaining and negotiation was
characteristic of Miami relations with the United States into the 1840s. In 1826, for
example, Le Gros confidently informed Governor Lewis Cass that "[y]ou have made a
request of us for our land, which we have already refused. I told you our situation. We
have a right to trade or exchange our property."331
These methods of combating and negotiating American empire travelled along
with migrating Indians to places like Missouri. Thus, as chapter three makes clear,
Americans’ ideas regarding race and class travelled, but so too did new ways of
manipulating and appropriating those ideas. American settlers were not naive to such
claims to power. Just as settlers destroyed Dennis's Station at the start of the War of
1812, they continued to attack Indians' agricultural infrastructure. "Six ploughs, and other
Tools, were Stolen from us by the Whites," Shawnees and Delawares complained in
1820, and "our Houses have been broken open and our property robed [sic] by the
Whites. Father! The Whites do not Steal these things merely for their value, but more to
make us abandon our Land and Take it themselves."332 Just as Americans were savvy to
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Native peoples' ability to translate economic "improvements" or success into political
power and entrenchment in a coveted land, so too did Ohio Indians recognize Americans'
greed: the thefts did not occur simply because Indians owned items of value (though that
was part of it), but rather they occurred because Americans wanted Indians' developed
lands. Perhaps more important, however, was that the victims of the thefts recognized
their power to seek redress.
Indeed, Shawnees and Delawares did not employ violence to remedy the
situation, but rather they chose to petition the president of the United States. They
actively sought compensation for their losses, and such efforts further cemented a
political relationship with the United States that simultaneously undermined and
solidified Native polities' independent power. From the U.S. perspective, these claimants
depended upon the state for assistance; from the petitioners' perspectives, the familiar
rules of political alliance and reciprocity demanded that the U.S. government make
amends for the acts of its citizens. Here, then, differing notions of the political
relationship between the U.S. government and Indian peoples produced an opportunity
for Indian peoples to exercise power. Indeed, the politics of fictive kinship meant that the
Shawnees and Delawares seeking redress possessed the right, from their perspective, to
exact compensation from their "father." U.S. paternalism offered a means to erode
indigenous sovereignty, but it also provided opportunities for Indians to navigate and
make claims upon the state bureaucracy in ways that reflected their own understandings
of political reciprocity and association.
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While the politics of petitioning involved the meeting of distinct political cultures,
the claims nonetheless reveal the adaptability of Native peoples' political economy. In the
same 1820 petition to the president, Shawnees and Delawares claimed that "Two White
Men have Stolen Two Hundred Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s
and one Bridle at Two Dollars."333 Not only did these men demand redress in the form of
monetary compensation, they demonstrated the extent to which their culture changed
during the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While land still held
value for reasons of lineage, nationhood, kinship, and history, such ideas were coupled
with ideas of worth rooted in the dollar. Like the locks placed upon Creeks' valuables by
the nineteenth century, Indians—in the Ohio Country but also in places where Indians
had former or ongoing contact with missionaries—likewise took stock of their
possessions and quantified them in terms of monetary value.334
Though Native petitioners did not shy from addressing the U.S. president directly,
more direct relationships also, of course, offered numerous benefits to Native peoples,
even if they were formed as a direct consequence of U.S. imperial ambitions. In Ohio,
Shawnees' close relationship with John Johnston offered a potential means to secure
payment for crimes committed by Euroamericans in ways similar to Shawnee and
Delawares' petition to the U.S. president. Johnston complained to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney, in 1825 that he was "often compelled to grant
renumeration to the Whites out of the Annuities of the Indians, and when an Indian
suffers loss, which is now frequently the case...no redress can be afforded for want of
333
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funds at the disposal of the Agent. It is beleived [sic] $1000 would not satisfy the claims
of this nature now pending, and which are just and equitable."335 Johnston went on to
submit a detailed list of "depredations committed on their property by our Citizens" on
behalf of the Indians near his Piqua agency in 1827.336 The Seneca Captain Smith
claimed $35 for a horse stolen; John Sky, $65 for one horse shot and another stolen; Blue
Jacket's Daughter demanded $35 for a horse stolen; others listed saddles taken by
Euroamericans and horses and cows stolen, shot, or killed by the same, and money, furs,
blankets, and a kettle stolen.337 The goods ultimately totaled just over $1,000—a debt
Johnston forwarded onto the U.S. federal government on behalf of the mostly Senecas
and Shawnees near Piqua.338 The agent performed this duty out of a concern for "the loss
of their confidence in the justice of the United States," and such work served both his
own interests and those of the Indians near his agency.339 Indeed, it appears that the act of
claiming damages against Euroamericans became so common that, by 1828, Johnston
needed to make clear to McKenney that a "list of Claims of Shawanoese who have
emigrated from Ohio west of the Mississippi" were "unfounded and ought not to be
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The requests reveal Piqua-area Indians' recognition that cultivating a close

relationship with Johnston offered a means to make claims upon the U.S. state.
Such claims could, however, prove to be a double-edged sword. Johnston fought
for Senecas and Shawnees' property rights, but he also advocated for their removal as a
direct result of the damages suffered upon the Indians near his agency. Immediately
following his recommendation that Piqua-area Indians receive compensation, he wrote,
"[t]hese evils and a multitude of others which readily occur to your mind are rapidly
encreasing upon us, and after a considerable part of my life spent managing this
description of persons I am free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate
remedy but removal to a Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be
established over them."341 Native peoples' authority—and, indeed, the political act of
remaining—often encouraged their removal from eastern lands.
Though Indians' claims making produced mixed consequences, it nonetheless
reveals the extent to which Native peoples engaged with the politics and strategies
embraced by U.S. citizens more broadly. Petitioning formed a political bond between
petitioner and the state, and oftentimes, Native peoples living in the Ohio Country or who
migrated from that region not only employed the tools of petition writing and claims
making, but they also employed the discourse of civilization to their own ends; they thus
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turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head. Like the poverty rhetoric
employed by Little Turtle and others during the first decade of the nineteenth century,
Indians continued to make claims on the U.S. state by either asserting authority, or by
couching their grievances in terms of impoverishment and pity. Even when material
conditions were harsh, Native peoples found ways to appeal to government officials’
ideas regarding Indians, poverty, and civilization.
After years of hearing Euroamericans' pronouncements regarding the benefits of
civilization—and after receiving the material benefits that accompanied partnerships with
civilizing agents such as the Baltimore Friends—Native peoples combined ideas of
petition-making with ideas of either civilization or savagery, depending on their aims.
Hendrick Aupaumut and his fellow Mohicans, for example, masterfully used the
discourse of civilization both in an attempt to secure Indiana lands before and after the
War of 1812 and, when that ultimately failed, to secure a place for the Mohicans in
Wisconsin Territory during the 1820s and 1830s. Aupaumut's initial petition, penned in
1819, suggests both that he saw himself as possessing a viable claim as well as a political
relationship with the state. In 1818 White River Delawares in Indiana sold their lands to
the United States, but members of the Stockbridge nation lived upon those lands with the
Delawares since an 1808 treaty, and they were not consulted during the 1818
negotiations.342 When the Christian Mohican petitioned the President of the United States
and Congress for redress in 1819, he wove together discourses of religion, poverty, and
missionary zeal in order to make his appeal. He claimed that his people were lately "few
and weak," but that they and Americans were "all decended from one father
342
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and...acknowledge and worship one GOD."

213
He continued to explain that his "nation

have long ago cast away their dumb idols which could not speak, and we now worship
the only true GOD and Savior Jesus Christ. Our Children are taught to read and write, to
Cultivate the Earth, and to worship, love obey and serve the Lord."344 Not only did
Aupaumut claim that his people held up their end of the bargain—they cultivated the
earth according to the plans set forth by U.S. civilizing policies—but he also asserted that
they could be instrumental in encouraging others to live in a "civilized" manner. A
portion of the Stockbridge, Aupaumut explained, traveled to the White River in the hopes
of civilizing the Delawares: "We saw them lying in darkness and paganism, and believed
that our GOD called upon us to send among them a [coliny?] of our nation in which was
built up a Church of our Lord and Savior, that we might be the means o [sic] Civilizing
and Christianizing them and doeing to them great good."345 The Stockbridge thus
internalized the discourse of civilization and appealed to U.S. missionary ambitions: they
offered government officials hope that "civilized" Indians could become civilizers.
Aupaumut laced the language of Christianity together with that of civilization and
duty, and he used that rhetoric to assert Mohicans' rights. Complaining of the
Stockbridges’ loss of the lands sold in 1818, Aupaumut contended that the Stockbridges
were "directed to leave them in a short time," and that their "right to them is denied."346
Weaving ideas of property and investment into his claim, he continued to explain that "A
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part of our nation, as we have told you, removed to these lands and possessed them with
the Delawares and Munsees and made large improvements on them, at great expense to
our nation, to prepare them for us."347 Aupaumut then closed his appeal with another
consideration of the Stockbridges' rights: "we pray that you will consider our just rights,
and set off to our Nation such a location of these lands as we are justly entitled to---that
we may not suffer under this wrong and that we may thus be aided in our designs, and
our nation again be...in peace and our hearts quieted."348 It was a petition that sounded
eerily similar to claims of squatters' rights in the early republic. Just as U.S. immigrants
claimed a right to the lands they developed, so too did these Stockbridge. Though the
Stockbridge eventually moved to Wisconsin Territory, civilizing mission work, its
accompanying rhetoric and that of U.S. settler colonialism nonetheless offered
indigenous peoples additional means to use U.S. economic and political ideas in order to
confront growing U.S. state power.349
Just eight years after making the 1819 appeal, couched as it was in language of
Christianity and civilization, Aupaumut's signature graced a piece of paper that made yet
another appeal, this time, to the ABCFM and for missionary aid. Rather than emphasize
their civilized state or their belief in Christianity, however, the appeal began "We thank
the Great Spirit that he has favored your Society with compassionate feelings for our
Nation. We rejoice greatly that you have sent the Rev Jesse Miner to pay us a visit for the
purpose of ascertaining our true state & condition to enable you to know what you could
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Here, the Stockbridge Indians

appealed to their supposed "heathen" state by calling upon the power of the Great Spirit.
They down played their "civilization" (which was, apparently, lost in the eight years
between appeals) by thanking the ABCFM for being willing to witness their "true state."
What was more, the Stockbridges, Aupaumut among them, were eager to discern what
the missionary society "could do for us." The Stockbridges, armed with their long history
of missionary encounters, knew that missionaries held many keys: to "civilization" and
Christianity, but also to powerful political alliances, economic infrastructure,
Euroamerican labor, and the U.S. government's ear.
The mission complex in the Ohio Country thus offered material benefits to the
region's indigenous peoples, but it also offered a means by which Shawnees, Miamis,
Stockbridges, and their neighbors could make claims upon the federal state after the War
of 1812. A discourse of civilization increasingly intersected with discourses of rights and
nation to create a complicated nexus of ideas that both rendered Native peoples further
intertwined with emerging U.S. intellectual currents and offered them opportunities to
manipulate policies to their advantage. Such strategies reveal the ways in which Native
peoples adjusted to life in the increasingly populated Ohio Country: as Euroamerican
immigrants struggled to make a living in a new land, Native peoples confronted similar
problems of money, work, and survival in a rapidly changing economy.
The various strategies adopted by Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis and their
neighbors—whether petition-writing, cultivating connections with area traders, or
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asserting economic independence—reveal that the economic and political development
accelerated by the mission complex in the Ohio Country offered means by which
indigenous peoples simultaneously continued to assert their cultural, political, and
economic independence and consciously borrowed from and adapted to Euroamerican
ideals. Some Ohio Country Indians understood that they could carve a place with the
emerging political and economic order in the region, and as they made steps toward
doing just that, they increasingly frustrated Euroamericans. By using the mission
complex and civilizing policies to their advantage, Native peoples forced the United
States and its inhabitants to recognize that indigenous power was real and enduring. For a
people desirous of a unified nation, this proved problematic. Thus, as Native power and
authority endured, Americans increasingly supported removal policies in a quest to
acquire lands but also to render the United States a homogenous, inclusive nation—a
nation built on the policies and politics of exclusion.

***
When Hugh McKeen declared the Miamis to be a "damnd rebelious race," he
expressed frustration at their unwillingness to disappear from the Ohio Country on
Americans' terms. That he wrote the statement with Richardville in mind is not
surprising. The Miami leader was, in many ways, the exemplar of what many considered
to be indigenous rebellion in the early years of American empire. Richardville, along
with Shawnees at Wapakoneta, Delawares and Senecas near Piqua, and others who dared
remain in the region, turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head and adopted
and adapted to civilizing policies and the economic, political, and social relations
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established by the mission complex. They took part in an imperial struggle on Americans'
terms, but they eked out victories that frustrated U.S. attempts to take the region by force
or for no financial compensation or simply entirely on the state's own terms. When
Wapakoneta debtors ruined George Johnston's finances, they secured items that made
their own lives just a little bit better, and they did so on their own terms by partially
paying off debts through barter of furs and by becoming economically-savvy neighbors in
the midst of a population that sought their physical and cultural removal. When
Delawares and Shawnees petitioned for economic redress, they invested the federal state
with authority, but they also forced government officials to fulfill economic and political
obligations that drew upon indigenous peoples' understandings of reciprocity and
political alliance. They secured, in some cases, funds and goods that frustrated, at least in
the short term, Ohio Country Euroamericans' attempts to drive them off of their lands.
Ohio Country Indian leaders and peoples, then, ultimately used the tools available to
them, and they ensured that they continued to exercise their power to shape their own
lives and also to mold the contours of American imperial policy and the U.S. market
economy and state. They also forced Americans to confront an immense problem—that
of how to simultaneously live up to their republican ideal while eliminating persistent
Indian peoples.
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Chapter 6
"Of Mercy and of Sound Policy too": Indian Removal and the Cultivation of
Empire

The U.S. civilization plan and its effects offered tools with which the Ohio
Country’s Native peoples could both mold and combat the American empire. The plan
also, however, ensured that U.S. officials and American citizens confronted the problem
of persistent eastern American Indians in a manner that cultivated U.S. claims to
benevolence on a global stage. Americans’ brand of empire was cloaked in the garb of
humanitarianism, and it was in large part thanks to the Society of Friends and their fellow
non-governmental organizations, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions (ABCFM) most particularly, that it gained purchase. That many Americans
considered Indian removal in the early 1830s Ohio Country to be humanitarian is
significant. With eyes toward Great Britain and a reputation at stake, Americans
struggled to reconcile their own policies with those of other empires. British abolition in
1833 did not, of course, ease Americans’ consciences. It did not grant American
abolitionists their victory, convince many to renounce slavery, or prevent the forced
migration of thousands of enslaved people to the southwest. Instead, Americans placed
their hopes upon a “benevolent” Indian policy. With the problem of slavery looming with
no politically amicable solution apparent, Americans endeavored to reconcile Indian
policies—particularly Indian removal by the 1820s and 1830s—with both their own and
others’ ideas of sensibility, humanitarianism, and morality in order to claim moral
authority on the world stage. Absent from their musings on benevolence, of course, was
that southeastern Indian removal and the expansion of slavery went hand in hand.
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Removal became a means by which the United States could deal with Native
peoples who, by successfully appropriating and manipulating U.S. ideals and policies,
refused to disappear on Americans’ terms. Importantly, Americans did not contemplate a
single “Indian removal.” The removals of southeastern Native peoples such as the
Seminoles or Cherokees galvanized the republic’s attention—as well as the attention of
foreign observers—but in the Ohio Country, removal was a protracted process marked by
land sales and both federal and missionary encouragement. For some Americans, removal
in either the Ohio Country or the southeast seemed a logical solution to the republic’s
“Indian problem.” They understood it in terms of sovereignty and rights to land and state
versus federal jurisdiction, but they also framed it as being a fundamental determinant of
the national character. U.S. officials, reformers, and everyday Americans understood
Indian policy, like the problem of slavery, in moral terms, and it was part of an
international discourse regarding empires and nation-states, their moral authority, and, in
turn, their political authority. Those who opposed removal spoke in moralistic and
humanitarian terms to point out the hypocrisies of the United States’ republican
experiment. Those who supported removal schemes used the same rhetoric often to
present the policy as the only viable option available to Indian peoples, as did Indian
agent John Johnston when he informed Lewis Cass that offering Delawares funds to
remove west of the Mississippi would be an act “of Mercy and sound policy too.”351 For
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many Americans, Indians could either remove and receive government charity or face
further moral corruption or extinction.
At the root of both positions, however, were ideas of philanthropy cultivated
during the earliest years of the civilization plan. Whereas from the 1790s through the
early 1820s, Friends’ motivations differed somewhat from those of some U.S. officials,
and Quakers certainly took issue with certain aspects of Indian policy, they nonetheless
perceived government efforts in Indian Country to be fundamentally beneficial. By
Jackson’s presidency, however, most Quakers and other reformers openly lamented the
state of U.S. Indian affairs. Nonetheless, the U.S. government’s endorsement, funding,
and support of missionary projects and non-governmental organizations like the Society
of Friends, enabled many officials to claim enlightenment in the realm of Indian affairs,
and those claims to humanitarianism continued to facilitate the ongoing development of
the federal state by both masking the violence of American imperialism and fostering the
ongoing growth of the republic’s market economy.352

***
U.S. officials, regardless of politics, harbored deep concerns for the United States’
reputation abroad, and Indian policy was a means by which some hoped to cultivate an
image of humanitarian power on the world stage. The American Revolution invested the
slavery issue with new political potential, and as such Great Britain’s elites ultimately
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acted on their abolitionist ideas thanks to the politics of the eighteenth-century imperial
crisis. A moral push against slavery was one way to defend the British Empire’s
reputation—and purpose—in the face of colonial attacks. U.S. Indian policy ultimately
became politicized in a similar vein during the nineteenth century.353 With fervor for
abolition growing, Great Britain, in particular, presented the United States with a clear
rival in the global contest over moral authority. By the nineteenth century, the new
United States sought to convince the world—and itself—that it too was an enlightened
empire.354
Indeed, U.S. Indian policies had global consequences and international
connections. While frameworks of settler colonialism enable and encourage some to
compare indigenous experiences and their relationships with imperial powers in the
United States, Australia, and South Africa, fewer works explore the linkages that
extended between the policies of the United States and Great Britain during the early
nineteenth century.355 Reformers, often Quakers, corresponded and shared ideas and
literature during the nineteenth century, and they kept each other abreast of their
respective empires’ policy initiatives. Indeed, the Philadelphia and Baltimore Yearly
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Meetings had, since the eighteenth century, regularly discussed the issue of Indian affairs,
and London even offered some funds for North American Friends’ initiatives to civilize
Native peoples. Such trends continued into the nineteenth century. In 1817, for example,
Baltimore Friends recorded that "by a letter received from Elizabeth [Pickessew] a friend
residing in Cork, Ireland…we have received £100 Sterling, to be appropriated to the use
of the Indians to assist in procuring tools or other conveniences for their advantage."356
Historian William Unrau demonstrates that prominent members of Britain’s
Aborigines Protection Society (APS) developed their ideas regarding indigenous policies
in light of and in tandem with those of the United States. Quaker Thomas Hodgkin, he
points out, encouraged the APS to adopt an assimilationist policy in South Australia
thanks to his contempt for Jacksonian plans of removal.357 One British reformer, Adam
Hodgson, moreover, applauded Jedidiah Morse’s 1822 plan to civilize Native peoples in
communities near Euroamerican settlements, and deemed the plan a humanitarian one in
his 1824 Letters from North America, Written During a Tour of the United States and
Canada.358
By the 1830s, however, British officials, reformers, and thinkers considered U.S.
Indian policies to be decidedly less philanthropic. In 1837, for example, Saxe Bannister,
an official in New South Wales and later a member of British Parliament, applauded the
United States’ civilizing efforts, but decried Jackson’s harsher policies of removal. He
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also made it clear that Britain and the United States were in close competition for the
right to claim moral authority. He remarked that “no more honorable rivalry can be
imagined than that of the British Parliament with the American Congress in the difficult
task of elevating the ignorant and protecting the weak.”359 As both the American and
British empires sought to expand their territorial claims, such a competition mattered.
The discourse of morality and humanitarianism offered a common language that rendered
each power intelligible and comparable to the other.
Cultivating the image of a benevolent empire was not easy for a republic tainted
by its notoriety as a slave-holding power. In 1827, Lewis Cass, future Secretary of War
under Andrew Jackson, nonetheless made the attempt by penning an eighty-page
document that compared the treatment of North America’s indigenous peoples during the
eras of both the British and American empires. Cass, the architect of Jacksonian removal
schemes, had served as the territorial governor of Michigan from 1813 until his
appointment as Secretary of War in 1831. He was renowned as an expert on Indian affairs
and penned works relating to various Indian nations, perhaps most famously, the
Delawares in 1821-22, and he continued to write in defense of removal into the 1830s.
He was a Democrat, and central to his pro-removal arguments were ideas of benevolence
and civilization.360 His 1827 article was an attempt to position Indian policy as evidence
of the United States’ enlightened state in contrast to Great Britain. His essay was in

359

Quoted ibid., 530.
Work on Cass is surprisingly limited and often of a celebratory mind. See Francis Paul Prucha,
Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1981); Frank B. Woodford, Lewis Cass: The Last Jeffersonian (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1950); Willard Carl Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation (Kent,
OH: Kent State University Press, 1996)
360

224
response to an indictment, recently printed by the London Quarterly Review, of the U.S.
government’s handling of Indian affairs. Cass’s response reveals the extent to which such
criticism riled U.S. officials. He began his discussion of Indian affairs claiming that
“[t]he true character of this policy has not been well understood, even in this country, and
abroad it has too often furnished the motive or the pretext for grave accusation and
virulent invective.”361 The document, written for a British but also a global audience,
references the United States’ reputation numerous times, and, indeed, Cass insisted that
“[t]o the judgment of the world we may safely commit the conduct of the American
government, in regard to the particulars here touched upon.”362
Those particulars included extensive analysis of wars conducted by Great Britain
and the United States alike and of the virtues of U.S. efforts to offer Native peoples
annuity payments and civilization. Cass deemed annuities to be a particularly enlightened
policy. He argued that “[t]he plan of permanent annuities guaranties to the Indians a
never failing resource against want, and its beneficial effects are apparent in the improved
condition of the Wyandots, the Shawnese, and the Miamies.”363 As chapter five
demonstrates, any “improvement” of Ohio Indians’ condition according to
Euroamericans’ standards, was the result of Miamis, Shawnees, and Wyandots’ own
adaptability and ingenuity. Nonetheless Ohio Indians were Cass’s rhetorical foil;
indigenous peoples of the southeast—those peoples upon whom historians have, for the
most part, centered their analyses of Indian removal—he largely ignored. The situation of
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Shawnees and Miamis offered Cass his best talking points, largely thanks to mission
work, land sales, and importantly, the absence of slaveholding. “Civilization” in the Ohio
Country was tied to ideas of market economy, not slavery, and thus Cass offered little
mention of elite Cherokees or Creeks of the southeast, many of whom owned African
slaves.364 In this way, Cass diverted attention away from the issue of slavery in the
United States, while simultaneously pointing to Indian policy as the realm in which the
republic could stake its benevolent reputation.
Discussion of annuity payments and civilizing policies enabled Cass to draw
explicit comparisons with the British Empire. Annuity payments, he argued, ensured
Ohio Indians’ well-being, and Cass placed the policy—and others—in direct contrast
with that of Great Britain in both Canada and Australia. He wrote that “[t]he inquiries,
which we have instituted, have satisfied us, that no system of permanent annuities has
heretofore been adopted in the Canadas, as a consideration for cessions obtained from the
Indians.”365 Great Britain likewise offered no compensation to indigenous peoples of
Australia. “We hear of no treaties of cession,” he contended, “no ‘purchases compulsory,’
or voluntary, no mutual discussions, no annuities for future relief.” Instead “The land is
wanted, and it is taken.”366 The comparison with Britain’s colonies suggests not only the
extent to which Cass endeavored to portray the United States as an enlightened power but
also the degree to which U.S. officials understood the United States as an empire among
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empires. Employing a direct comparison with Britain in the world, Cass took issue with
the London Review’s suggestion that the United States was among the most land hungry
of polities, “Has England furnished us with any example of such a system of self denial,
or rather of canting weakness?” he asked. “We will not inquire in India, for there no
barbarians, strictly speaking, are found. But the Australasian continent is now a British
province, acquired and settled within the memory of the present generation. And where
are its aboriginal inhabitants?”367 The idea of “self denial” is particularly striking. Cass’s
claim that Americans were unable to deny themselves extensive lands contradicts the idea
of Americans as virtuous Protestants and ultimately reveals the inconsistencies of
American ideologies at work.
Britain, Cass contended, failed to ensure indigenous peoples’ well-being. He
censured the British government for neglecting to pass “any prohibition against the
introduction of spirituous liquors in any part of their Indian country,” and for failing to
“to provide a permanent residence for the Indians.”368 Indeed, he wrote, “[t]here were no
schools, and no efforts to introduce agriculture, or the mechanic arts. There were no
annuities, no regulations to direct the conduct of the traders, and no law to prevent the
sale of ardent spirits.”369 For Cass, then, government regulation took on the cast of
benevolence. Trading laws, civilizing schemes—these were the tangible evidence of the
United States’ “benevolent empire,” evidence that the British Empire did not have.
According to the London Quarterly, however, there was “‘not to be found, on the
face of the globe, a race of men, so utterly abandoned to vice and crime—so devoid of all
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fear of God and regard towards man, as the outsettlers of Kentucky, Ohio, and the other
back states.’”370 Cass defended the reputation of Ohio Valley settlers, but also raised the
issue of removal in an effort to confront the issue of vice. “Revolting scenes” of Native
peoples falling victim to traders’ liquors, Cass argued, were limited to areas where
Indians and settlers lived in close proximity.371 “In the interior,” on the other hand, he
insisted that “[w]e have seen many Indians, remote from the white settlements, who had
never tasted of spirituous liquors, and we can testify, from personal knowledge, that the
evil itself is almost unknown there.”372 Such an argument suggests that Cass viewed
removal from the “white settlements” as a potential remedy to Indians’ supposed
miserable nature.
Cass was clear to say, however, that the issue of removal was contested. He
explained that “[w]e have brought it before our readers merely as an evidence of the
feelings of the American government, and of their earnest desire to discharge with
fidelity a great moral debt, which is neither concealed nor denied.”373 By recognizing and
attacking the republic’s missteps head-on, the United States could remedy past faults.
Cass pointed out that in British Canada no “plan has been digested or proposed for
removing the Indians from any part of the lands they now occupy, where they are
peculiarly exposed to temptations and danger.”374 By framing the “Indian problem” as an
ethical quandary with which the United States actively grappled, Cass offered evidence
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of American moral superiority, and he framed removal as evidence of Americans’
enlightened approach to empire.375
The civilization plan and missionaries’ labor also figured prominently in Cass’s
evaluations of U.S. morality. Once again invoking an imperial comparison and quoting a
British publication, he informed his readers that “we are told, that ‘in Canada, there is but
one regular protestant Indian mission!’”376 As a result of Britain’s failure to engage in
mission work Canada suffered “no want of physical wretchedness, or of moral
depravity.”377 That “moral depravity” was the result of British indifference and vice.
Ultimately, Cass was able to detect only minimal “interference of the British government
in any plan to improve the moral condition of the Indians.”378 American missionaries,
however, actively sought to spread knowledge of agriculture and the mechanic arts, and
they did so at the behest of the U.S. government. Their work became an important
element of American imperial rhetoric. Missionary societies’ work as non-governmental
organizations was thus crucial to U.S. claims to benevolence in the early republic.
Cass’s article ultimately sought to restore and bolster the humanitarian reputation
of the United States abroad, but it was also an attempt to rally his fellow citizens to his
side. He insisted that Americans could not “sit still, with folded arms, while the civilized
world are believing, and judging, and condemning, deceived, as they well may be, by
such bold assumptions” of the United States’ Indian policies.379 He contended that
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“[v]ainly shall we look back with pride, or forward with hope, or around us with
congratulation, if we do not cherish a sacred regard for national character.”380 Connecting
Indian policy to the nation’s character raised the stakes at home, even as it established
indigenous affairs as a pivotal battlefield upon which U.S. officials endeavored to build
and protect the republic’s global reputation. The American Empire, Cass suggested, was
an enlightened one; Indian policies were a means by which Americans’ could claim
moral and political authority.
Cass’s frequent allusions to the virtuous nature of American intentions in Indian
Country reveals the extent to which considerations of morality factored into claims to
global authority. If domestic politics and divisions ensured that the United States could
not compete in the race toward abolition, then a “merciful” Indian policy could, perhaps,
offer a means to claim enlightened standing in the world and political durability. Indeed,
in a last biting remark, Cass wrote that “[s]incerely do we hope that [Britain’s] day of
glory will not be shrouded in a night of gloom,” and that “what has happened to other
nations may happen to her; and the traveler may yet inquire for the site of London, as we
now inquire for those of Nineveh and Babylon.”381 Failed Indian policies in North
America and Australia, then, showcased Britain’s backwardness and proximity to demise.
The United States’ own policies offered proof of American exceptionalism: the young
republic was unique for its humanitarian treatment of indigenous peoples, and it would
thus endure.
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***
U.S. claims to humanitarian Indian policies rested, however, on contradictions
and widely-believed fictions. The civilization plan, for example, was a supposed effort to
offer Native peoples an education fit for potential “good citizens,” but it ultimately served
to categorize Indians as non-citizens while also limiting their access to the educational
opportunities afforded “middling” and “elite” Euroamericans. The mission complex,
meanwhile, ultimately linked indigenous peoples closer to the U.S. market economy at
the expense of their formerly more global connections, again in the name of “civilization”
and “progression.” As earlier chapters demonstrate, Quaker missionaries carried with
them ideas regarding poverty in the early republic, and Native peoples, in turn,
appropriated those ideas in order to secure wares, infrastructure, and labor. Indians’
demands for material goods or labor, however, ultimately bolstered Americans’
assumptions regarding Indians’ dependence upon the U.S. federal government. Indians’
demands also facilitated Americans’ claims to offering assistance. Ideas of poverty,
dependence, and charity, then, became foundations for yet another fiction embraced by
many regardless of politics: by assisting “deserving” “poor Indians,” the U.S. government
could cancel the “moral debt” to which Cass and McKenney referred while
simultaneously revealing itself as a philanthropic empire on the world stage. Native
peoples’ sovereign authority, power that forced the United States to welcome Quakers as
diplomats during the 1790s, now was subsumed beneath a fiction of impoverished
dependence—“domestic dependent nations” by 1831—cultivated by a growing state.
As ideas of humanitarianism and human rights gained purchase in the early
United States, Americans endeavored to frame, and perhaps to understand, Indian
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policies such as removal as benevolent and as a means by which the republic could
defend its character.382 The idea of a moral debt that the United States could somehow
repay to the continent’s indigenous peoples by working to alleviate their want became a
centerpiece of the young republic’s claims to benevolent power by the 1820s and 1830s.
In the 1820s Ohio Country, government assistance in the form of clothing or funds for
removal became commonplace, and just as Friends’ diplomacy during the 1790s rendered
missionaries partners in foreign affairs, so too did missionaries’ civilizing efforts
continued to offer a crucial and, importantly, visible foundation for U.S. philanthropy
both in North America and the world. Again, the Society of Friends and the ABCFM, by
performing as non-governmental organizations that nonetheless possessed close ties with
the American government, played central roles in the creation of the United States’
humanitarian reputation. In the 1820s, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas L.
McKenney encouraged the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions to
continue their work.
The Indians hold us in great arrears, and the Missionaries go to aid in
cancelling them—not by a re-investment of their titles to land—nor by a
counting down the cost of this vast territory, which once was theirs—no;
but they go to spread a moral beauty over the face of the desart; they go to
'reclaim another, and another portion from the wastes of dark and fallen
humanity;—to invite the wanderers into the fold of civilization—to teach
them the arts and the comforts of domestick life; and to point them to the
vast concerns of a future state.383
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McKenney’s hope was that missionaries would follow Native peoples as they traversed
the heart of the continent from the Ohio Country to Missouri and Kansas, and in doing so,
they would aid Native peoples as well as pave the way for virtuous settlement—safe from
the vices of “white savages” or corrupt traders—across the continent. Removal, then,
would be a good. It would “improve” both lands and peoples, and it would offer evidence
of the United States’ inherent virtue.
With McKenney at the helm of Indian affairs in the 1820s, ideas of removal thus
became concerned with not only the emptying of lands that, supposedly, could be better
employed by Euroamerican agrarians but with the expansion of morality—or, at least,
American ideas of morality—in North America. According to McKenney, it was not
merely North America's indigenous peoples who required civilizing. Writing in a vein
reminiscent of Quaker theology, he explained that in order for Native peoples to become
"a portion of 'our great American family of freemen,'" Americans needed to view Indians,
as human beings, having bodies and souls like ours—possessed of
sensibilities, and capacities, as keen and as large as ours—That their
misery be inspected and held up to the view of our citizens, that the
trophies of reform be pointed to—I say, it needs only this to enlist in their
favour the whole civilized population of our country; for could the extent
of their wretchedness be comtemplated with indifference by our citizens,
if it were known? And would not the charities of seven millions of men
warm into animation their sad and dismal torpor?384
Here, discourse of civilization combined with that of poverty in an effort to appeal to
Americans' own sense of and claims to civilization. Indians' "wretchedness" required
Americans' charity, and such philanthropy possessed the power, in turn, to translate into
moral capital that would further elevate the United States to a place of prominence.
384
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Of all Quakers employed in the service of the War Department, McKenney
attained the most prominent position, and his rhetoric and policies reflect his spiritual
beliefs. As Superintendent of Indian Trade he institutionalized the paradigm of labor
established by Quakers in the Ohio Country by aiding in the crafting of the Civilization
Act of 1819. His belief in the Inner Light, familiarity with Quaker reform efforts, and his
business savvy gleaned as a result of merchant work in Maryland all shaped his policymaking and manner of business. He ardently believed that Native peoples were the equals
of Euroamericans, and he maintained a generous and philanthropic attitude toward Native
peoples. Such an attitude led him to publish his multivolume History of the Indian Tribes
of North America (1836-1844), but it also precipitated his removal from office by
Andrew Jackson in 1830.385 Jackson disagreed with McKenney on the topic of Indians’
intellectual potential, and he deemed the superintendent too soft, in general, on Indian
affairs.
McKenney’s example, while exceptional in some ways, nonetheless reveals the
extent to which Friends’ early efforts established a paradigm for a program of benevolent
policies that was, nonetheless, connected with ideas of market capitalism. Just as Friends’
educational reform efforts ensured that “poor Indians” received an education that was
tailored for their assumed station, ideas of mercy, charity, and poverty further wed Native
peoples to the republic’s socio-economic hierarchy. What is more, Cass and McKenney’s
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rhetoric of “arrears” and cancelling a debt illuminates the market context in which early
U.S. Indian policies were conceived.
Indeed, ideas of success and virtue, born out of the development of the republic’s
capitalist economy, ultimately gave U.S. Indian policies the “benevolent” sheen that, in
turn, invested authority in the American Empire at home and abroad. Native peoples’
supposedly sad state offered the United States a chance to offer aid that, in turn,
demonstrated the republic’s generous character. Central to this intellectual somersault
was a tendency to frame Native peoples as “poor Indians”—not in the eighteenth-century
sense of savage or misguided, but as poverty-stricken populations. If ideas regarding
“civilization” and savagery encouraged Americans to consider Native peoples as “poor
Indians,” Shawnees and Miamis’ own claims of impoverishment entrenched that status in
the imaginations of many Americans. Though ideas of poverty and dependence relegated
Native peoples en masse to the lower ranks of a developing socio-economic hierarchy,
they also created space for Americans to distinguish between different kinds of
impoverishment. As Michael Katz’s work shows, ideas of the “deserving” and
“undeserving” poor abounded during the era of the early republic, precisely when
Americans worked to define ideas of race and class.386 Such ideas applied to Native
peoples as well. For some Americans and U.S. officials, those Miamis or Shawnees who
attempted to become civilized—but who in actuality appropriated some of the ideas of
the civilization plan in order to mold and combat U.S. imperial policies or to maintain
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their own lands—earned a place among the republic’s “deserving poor.” Ideas of class,
then, played a large role in how Americans perceived their Native neighbors.
Katz’s work on the “undeserving poor” demonstrates that the “redefinition of
poverty as a moral condition accompanied the transition to capitalism and democracy in
early-nineteenth-century America.”387 Ascribing morality to wealth and immorality to
poverty was a means by which Americans endeavored to make sense both of growing
inequality and others’ sometimes dire situations. Other scholars suggest that linking
poverty with laziness or vice was also a way to “discipline” laboring populations.388
Ultimately, it was a way of rationalizing the apparent inadequacies of the republican
ideal.389 Katz notes that a distinction arose between impoverishment and pauperism in the
early republic, with the latter term reserved for those able-bodied individuals who
nonetheless failed to succeed in the U.S. economy. Those individuals whom Americans
deemed the “impotent poor”—those who suffered from some condition that hindered
their ability to succeed—were vilified less, though this changed as the nineteenth century
wore on. Eventually, Americans subsumed “the poor,” as a more or less homogenous
group, within a broad discourse of immorality and failure.
Euroamericans’ rhetoric regarding Native peoples’ impoverishment and supposed
savagery or immorality similarly demonstrates the extent to which the emergence of a
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capitalist political economy influenced the development of U.S. Indian policy. As chapter
three makes clear, Quakers and U.S. officials alike employed a discourse of poverty when
considering reform among Indians and urban laborers. Those notions of poverty,
however, emerged out of developing ideas regarding race and class to render those
Indians who attempted to “civilize” initially among the ranks of the deserving poor, or in
Katz’s terms, the “impotent poor,” in the minds of many early Americans. Those Native
peoples who refused to become civilized, who failed to employ the lessons offered by
missionaries, were akin to able-bodied “paupers” who inexplicably failed to try to better
their station. Such categories offered Americans a means by which they could ascribe
logic to the harsh consequences of American empire on the continent.390
Native peoples were akin to those “impotent poor” who were hindered by some
factor, either physical or mental: they were, in the minds of American reformers,
handicapped by their race and their supposed savagery—as well as, sometimes, by age or
some infirmity—and they were deserving of the U.S. government’s “liberality.” At times,
U.S. government officials were happy to be generous, both in the Ohio Country and
elsewhere. In 1820 Missouri, for example, Delawares and Shawnees, former Ohio
Country inhabitants, appealed to the U.S. federal government for redress and "pity."
"Two White Men," Shawnees and Delawares claimed, "have Stolen Two Hundred
Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s and one Bridle at Two Dollars."
The owner of the stolen $200 was an elderly man, and the petitioners explained that the
money took "many years to collect." They explained that the owner "is now too old to
work" and that the United States should subsequently "have pity on him, and have that
390
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Sum returned to him." This appeal was followed by a proclamation of Shawnees and
Delawares’ civilized state. They argued that "we have made use of the plough since
several years. Father! We wish to hear from you as Soon as possible so that we may
know what to do."391 The plough "improved" lands, but it also bolstered indigenous
peoples’ claims to economic assistance and prompted U.S. officials to label them as
“deserving.”392
Indeed, after receiving Shawnees' and Delawares' requests, Indian agent Pierre
Menard informed Calhoun that they "deserve the indulgence and encouragement of
Government—They have acquired habits of industry and learned to value the soil—They
farm quite handsomely, and raise every kind of Stock common in the Country, and are in
general orderly and well disposed." These Shawnees and Delawares were not alone
among those deemed “deserving” Indians. In 1821, Indian agent John Shaw wrote to
Lewis Cass that Wyandots near Upper Sandusky were "intirely destitute of many usefull
Tools, and their dispositions to use them are equal at least to any other Indians that I am
acquainted with, they in my opinion deserve as much of the bounty of Government as any
other Tribe."393 Here, Shaw claimed that the Wyandots in question deserved “the bounty
391
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of Government” because they showcased a particular disposition to make use of “usefull
Tools.” Shaw continued to assure Cass that the Wyandots, who "may be considered
poor," demonstrated appropriate "signs of thankfulness when they receive favours."394
Wyandots’ manners—no doubt evidence of their propensity for civilization—too
convinced Shaw that those near Upper Sandusky were worthy of government aid.
Shaw also offered evidence of Wyandots’ destitution. He noted that "as a proof of
the poverty, as also of the Acconomy of these Wyandots they dress very much in leather,
and very seldom see them wear any costly clothing or ornaments of Silver as is
customary with some other Tribes."395 Shaw’s argument makes clear that Americans’
ideas regarding poor Indians were, by the early republic, grounded in observable notions
of destitution. For many Euroamericans and indigenous peoples alike, the materials and
adornments that one wore offered information regarding economic and political status.396
Still Shaw’s observation is particularly interesting given his Quaker background. For
Shaw, Wyandots’ leather clothing and lack of silver ornamentation connoted poverty,
rather than proof of their humility or simplicity. The Wyandots’ dress also, however,
demonstrated their “Acconomy” and, in turn, virtue: they refrained from wearing items
that they could not afford. Federal officials' perceptions of Natives' civilization offered
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opportunities for Native peoples to receive material aid, even as it further linked Native
peoples with evolving ideas of morality, poverty, and pauperism in the early republic.397
Shaw’s assurances of Wyandots’ worthiness contrasted their supposed poverty
with government abundance and generosity. It was a discourse that positioned the United
States as Indians’ merciful benefactor. In urban spaces, Americans were more
sympathetic to those—widows, children, and the “impotent poor”—who were
“deserving” of public assistance, and offering charity to those in need was, like
reformers’ educational efforts, a means to garner “moral capital.”398 A similar
phenomenon applied to the United States’ treatment of Native peoples deemed to be
among the “deserving poor.” Missionaries’ civilizing work, as Cass made clear, offered
the United States rhetorical tools for displaying its humanitarian character. It also,
however, offered means by which Indians could become “deserving” “dependents” even
though rhetoric suggested “civilization” was intended to render Native men independent
providers for their families. With Native Americans categorized as impoverished, U.S.
officials increasingly offered assistance and “merciful” aid to those deserving individuals.
In the imaginations of many U.S. officials and reformers, Indians’ vices were the result of
contact with unruly Euroamericans, and as a consequence, many—like Cass—in turn
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framed Indian removal in terms of—and sometimes as a form of—morality-based public
assistance.

***
In 1825, President James Monroe offered a message to Congress on the topic of
Indian removal. He ultimately suggested that, through removal, the United States could
secure peace with Native Americans and that also “our commerce [would] be much
extended.”399 He advocated establishing a government that would “protect their property
from invasion, and, by the regular progress of improvement and civilization, prevent that
degeneracy which has generally marked the transition from the one to the other state.”400
Through such a scheme, Monroe argued, the United States would “become in reality their
benefactors.”401 Here it was clear that Monroe, like other U.S. officials endeavored to
frame removal policies as philanthropic endeavors for reasons both foreign, as made clear
in Cass’s article, and domestic. As a result, ideas of philanthropy, mercy, and charity
infiltrated officials’ and reformers’ correspondences on the topic of removal.
As time wore on, U.S. officials’ rhetoric lost some—but certainly not all—of its
generosity. In 1829, Secretary of War John Eaton informed Cherokees residing in
Georgia that “[i]t must be obvious to you, and the President has instructed me again to
bring it to your candid and serious consideration, that to continue where you are, within
the territorial limits of an independent state, can promise you nothing but interruption and
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Eaton nonetheless softened by the end of his message to write that

removal would ensure that
Indians being thus brought together at a distance from their brothers, will
be relieved from very many of those interruptions which, situated as they
are at present, are without a remedy. The Government of the United States
will then be able to exercise over them a paternal, and superintending care
to happier advantage, to stay encroachments, and preserve them in peace
and amity with each other; while with the aid of schools a hope may be
indulged, that ere long industry and refinement, will take the place of
those wandering habits now so peculiar to the Indian character, the
tendency of which is to impede them in their march to civilization.403
Eaton’s statement that the afflictions facing Native peoples were “without a remedy”
obscured the fact that Americans were the root of the problem. Indeed, such ideas reveal
one of Indian policy’s fundamental contradictions. Namely, that the United States was a
supposedly “benevolent” and virtuous power because it endeavored to tackle the
problems posed by its vicious citizenry.
The contradictions inherent in Americans’ brand of humanitarianism, nonetheless,
offered the foundations for removal. Indeed, such ideas prompted Alexis de Tocqueville
to comment that it was “impossible to destroy men with more respect to the laws of
humanity.”404 Removal in southeastern North America was, on the surface of things,
more blatantly contentious and violent than in the Ohio Country. As such, most historians
focus their studies on removal schemes in that region, and in particular, on the
experiences of the Cherokees and the “Five Civilized Tribes.” Contemporary Americans
likewise focused their attentions on the plight of southeastern Indians. Georgia’s relations
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with the Cherokees, in particular, galvanized citizens’ attention. In 1827, the state of
Georgia declared that it possessed jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, and that Cherokees
were subject to Georgia law. The state pressured the federal government to remove
Cherokees from Georgia lands, and soon, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in
1830 that authorized the president to negotiate treaties that would remove Native peoples
east of the Mississippi. Soon thereafter, Georgia squatters and speculators intensified
their campaign to push Cherokees out.405
The Cherokee Nation, however, fought back. When one Cherokee killed another
on Cherokee lands, Georgia hanged the accused offender, Corn Tassel, denying the
Cherokee Nation the right to prosecute its own people and attempting to signify the end
of Cherokee sovereignty. The Cherokees brought the case before the Supreme Court in
1831, and, in one of the most infamous cases in the history of U.S.-Indian law, Chief
Justice John Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court possessed no jurisdiction because the
Cherokee Nation was a “domestic dependent nation.” The remainder of the 1830s were
marked by ongoing pressure to remove and, ultimately, the forced removal of thousands
during the “Trail of Tears” in 1838.406
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Even in the 1830s and 1840s, Ohio Country removals were, in some ways, quieter
affairs.407 As in the southeast, it was a negotiated phenomenon, with Native peoples
doing their best to secure advantage as well as they could, and in the Illinois Country, it
provoked violent episodes such as the 1832 Black Hawk War.408 Corrupt treaties and
bargains characterized the treaty-making process that ultimately rendered Ohio Indians
migrants, but even there individuals such as the Miami Jean Baptiste Richardville secured
some of his countrymen lands in Indiana. Nonetheless, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis,
Wyandots, and their neighbors repeatedly lost more land as the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s
wore on. Treaties with the Potawatomi and Miamis in 1826, for example, granted the
United States valuable lands near the mouth of the Mississinewa on the Wabash River in
Indiana. An 1828 treaty with Miamis, meanwhile, ensured that the republic gained lands
near Sugartree Creek in Indiana from the Thorntown band of Miamis. The republic
bought Delaware lands that lay adjacent to the Wyandot reservation on the Sandusky
River in northern Ohio in 1829, while other treaties gradually ate away at Ohio Indians’
territory in the 1830s and 1840s. Finally in 1846, the United States forced remaining
Miamis to leave Indiana for Kansas, though some Miamis nonetheless thwarted the
United States and remained along the Wabash.409 Baltimore Quakers lamented the
removals, but nonetheless hoped that their work would not be for naught. In 1825, when a
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portion of the Shawnees endeavored to leave Wapakoneta and travel westward, Baltimore
Friends lamented that "We...hope that our labours have not been unavailing, and that
even should [the Shawnees] finally be removed, they will carry with them the knowledge
they have acquired, and as this becomes diffused amongst their people, they may long
continue to reap advantage from the efforts that have been made for their benefit."410
Removal in the north, including the infamous Buffalo Creek treaty of 1838 as
well the various treaties pertaining to Ohio and Indiana lands, was embedded in
developing American market culture: Native peoples and Americans took into account
any “improvements” made on the lands, haggled for the best deal, and ultimately framed
the removals as economic transactions. Ohio Country removal was also, like all
American-sponsored removals in nineteenth-century North America, part of a national
effort to exclude. The Mississippi still presented a formidable boundary in the
imaginations of many early Americans, and pushing Indians west of that boundary was
akin to other efforts to eliminate “undesirable” peoples—the urban poor, free African
Americans, and Native Americans alike—from the new nation-state.
During the 1820s, many reform-minded Americans moved to institutionalize the
poor by placing them in public almshouses, and Indian removal operated similarly: both
offered a means to eliminate from the United States the specter of difference as well as
those whom many Americans deemed undesirable. In both cases, rather than
acknowledge the inadequacies of the republic’s political economy that was grounded in
ideas of difference and inequality, some Americans employed physical space in order to
exclude individuals from their view. Removing impoverished laborers by placing them in
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almshouses or shuffling poor Indians onto lands beyond the Mississippi meant that
poverty, difference, and supposed failure disappeared behind walls and rivers in the early
republic. Such removals left only a cultivated and successful—and thus virtuous—
citizenry in plain sight.
In an era when Americans increasingly saw their claims to North American
territories as boundless, geographic space was an obvious way to consolidate a nation
both by claiming the right to an entire continent—and the right to carve up that territory
as the republic saw fit—as well as by excluding certain people from the nation-state
geographically. The case of free African Americans in the early republic elucidates this
point. In 1806, Quaker John Parrish, the diplomat who factored so heavily into the United
States’ efforts in the 1790s, argued that the United States should establish a territory
beyond the Mississippi where free African Americans might settle. He wrote, “[h]ave not
the General Legislature a right to instruct a committee to assign a tract within some part
of the western wilderness (where there are millions of acres likely to continue many ages
unoccupied) for colonization of those already free and disposed to remove thither?”411 As
early as 1806, then, removal offered a possible solution for confronting the problem of
African American freedom. Parrish envisioned the “west” as a land unoccupied—a
surprising observation for a Quaker so involved in Indian affairs—that would offer
African Americans refuge from the scourge of racism and the specter of re-enslavement.
Efforts to remove free blacks gained popularity—among reformers but also
among slaveholders—after Gabriel’s Rebellion in 1800 and 1802, and as the numbers of
411
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freed people grew after the American Revolution.
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Gradual emancipation and wartime

service meant that more and more African Americans gained freedom to the
consternation, and sometimes fear, of white Americans. In 1816, Presbyterian minister
Robert Finley established the American Colonization Society (ACS) for the purpose of
removing free African Americans to Africa. Great Britain, with the aid of the Committee
for the Relief of the Black Poor, had already begun to send free Africans to Sierra Leone.
Christopher Brown indicates that the committee’s work was partially the consequence of
the British government’s increasing tendency “to think of black loyalists as wards of the
state,” and the removal of black loyalists to Sierra Leone was similarly couched in terms
of charitable aid.413 After an exploratory mission to the continent, the ACS, similarly
decided that Liberia, just north of Sierra Leone, presented an ideal location for emigrating
Africans. It supposedly offered a haven away from the poverty of the republic’s urban
spaces, it offered a means by which slaveholders could hide the example of free blacks
from the enslaved, it offered free blacks an opportunity to gain the kinds of political
freedoms longed for after the American Revolution, and it offered reformers a chance to
further claim benevolence.414
Some missionaries explicitly considered the problems presented by both Native
American and free African Americans populations to be similar. Both posed challenges
to ideas of citizenship. Both were free, but they were non-citizens. Both were not quite
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“American,” but they were not wholly “other” either. One missionary wrote to
Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney in 1818 in the hopes of convincing
him to consider forming an American Civilization Society. This society, the missionary
contended, would act "as a sister establishment to the Colonisation Society. The object of
which should be to patronise the exertions of such Societies of different denominations as
are actually engaged in civilising and educating the American Indians & otherwise to
promote this verry important work." Such a society would "form a connecting chain to
them, & harmonise their operations, & more effectually prevent any clashing between
them than perhaps any other method."415 It was a proposal that revealed that some
Americans considered the "Indian problem" to be akin to that posed by African
Americans, slavery, and the problem of freedom.
Indeed, historian Linda Kerber demonstrates that reformers such as Lydia Maria
Child, John Greenleaf Whittier, David Lee Child, and Nathaniel P. Rogers all denounced
the U.S. government’s Indian policies while juxtaposing the Indian problem and
slavery.416 These individuals, in newspapers and in novels, exposed the fictions of
American benevolence in Indian Country and, as they did with the problem of slavery,
denounced the United States for claiming to be a liberty-loving nation when, in fact, it
was one that consistently failed African Americans and American Indians by qualifying
or rejecting non-white peoples’ freedom or humanity.417 Most Quakers too, lamented the
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U.S. government’s plans for removing Cherokees, Choctaws, and Seminoles, and others
in southeastern North America. By the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs, the party of choice
for many abolitionists, staunchly opposed Cass’s and Jackson’s removal plans as did
many members of the Society of Friends. Ohio Friend Elisha Bates, for example,
lamented in 1836 that he had “thought it possible that some plan might be adopted by
which sections of territory (intermixed) might be obtained by Europeans, without at all
unsettling the natives from those spots on which they might be disposed to locate
themselves.”418
Whether or not they shared Bates’s disappointment and disillusionment, some
Whigs, as well as others who professed a sense of concern for the well-being of Native
peoples, supported removal and participated in American settler colonialism. As Bethel
Saler demonstrates, the term “settler” is flexible, and in the early republic, state agents—
even those who sought to extend “mercy” to Native peoples—were settler colonists as
much as Euroamerican immigrant families.419 In the Ohio Country, Indian agent John
Johnston, for example, an eventual Whig who was removed from his post by Jackson in
1829, admitted that removal was, perhaps, Indians’ best hope for endurance. When
organizing some Ohio Indians’ departures, however, he endeavored to ensure that they
were provided for as well as possible, and he invoked ideas of mercy and charity, a
narrative that obscured the violence of removal, when discussing plans for Native
peoples’ removal from Ohio with his superiors.420 Various “depredations committed on
[Natives’] property by our Citizens,” he contended in 1827, “are rapidly increasing…and
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after a considerable part of my life spent in managing this description of persons I am
free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate remedy but removal to a
Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be established over them.
Whatever speculative benevolence may urge to the contrary, their race must perish under
the present management.”421 Johnston’s argument was, like Cass’s, based upon the
assumption that Americans could not—and should not—engage in “self denial.” For
Johnston, federal regulation offered the moral option. Here, then, Johnston contrasted
“speculative benevolence” with that of removal, a policy that, to his mind, offered the
truest form of aid to Native peoples, that of survival. As with Cass’s 1827 article, federal
power offered the most philanthropic course of action.
Johnston’s plan for removal was not that of Cass or Jackson, but his language
reveals in stark terms his participation in American settler colonialism. In 1828 he wrote
to McKenney to describe a piecemeal process by which, eventually, Native peoples
would remove to the west. He argued that “the best and cheapest way to get rid of them
would be to afford aid to individuals families and small parties. in this way a few years
would relieve us from all within my agency, it would be much the cheapest plan by far
the most agreeable to the Indians. the Agent might be authorised to purchase of each
family when ready to go their right to the soil and compensate them for their
improvements, and this would nearly cover all expence of emigration.”422 Johnston still
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advocated for removal—he wanted to “get rid of” the Indians—but insisted that both his
(relative) good intentions and the economy mattered.
Though land sales and migration had long been part of U.S. government policy in
the region, the push for removal in the Ohio Country began in earnest in the 1820s. Still,
removal was colored by ideas of both U.S. political economy and settler colonialism:
notions of poverty, charity, investment, territorial acquisition, and bargaining were at the
heart of removal schemes. In 1820, Johnston remarked that Delawares near Piqua
requested half of their annuity, $2,750, before attempting to remove. Johnston
encouraged Cass to agree to the deal since "otherwise it will be impossible to get them
off on account of their poverty." He continued to state that "some provision should be
made for furnishing them with subsistence and amunition [sic] to prosecute their
journey." Ultimately, he lamented that "it is a troublesome and expensive affair to get rid
of about 1800 sou[ls] many of them the most miserable and wretched o[f] their race. The
Government as an act of Mer[cy] and justice too should present them with $3000 worth
of goods, to clothe and send them awa[y] confortable [sic]...their claims for
depred[a]tions could be commuted in this way."423 Johnston combined both harsh
language—“get them off” and “get rid of”—with ideas of paternalistic benevolence in a
way that he believed would appeal to federal officials and in a manner reflective of the
growing tendency to couple poverty with assistance.
Johnston made a similar appeal in that same year that again wove rhetoric of
poverty, mercy, and removal together, but that also reveals the extent to which British
423
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agents in the region continued to offer Native peoples a means by which to counter the
political authority of the United States after the War of 1812. Johnston noted that
"[a]lmost all the Indians of this [Piqua] Agency has been at Malden the present seaso[n]
to receive goods from the English, Necessity has been the chief motive, as it is found
their annuities is totally inadequate to cloth their population." Here it is apparent that the
British too—though, of course, Cass could never admit it—were willing to offer the
region's indigenous inhabitants material goods to ameliorate their condition. Again, it
appears that Native peoples’ ability to play one imperial power off of another did not
vanish with the conclusion of the War of 1812. Indeed, Johnston sensed the political
threat that British assistance posed his federal government, and he explained to the War
Department that, "the character and dignity of this Government will be somewhat
affected by these visits these Indians have parted with their Coun[try] and are now
oblidged to solicit charity from a foreign nation, whose Agents will not fail to improve
the occurrence in a way the most disadvantageous to us." Foreign policy thus intersected
with ideas of benevolence, charity, and Indian removal in the Ohio Country, and
Johnston, savvy politician and practical Indian agent that he was, knew it. Earlier in the
nineteenth century, Britain posed a military and diplomatic threat to the United States’
claim to the Ohio Country. By the 1820s and 1830s, the British state continued to act as
both a diplomatic rival and as a sparring partner in a contest over moral authority on the
continent and in the world. Johnston ultimately asked Cass, "[a]s the residence of the
Tribes here cannot continue over a few years, would it not be an act of Mercy and of
sound policy too, for the Government to send on Annually Three thousand Dollars worth

424

of cloathing for them?"

252
Johnston, though he was a Whig by the 1830s, did not openly

combat removal—indeed, he saw benefits to Ohio Indians’ departures. Nonetheless, the
discourse of mercy and morality proved useful to him when making his appeal to Cass.
Though Johnston offered his pleas for government mercy in 1820, other middling
officials continued to appeal to humanity in order to secure federal assistance in removal.
In 1828, for example, William Clark lamented that “[a]s the wild game deminishes, the
pressing calls of those unfortunate people upon the humanity of the Government for
assistance increases.”425 Here, however, Clark exposed the continuing disconnect
between ideas and reality from which so many Euroamericans suffered. The “unfortunate
people” to which Clark referred in this case were Delawares migrating from Ohio,
Delawares who had undoubtedly sufficient knowledge of agriculture and who were by no
means completely dependent on “the wild game.” Nonetheless, even this intellectual
blindness offered a means to construe the U.S. government as humane.
Indiana memorialists felt similarly in 1830. A group of citizens who were
primarily concerned with the ongoing construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal—a
project that ran through Miami Country near the old site of Dennis’s Station—petitioned
the federal government that year in an effort to eliminate Miami Indians. They framed
their call for Miami removal, however, in philanthropic terms. The memorialists opened
their letter stating that “the interest of the United States and of the State of Indiana,
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require, at this time, a course of appropriate measures to be pursued, calculated to
extinguish the claim of the Indians, (more particularly the Miamies) to their reserved
territory, lying upon the borders of the contemplated Wabash Canal, and within the
boundaries of this State.” The writers were careful to say that they would “not fatigue
your honorable body with detailing the evils which will necessarily follow the longer
continuance of the Indians in the possession of their reserved territory.” Instead they
simply explained that “humanity dictates their immediate removal from a place where
they are exposed to many evils.”426 Though these memorialists were some of the very
people who possessed the power to ensure Miamis’ protection from “evils,” they
nonetheless chose to ignore that point by obscuring it with language of philanthropy in an
effort to conceal—from others but also likely from themselves—less-than-humanitarian
motives. Here it is clear that settler colonialism was a powerful force that was,
nonetheless, made stronger with government assistance.
Indeed, rhetoric of philanthropy bolstered Americans’ various political claims,
and it also, as with the mission complex, endeavored to conceal the violence of American
imperialism. Rhetoric of mercy and charity obscured the fact that Native peoples’
territorial exclusion had political as well as economic benefits for the republic. Early
Americans framed removal, in part, as an economic transaction—and it was. The mission
complex was an investment in the United States’ future in a myriad of ways, and it
presented easily-observable rewards when policies increasingly turned toward removal in
the Ohio Country. In performing an analysis of Indian removal, federal officials and their
correspondents made it clear that improved land was more valuable. In 1820, John Scott
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wrote to Calhoun regarding the sale of the Shawnees and Delawares' lands. "[T]he
Bargain to the U States," he determined, was "a good one." The Indians' land had
"Houses, Towns, and farms thereon," "Their Animals are domesticated to the place," and
they had "all their property there." The proposed land west of the Mississippi, on the
other hand, was "not of equal quality by a great difference" and would not be as valuable
as the lands they were leaving for a long time, though Scott made no mention of how
unfair such a transaction was for the Shawnees and Delawares or that such a move would
erase all of the “gains” made by the civilization plan. Indeed, regarding the U.S.
government's initial investment of $20,000 for the removal scheme Scott speculated that
"[t]he Very first sales will more than remunerate this disbursement—and the Land [the
Indians] will receive would not do it in many years." Improved land translated into
profits. Missionaries' civilization efforts, the mission complex, and Native peoples'
participation in the U.S. imperial market economy, ultimately incentivized, from the
perspective of the United States, Indian removal.427
Even when confronting the possibility of relocation, however, Native peoples held
negotiating power. When Benjamin Parke wrote to John C. Calhoun in 1820 regarding
Weas' civilization and imminent departure from Indiana, he insisted that while the
"prospect of civilizing the Weas" was "remote," even though their requests make it clear
that they had learned enough of Euroamericans’ economic trends to negotiate a higher
price for their lands. They contended that "the land abounded in Salt, Iron, Copper &
Silver," and they insisted on $15,000 plus $4,000 annually for twelve years for their
427
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lands. Parke "reluctantly allowed them five thousand dollars"—a price far below the
asking price but nonetheless more than the War Department hoped to pay at a time of
economic depression in the United States.428
Bargaining similarly took center stage in a talk delivered by Shawnees and
Delawares that same year. They informed President Monroe that they would "exchange
our Land which our Spanish father, has given us, for Fifty Square Miles, on the other side
of White River, and Twenty Thousand Dollars....More than one half of this sum you will
pay to those we owe, the half of the Balance will help us to improve our New Land, and
the other half to procure Farming Utensils."429 Here, Shawnees and Delawares did not
just "accommodate" American land greed but used it, as best they could to their
advantage: they demanded certain lands for a certain price distributed in a particular way.
What was more, they demanded that part of the cash balance owed them be issued in
"Farming Utensils" and that the other half would help them "improve our New Land."
This was a win-win: the utensils ensured that U.S. manufacturers maintained a consumer
base by expanding the mission complex further into Missouri, but it also ensured that
additional lands would become "improved." Improved land was a thing desired by
Indians and Americans alike.
Ideas of economy continued to have a prominent place in Americans’ appeals to
Ohio Indians in 1830s Ohio and Indiana, even after the Indian Removal Act became law
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in 1830. In 1833, for example, U.S. officials spoke in glowing terms of the financial
opportunities that awaited Miamis west of the Mississippi should they choose to remove.
They contended that there Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks “have all got comfortable
cabins to live in, good plantations and fences, cattle and horses, and every every [sic]
thing comfortable about them, and last year, the Creeks raised forty thousand bushels of
corn more than they wanted for their own consumption.– Instead of Indians looking to
white men for bread as they used to do, now, white men look to Indians.”430 Such rhetoric
no doubt appealed to some extent, but it was also likely looked upon with skepticism by
Miamis, such as Richardville, who knew that their lands in Indiana were much more
valuable than lands westward. Nonetheless, it is clear that U.S. officials understood that
ideas of market, profit, and power held sway among Miamis, and the 1833 appeal reveals
in stark terms the extent to which ideas of market economy ultimately informed U.S.Indian relations. Indeed, officials went on to remark in that same appeal that “[o]ne of the
chiefs [west of the Mississippi] had a contract to supply Fort Gibson with what corn they
want.”431
Ideas of exclusion also ran through the 1833 appeal as officials insisted that
Miamis would enjoy a section of land to themselves, set off from any “white people.”
Such a promise would seem to undercut the officials’ insistence that Euroamericans
depended upon Native peoples for wares and subsistence, but they paid such logical
inconsistencies no attention. They did offer, however, that “the time may come, when
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your condition shall be so improved that you may be admitted as a state in the American
Union.”432 Thus, in the west, Miamis could enjoy economic power and independence,
and, perhaps, someday citizenship. But those things were in the future, and they were
contingent upon removal. The 1833 appeal thus offers a glimpse of the ways in which
Americans employed ideas of independence and market economy in order to cultivate—
by ways of exclusion and territorial acquisition—a homogenized nation grounded in
ideas of citizens’ equality.433

***
After the American Revolution, the new United States struggled to pinpoint in
precise terms the kind of polity it would be. Rhetoric played a central role in that defining
process. The discourse of morality offered a means to compare the young republic with
the empires of old, and it offered a powerful narrative by which early Americans could
understand their place in the world while simultaneously grapple with their status as a
postcolonial empire.
Ideas of race and class combined to create U.S. Indian policy in the nineteenth
century, and missionaries and indigenous peoples alike played central roles in crafting
both the character of those policies and the narrative that Americans spun when trying to
contemplate and reconcile the immense violence that characterized their republican
experiment. Non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends offered a means
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to provide “merciful” American charity for those “deserving” of it, and they ultimately
enabled U.S. officials to make claims regarding the benevolence of the American empire
on a global stage. Native peoples, meanwhile, alternatively fought, outwitted, and
endured—sometimes all three—and they forced the young republic to make sense of an
inherent contradiction—that of how to be an empire of liberty that denied the liberty,
rights, and humanity to many of North America’s peoples.
Americans ultimately confronted that contradiction with additional contradictions.
And they were powerful. The idea of a benevolent empire, one that could best Britain on
the international stage, held purchase in the imaginations of many Americans. Whigs who
disdained Jacksonian removal along with Democrats who saw in it the future of the
nation, each saw power in the rhetoric of humanitarianism and philanthropy. As Linda
Kerber points out, however, both got it wrong. Even those reformers who fought removal
at the ballot box and in the press found a solution in the maintenance of paternalistic
“benevolence” into the twentieth century.434 In the formative period of the republic’s
generation, the rhetoric of civilization, built on the foundations of missionaries’ labors,
became a tool by which Americans crafted fictions that ultimately became inseparable
from their national narrative and sense of selves as citizens of the world. Missionaries,
Native peoples, settlers, and officials together, then, created the American empire, and
each played a role in defining the story of its birth—and of its supposed nonexistence.
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Conclusion
Negotiating American Empire
While missionaries endeavored to teach Native peoples in the way of "civilized"
agriculture, they ultimately succeeded in teaching them the ways of American empire
such that they facilitated Indians' adaptation to, appropriation and manipulation of U.S.
imperial practices. Sometimes, this meant that Shawnee women obtained goods without
paying off their debts. Other times, it meant that a Mohican could gain employment with
the War Department in order to make connections with federal officials and Native
leaders that could secure new lands for his people. Sometimes these strategies worked,
and other times they did not. Nonetheless, they had consequences.
Indigenous peoples of eastern North America, as elsewhere, persisted in the face
of incredible obstacles, and they made their persistence known. Their efforts—what
Gerald Vizenor terms “survivance”—had ramifications that reverberate across time and
space, and they point to a pattern of indigenous peoples working within and against
ideological and political paradigms created as a result of U.S.-Indian negotiation.435 The
experiences and strategies of one group of Shawnees who voluntarily left their Ohio
lands behind during the late eighteenth century serves as a case in point. In 1824, these
Shawnees, then in Missouri, combated the growing American empire with a nationbuilding project of their own. They employed the discourse of civilization in a political
move that reveals not only their knowledge of North American geopolitics but also their
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willingness to manipulate imperial ideas to their advantage. In 1824, they petitioned the
Mexican government, in the very year of that republic's birth, in an effort to escape the
clutches of the United States and join the state of Coahuila and Texas. The Shawnees
indicated a desire "to place themselves under the protection of the Mexican government"
and asked for a tract of land "on the west bank of the Colorado River from the Pedernales
upward on this river with its western branches which go out from it, with the proportion
of an English square mile for each family."436 They asked for this land not only for
themselves but also "for all their allies and friends who may follow them, giving them
one English mile square for each family."437 They ultimately indicated that it was "[o]n
these conditions they have the hope that many thousands will unite with them in taking
this asylum under the Mexican Government."438 These Shawnees were willing to adopt
the ways of U.S. settler colonialism—moving with families to new lands—in order to
remain together and ensure their future.
The Shawnees' petition reveals both that Shawnee leadership kept themselves
well-informed concerning North American politics, but also that they were keenly aware
of the needs of the newly republican Mexican government in particular. According to one
official, the Shawnees in question apparently promised Mexican officials "of being
industrious, pacific, and in another state of culture than those that have hostilized [sic]
us."439 Here, then, it is apparent that the Shawnee leaders who made the original petition
capitalized on the discourse of civilization. These were "industrious" Shawnees who
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could also protect the Mexican state from the raids that pestered its northern border.
Indeed, these Shawnees coupled their civilized state with the fact that they could offer
"270 men capable of bearing arms."440 The discourse of civilization here was thus
flexible: Shawnees could use it to either make claims upon the U.S. state or to appeal to
other states; what was more, the Shawnees could claim to be farmers who also knew how
to wage war. Civilization, these Shawnees found, offered numerous ways to mold
themselves into what it was that their audience required. Indeed, they were so successful
at doing just this that the official who forwarded the Shawnees' petition onward to
Mexican officials wrote that, "[i]n conclusion...this province needs this kind of settlers
for its advancement."441
The Mexican Republic offered Shawnees a means by which to become "settlers"
themselves. By joining the Republic of Mexico, they hoped to carve an independent life
for themselves and for their nation or for a pan-Indian confederacy of Indian nations–for
"all their allies and friends who may follow them." Indeed, it was a political move for
independence that nearly parallels Texans' movement to be part of Mexico. What is more,
the attempt to secure "one English mile square for each family" indicates an adoption of
the ways of U.S. settler colonialism. These Shawnees desired land per family, and the
household became the unit by which they proposed to move and settle Mexican lands.
While we should not ignore the trauma of being pushed off of ancestral lands, these
Shawnees demonstrate that there was ample power at play even in removal.
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The Shawnees' petition did not ultimately secure them "one English mile per
family," but they were nonetheless allowed to remain "on the right bank of the Red River
of Natchitoches."442 The Mexican government granted "them as well as to their friends,
those already settled, that they continue there cultivating and working the lands which
they already have opened, or may have commenced to cultivate, reserving as to their
estate and permanence whatever it may please the Supreme General Executive Power to
resolve as a point specially of his knowledge and approbation."443 Thus, these Shawnees
could remain in the state of Coahuila and Texas and others could join them there even
though additional lands would not be available. Though this was a mixed result for the
Shawnees, the petition nonetheless reveals the tenuous nature of North American
geopolitics even after the War of 1812. The power of the discourse of civilization
extended far beyond attempted "assimilation" or even Indians' ability to carve out a place
within the Ohio Country; it offered some emigrants an opportunity to continue to play
one power off of another even after the War of 1812 decreased their ability to work with
the British in North America. Shawnees' adoption of ideas of U.S. empire ultimately
provided opportunities to carve out new lives either in the Ohio Country or as far
removed as the Mexican Republic, and such episodes illuminate the contingencies of
North American political and economic development.444
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The power of civilization and of missionaries and NGOs’ partnerships with the
U.S. federal state opened space for Native peoples to develop innovative methods to
combat the American empire, but it also proved remarkably effective in facilitating the
growth of that empire. The civilization plan’s many effects—economic development,
state growth, U.S. claims to humanitarianism—were powerful enough that variations of
the plan continued to shape U.S. foreign policy into the twentieth and, indeed, twentyfirst century. The mission complex soon included Asia, Africa, and South America.
Wherever missionaries traveled, they brought with them particular ideas of consumerism,
labor, and morality that facilitated the spread of American socioeconomic and, often,
political ideals. In many ways, Indian Country was the formative ground upon which
those paradigms of American imperialism emerged. As the nineteenth century
progressed, the world became the United States’ newest “Indian Country.”445
The Shawnees’ efforts also, however, point to the holes in Americans’ imperial
project. Americans continued to adapt their Indian policies to Native peoples’ politics of
persistence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Policies shifted between—
and sometimes combined—civilization, removal, allotment, boarding schools,
termination, and, thanks to indigenous peoples’ work during the height of “Red Power”
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and the American Indian Movement, a slow recognition of indigenous rights and
sovereignty by the later twentieth century. The Society of Friends, too, remained central
to such policies, and they ultimately became pivotal to President Ulysses S. Grant’s
“peace policy” after the U.S. Civil War, acting as superintendents of Indian affairs during
that period. Such shifts were due in no small part to indigenous peoples’ refusal to
disappear.
That American policy-makers altered their tactics so often suggests their
frustration in combating the United States’ “Indian problem.” Indeed, the very fact that
indigenous peoples continue today to live in Indiana and Ohio exposes the chinks in the
American imperial armor. Yet, to return to Tocqueville, because Americans built their
empire “quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, without violating a single
one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world,” they ensured that Native
peoples would find ways to maneuver within the legal and philanthropic paradigms of
that empire and, in turn, to continuously redefine those paradigms.446 Present-day
struggles in courts and before Congress on the issues of gambling, fishing and water
rights, and domestic violence on Indian reservations reveal that American imperialism
did not, in fact, lead to the ends that Tocqueville thought it did. He claimed that
Americans, “with marvelous ease,” found a way to “exterminate the Indian race” and
“prevent the Indians from sharing their rights,” but they did not, despite their best efforts,
do so.447 Rather, Americans’ strategies—including mission work and “philanthropic”
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violence—left room for American Indians to continue to negotiate the terms of American
imperialism into the twenty-first century.
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